Trust, the Internet, and the digital
divide.
by Huang, H.^Keser, C.^Leland, J.^Shachat, J.
The Internet is expected to be an important source of economic
growth in the 21st century. The Congressional Budget Office (1) predicts
the U.S. economy will grow at an annual rate of 2.1 percent over the
coming decade--an increase of 0.9 percent over U.S. growth for the
period 1974 to 1995. Varian et al. (2) estimate that the Internet will
account for 48 percent of this increase in growth. In a similar vein,
Litan and Rivlin (3) discuss research estimating Internet-driven
productivity gains in U.S. manufacturing of 0.2 and 0.4 percent per
year. Since the Internet dramatically reduces the oust of transmitting
information, the costs associated with the distribution of goods and
services between businesses, between businesses and consumers, and
between businesses and their employees are reduced as well, accounting
for these expected gains in productivity.
Whether predictions regarding the contribution of the Internet to
economic growth come to pass depends upon whether people and firms
choose to adopt the Internet and how fully they embrace the idea of
conducting business over it. The degree to which people and firms adopt
Web-based activities will depend on how willing they are to accept the
greater anonymity and associated possibilities for opportunism inherent
in Web-based transactions. This willingness may, in turn, depend on how
much people trust each other. If trust dues influence Internet adoption,
it will have an indirect impact on economic growth rates among nations
through its influence on the adoption of this growth-enhancing
technology.
In addition to the possibility of an indirect impact of trust on
growth, there is evidence that trust directly impacts economic growth
and growth rate differences across countries. Prior to the late 1990s,
economic growth rates were explained almost exclusively in terms of
labor and capital endowments and differences in how these endowments are
augmented by capacities for technological change. Differences in the
prosperity of nations or regions relative to others are, in some cases,
difficult to explain in terms of differences in these standard economic
variables. During the 1990s, spurred largely by observations and
arguments put forth by social theorists like Fukuyama (4) and Putnam et
al., (5) economists investigated the possibility that differences in
economic growth might stem directly from differences in the extent to
which members of different cultures were willing to trust each other.
The arguments in favor of this possibility are straightforward. Almost
all transactions involve some opportunities for misrepresentation,
non-compliance, or outright fraud. Detailed contracts, extensive
monitoring of performance, and litigation are means of discouraging such
behaviors, but they are all costly to implement. Empirical evidence
suggests that mutual trust is an efficient substitute for these
enforcement mechanisms. For example, Dyer and Chu (6) examined
differences in procurement costs in 453 supplier-automaker relationships
in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. Procurement costs incurred in
situations where the suppliers trusted automakers the least were rive
times higher than those in which the suppliers trusted automakers the
most, while the costs associated with negotiating contracts and
post-contractual disputes were double.
Trust appears to have significant returns at the macroeconomic
level as well. Knack and Keefer, (7) for example, round that a very
simple measure of how trusting inhabitants of different countries are
was a significant explanatory variable in regressions of average annual
growth rates in per capita income from 1980 to 1992. Moreover, the
impact was very large--a 10 percent increase in the measure of trust
translates into an increase of 0.1 percent in economic growth--a sizable
increment, given world average growth rates of 1 to 3 percent in the
latter half of the 20th century.
The fact that trust directly impacts economic growth through
reductions in transaction costs, coupled with the possibility that it
may impact growth indirectly to the extent that it impacts Internet
adoption rates, raises a troubling possibility: namely, that low-trust
countries, the majority of which tend to be of low and middle income,
will take a double hit in terms of economic growth in the coming years.
They may be penalized for low trust by incurring higher transaction
costs and by lower adoption rates of growth-enhancing technology. Knack
and Keefer's (7) findings suggest that the first effect, higher
transaction costs, will surely come to pass. Whether the second, lower
Internet adoption rates, does as well depends upon whether trust does,
in fact, encourage Internet adoption. Our objective in this paper is to
determine whether this proposition is true. To presage our findings, it
is. This result would seem to suggest that efforts to increase trust in
low and moderate trust countries are in order. Unfortunately, we show
that the returns for any such policy will be greater for high-trust
rather than for low-trust countries, so that differences in trust among
countries, will promote an increasing digital divide between them. To
the extent that contributions the Internet makes to economic growth
accrue disproportionately to high trust countries, this digital divide
will translate into a developmental divide.
Data
The specifics of out analyses of the impact of trust on Internet
adoption are dictated by the availability of trust measures for
different countries. In their examination of whether trust directly
influences economic growth rates, Knack and Keefer (7) used responses to
a question involving trust posed to thousands of respondents from 29
countries with market economies in the 1981 and 1990-1991 World Values
Survey (WVS). (8) The question was, "Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too
careful in dealing with people?" Knack and Keefer took the
percentage of respondents from each country who answered that people
could be trusted as a measure of how "trusting" that
country's populace was. (9) Then they conducted regression analyses
examining the impact of this measure of trust on average annual growth
in per capita income for 1980 to 1992. They round that trust contributes
significantly to economic growth, particularly in poorer countries
without developed legal enforcement systems. (10)
The growth rates in Knack and Keefer (7) were averages over the
period 1980-1992, To minimize endogeneity problems, specifically, the
possibility that economic growth rates have an impact on levels of
trust, they computed trust values based on 1980 wvs responses where
possible and 1990 responses otherwise. Knack and Zak (11) provide trust
measures derived from responses to the 1995 wvs for 17 of the 29
countries used in Knack and Keefer (7) and 1990 values for 11 of the
others. (No recent trust measure is available for Nigeria, the 29th
country in the Knack and Keefer study.) Given that the Internet was not
commercialized until 1995, endogeneity is not an issue in our analyses,
so we use the most recent 1995 data where possible and 1990 values
otherwise. None of the results reported in the ensuing sections are
particularly sensitive to whether we employ a combination of values, or
exclusively 1990 values. Values for this trust variable for each country
in Knack and Keefer's original study (excluding Nigeria), as well
as values for all other independent and dependent variables considered
in our analyses are shown in Table 1.
For each of the 28 countries for which we had a trust measure, we
tried to collect two measures of Internet penetration. The Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides data on the
percentage of households with Internet access in 1999 and/or 2000 for 17
countries. To maximize available degrees of freedom, we combined this
data, taking the average for countries with 1999 and 2000 data and the
single year data for the remaining countries, to create data on the
percent of households with Internet access for 1999-2000, denoted
"IP1." (12) OECD also provided data on the number of Internet
subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 2000 for 22 of these countries
(denoted "IP2"). (13)
The literature on the determinants of technology adoption suggests
a number of economic, demographic, and infrastructural factors that
might influence internet adoption. Economic theory suggests that the
quantity of a product that is demanded depends on its own price, the
buyers' income, and the price of substitutable and complementary
goods. For our measure of income, we computed the average per capita
national income for our sample of countries by averaging data provided
by the World Bank for the period 1995-1999. (14) This variable is
denoted "Income." Our measure of Internet access price,
denoted "Int. Price," is the average price of 20 hours of
Internet access for 1995-2000 in dollars adjusted for purchasing power
parity, as computed by OECD. (15)
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