Received knowledge: Knowledge is that which external authorities
and experts give. The authorities and experts "know" and
(selectively) share information with non-experts. Knowledge is concrete,
and therefore easily documented and reproducible. It is dualistic--right
or wrong, good or bad, true or false--and therefore, indisputable (there
is only one 'right' answer). Learning is by listening and
thereby requires both recipients of and generators of knowledge.
Learners see themselves as capable of receiving, even reproducing,
knowledge from the external authorities, but don't recognize they
are capable of creating knowledge.
Subjective knowledge: In this perspective, truth and knowledge are
conceived of as personally experienced and subjectively known or
intuited. The dualistic nature of knowledge may be maintained, but the
locus of authority, and hence "expertise," shifts from
external only to internal as well, and therefore signals a move from
passive reception to basic action and the development of voice. The
knower is not reliant on powerful authorities for truth and
knowledge--knowledge is grounded in first hand experience (Belenky et
al. 1997, 60). In a society that emphasizes rationality and science,
there are costs with a subjectivist epistemology--this form of knowing
is derided as myth and "old wives tales," or at best,
"mere common sense."
The idea of subjective knowing can be considered at the cultural
level as well. In the literature, subjectivist knowledge is often
discussed as part of local knowledge systems, the study of which have
been associated primarily with non-Western, indigenous cultures where
subjective knowing, intuitive processes, and experiential knowledge
generation are held in greater esteem, indeed are knowing (Patel 1996).
Where local cultures have been subordinated by dominant (usually
Western, Euro-centric), colonial culture, which emphasizes rationalism
and scientific thought, so too has the local accumulated knowledge, in
historical but also present times (Berlin 1992; Irwin 1995).
Procedural (reasoned) knowledge: Reason and critical thought are
not exclusive to scientific knowledge generation; in procedural
knowledge, the inner authority is active and critical. In this form of
knowledge, a distinction is drawn between opinions, intuitions, feelings
and reasoned knowledge. Authorities, while knowledgeable, are not the
dominant source of knowledge; careful observation and analysis, and the
application of reasoning, on the part of the knower also results in
knowledge. There is recognition of the possibility of different
perspectives--of different and equally correct ways of looking at
problems.
Constructed (relational) knowledge: This perspective views
knowledge as entirely contextual, and learners are knowers, constructing
knowledge, both subjectively and objectively (procedurally), with both
equally valued. As Belenky et al (1997: 134) note, this transformation
involves "the weaving together of strands of rational and emotive
thought, and of integrating objective and subjective knowing." The
knower is an intimate part of the known, and more importantly,
recognizes that he or she is "situated." Either--or thinking
is not present; answers depend on the context in which questions are
asked, and actions depend upon the context in which they are needed.
I came to further understand knowledge and knowledge generation
during a recent research project in which I studied a community's
sense of place in light of a recent environmental contamination (Dakin
2002). Part of the study involved a set of in-depth, semi-structured
interviews ranging from two to four hours in duration, with 24 citizens
of Walkerton, Ontario, carried out mainly in 2001. The following
instances are based on my own reflections on both the process and
content of these interviews, which explored participants' feelings
about, attitudes toward and attachments to their community, following
the contamination of their water supply in May 2000. These interviews
often evolved, unintentionally, into discussions, into narrative
"story-telling," and began to take on a purpose beyond data
collection for an academic study of sense of place and place attachment.
The people of Walkerton were, for the most part, very willing to
engage in these discussions, excited by the opportunity to share their
views, and even appeared grateful for the chance to do so. This struck
me immediately as significant and compelling, primarily because it was
very much at odds with warnings from others (mostly other academic
researchers) about "the ethics" of asking questions of
traumatized people--after all, they had been "hounded" by the
media for a long time during the crisis. But, the interview process, in
my view, was successful on several accounts, and upon reflection, this
should not have been surprising.
It was not that the participants provided any new information about
the enteric bacteriological processes at work in their own
gastrointestinal systems during that fateful May 2000--in fact, they
were still searching for more "information" themselves. It was
not that they had any more detailed or particularly insightful
perspectives on the local and provincial politics that contributed to
what had happened to them--indeed they were still grappling with the
complex, taken-for-granted acceptance of and apparently misguided belief
in the governance of their community and province. The research process
I was engaging them in was different from the question-answer episodes
they had earlier experienced. As one participant noted: "Until now,
no one asked us to tell our stories, to say how we feel or have changed,
only asked us who to blame ..."
What was so compelling for me as a researcher and what they did
seem to do in the interview process, was to reveal their very personal
stories, feelings and emotions, their fears and lingering questions
surrounding the contamination of their water supply--their
"environmental life-blood" according to one person--with that
deadly strain of e-coli. In so doing, they seemed to be working through
the events and their memories of them, trying to make sense of and
understand what had happened; indeed, they were participating in
constructing knowledge about this major event in their lives, based on
their own and shared experiences, and on information from others. As
such, the process was generative. Participants were trying to integrate
rationally-derived knowledge, received knowledge, and their own
subjective knowledge; seemingly engaging in Belenky et al's fifth
'type' of knowledge--relational knowledge (Belenky et al,
1997). More than just the means to an end, more than a method for me to
collect data, this generative process was transformative for the
participants--admittedly "refreshing" to some, and almost
"therapeutic" to others. Conceiving of an interview process
for research purposes as either "participation" or
"healing" is not generally accepted. In my view, it should be.
While it is not generally accepted, at least not in our dominant
culture, such "participation-as-healing" is akin to First
Nation's use of the "healing circle" to assist victims,
communities and even the "accused" themselves, recover after
traumatic experiences, societal transgressions, or criminal offences. A
shared, communal effort to support and reintegrate the offender into the
community, rather than an adversarial procedure to find guilt and expel
or punish, the "healing circle" is as much a therapeutic
intervention as it is a judicial process (Monture-Okanee 1995; Grogan
1999).
Participation: Beyond the Ladder
Fischer (2000) has suggested that participation can be defined as
1) deliberation on issues affecting one's own life, and 2)
facilitation of learning--a process of challenging learners with ways of
interpreting their experience and presenting them with "ideas and
behaviours that cause them to examine critically their values, ways of
acting and the assumptions by which they live." (Fischer 2000:
185). Participation as either deliberation or learning opens up the
decision process not only to a range of new perspectives and the
additional information and understanding they provide, but also to
"another kind of rationality" (Fischer 2000: 148). This
post-positivist rationality involves understanding of the social and
cultural dimensions of problems, not only their technical and scientific
aspects. Unfortunately, such rationality is often dismissed as a NIMBY
reaction because of the powerful role techno-experts play in our culture
(Fischer 2000). While attention to power in public participation has
been discussed for some time (e.g. Arnstein 1969), the specifics of
power sharing in relation to knowledge have received less attention. It
requires a significant divestment of power--from current
'experts' and from political authorities, most notably--to
accept sociocultural knowledge as legitimate, involving the holders of
such knowledge (citizens) in decision making throughout management and
planning processes, and integrating such knowledge on equal footing with
more prestigious techno-scientific knowledge. It also implies
empowerment of previously marginalized voices, which itself necessitates
capacity building and the requisite resource investments to do so.
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