Aboriginal forestry in New Brunswick: conflicting paradigms (1).

agreement is in effect. The next clause says you can't even

hold the band councillors responsible. So who in heirs

responsible? Who are these people answerable to? (Two

Rivers female elder, interview transcripts, 1999).

This same elder noted that through the Indian Act the federal government set up a welfare system for unemployed Aboriginal people, but this was not welfare money. Many Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people consider it to be treaty money. The friendship treaties were never abolished and there was never a treaty surrendering sovereignty. However, the elder quoted above contends that every time the chiefs and councils sign agreements with the government they are agreeing that the government has the power to legislate over them.

The provincial government and DNR are also seen by the chief and council as major factors in the conflict. It is believed by many Aboriginal people that the province does not want them to succeed and achieve self-determination or self-government because the province would lose control of the money generated by the forestry industry. This situation means that the political will is not there to devise policies that will allow Aboriginal people to have control over their economic destiny. The role of the DNR under the agreement was to ensure that Aboriginal people obtained forestry training, but no training occurred. Instead highly specialized people and equipment were brought in from Quebec and skills were kept in the hands of non-natives.

A major concern that presented itself was that the chief (and other members of the council) had no practical experience in forestry. However, despite this lack of practical skill, according to the Indian Act, the duly elected chief is the only person with whom the government will deal. The long-time loggers and members of the community said that they should have had experienced people making decisions about the forests and the allotment. Although knowledgeable people existed and indeed some were on the council at Two Rivers, they were very hesitant to go against the chief and the more powerful council members. On reserves, everything is done by political appointment and the decision makers are usually elected from the largest extended family group. Traditionally, clan-based leaders were also chosen to make decisions, but only in areas where they excelled. For example, the best hunter within the family group was often chosen to make decisions relating to hunting and trapping. Different leaders were chosen when other skills were required. However, on many contemporary reserves, leaders are not elected according to merit, but according to their perceived ability to help the extended family and to deal with dominant governmental structures. Therefore, it is possible for people with university degrees in forestry or management to be supervised by those with no experience in either, and there is little accountability to the people or the federal and provincial governments for these decisions.

The loggers understood the chief and council to say in an open meeting that the loggers could decide how the royalties from the forestry were to be used. The loggers decided that it should go toward the creation of new facilities and programs for elders, youth and the disabled. However, no money went to those facilities and programs. Instead, the chief reallocated the royalties to cover the band's financial obligations. Forestry royalties went toward past debts incurred for a daycare centre, winter supplements for heat and electricity, and financial support for university students. This allocation caused confusion and anger because loggers believed that the royalties would go into new programs.

Within the forestry agreement, there were problems with conflicts of interest and a general lack of accountability measures for band council leaders. The forestry agreement did not include attention to the institutional support needed to prevent abuse to the forests or an equitable distribution of the economic benefits. Incidences, such as the chief appointing a close relative as the interim coordinator (mentioned earlier), the lack of training for new loggers and the unregulated hiring of non-Aboriginal Quebec crews demonstrated a lack of organization and support. This situation led to wide spread perceptions that the elected officials and employees of the band were taking the largest share of what was intended for their people.

Misunderstandings arose over the status of the Two Rivers loggers and their salaries. According to the band council, all Aboriginal loggers were independent. Information concerning an individual's financial earnings was private. However, some band members understood that the agreement was a communal arrangement, therefore the information should have been public and the community as a whole should have benefited.

Although many reserve members believed that all Crown lands belonged to them, the Two Rivers' land and forests councillor argued that some reserve members misunderstood the traditional Aboriginal concept of inherent right. The councillor understood that Aboriginal people had an inherent right to the land, but this right came with a responsibility to ensure that it was sustained for future generations. Aboriginal lands were to be held collectively and could not become the property of individuals with the right to cut as they saw fit. Rather, land use decisions were to be made collectively through community-based consensus processes. However, some members of the reserve interpreted their communal traditions through the lens of representative democracy, arguing that it was the elected band officials who had the responsibility to properly care for the woods and if they failed in their custodial duties people had the right not to re-elect them. Still other reserve members argued that consensus should be reached through the clan system that forms the foundation of their traditional government, while others adopted an individualist position advocating for the rights of individual reserve members to decide what should be done in their forest.

Conclusions and recommendations

New Brunswick Aboriginal forestry involves many complex issues. Although the Turnbull decision catapulted the situation into public consciousness, many of the factors that precipitated the crisis have been in existence since the creation of the Indian Act--questions concerning the legitimacy of the Canadian government to legislate over Aboriginal people, tensions between traditional and elected leaders, partial and reinterpreted views of traditional practices, racial tensions between Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal groups, and ultimately the control and management of natural resources.

The clash that resulted within New Brunswick forests is not simply a collision between two realities (Euro-Canadian and traditional Aboriginal) but of two hybrid realities--the reconstructed traditional Aboriginal and the federal Indian. Traditional people want to adhere to the values and teaching of the elders and are concerned with holistic thinking, consensual decision-making, relatively egalitarian relationships and an emphasis on traditional knowledge in the service of the conservation and preservation of natural resources. On the other hand, the Indian has to learn how to cope with a system characterized by centralized hierarchical relationships, specialization, and economic efficiency. Chiefs and councils are often caught between the federal government and their own people, and are routinely forced to choose between Euro-Canadian and traditional Aboriginal values and practices. These socially constructed worlds and relations are not static but are constantly subjected to new experiences that reshape conceptions of the past and present and allow for moderate adaptations.

Although the experience of Two Rivers was tragic, it also holds promise for future understanding and cooperation. As Aboriginal people gain increasing access and control over their resources, two main choices are becoming available. First, many Aboriginal communities are entering into co-management agreements with industry or with the provincial government. In most of these co-management agreements, Aboriginal participation in the decision making process and the application of traditional ecological knowledge is minimal. Second, community-based forest management is developing where community interests and values are reflected in management goals. Economically driven policies are replaced by ecologically based programs that place a premium on the integrity and biodiversity of ecological systems. Under community-based systems value-added and non-timber forest products become the focus of long-term sustainable development strategies (Ginnish 1997). While the community-based approach would more adequately reflect traditional Aboriginal perspectives and practices the government still controls the agenda and demands fast and efficient solutions so that it can satisfy the demands of the industrial forestry sector.