Understanding strategy: why is strategy so
difficult?
by Mukherji, Ananda^Mukherji, Jyotsna
The discussion, so far, has been to contrast the more complex and
intractable view of strategy against the relatively more narrow view of
strategy taken by academics and practitioners. A narrower view of
strategy is popular because it is more comfortable and more convenient
to do so. This allows business problems to be analyzed from within the
repertoire of existing models, frameworks, and paradigms. The
intellectual challenges of stepping outside the narrow area of bounded
knowledge are considerable. However, as we will discover in the
discussion that follows in this section, strategizing necessarily has to
be a dynamic process dealing with an unknown, ambiguous, and
indeterminate set of variables that have an impact on an organization in
an uncertain future. As a consequence, we must be prepared to question
all assumptions, postulates, and theories. It does not mean we have to
craft everything anew or discard existing knowledge, but to ascertain
the validity of past theories and be open to new ways of thinking.
For example, when strategizing in business, a common approach is to
examine the phenomenon of consumption through the lens of demand.
Followers of Keynsian economics have subscribed to the axiom,
"Demand creates its own supply." This is in contrast with
Say's (1803) Law, which states "Supply creates its own
demand." There has existed an ongoing debate in economics between
classical economists and the followers of John Baptist Say, the
insightful French economist. We do not plan to enter into this debate,
but wish to sensitize the reader to the two viewpoints that frame our
arguments in this section. Much of training in business has centered on
the notion of consumption, and that economics is often thought of in
consumptionist terms (http://www.friesian.com/sayslaw.htm). As a
consequence, business and strategic orientation have focused on methods
to increase demand, hence consumption.
This is a traditional and orthodox approach to strategizing. One
needs to break away from this orthodoxy and approach the consumer from a
radically different direction. This is not to suggest that the
conventional approach is to be abandoned. Rather, the important point is
to expand the way one conceptualizes and theorizes about business.
Certainly, the conventional logic and existing frameworks, to which
there is so much invested, should be treated with due respect. It is not
only academics that have much at stake in current models, frameworks,
and paradigms, but also organizations that have invested in their
existing infrastructure. Organizations have an infrastructure that has
to be leveraged profitably (Trunick, 1996). However, leveraging existing
knowledge and infrastructure will result in making incremental movements
from where an organization is currently located. Such incremental
movements will result in better operational readiness and higher levels
of tactical effectiveness. However, it is not by following existing
models, frameworks, paradigms, or even infrastructure that radical
differences will be made. The mental approach to making radical
differences comes from the spirit of Say's (1803) Law that suggests
that supply creates is own demand. Larry Mulkey, quoted in Trunick
(1996), states, "Instead of building a system that is incrementally
based on where you are now, you build backwards from where you want to
be" (1996: 26).
How is it possible for supply to create its own demand? If not
taken literally by the letter of Say's (1803) Law, but the spirit,
we have to think of goods and services (products) that are delivered to
the customer even before the customer actually articulates a specific
need for the product. This is happening in many cases with products that
are at the cutting edge of technology or based on emerging concepts.
Strategists have to gain insights from the many discontinuities that are
taking place. Recognizing and leveraging discontinuities is not possible
from the mindset that is produced by examining standard models,
frameworks, and paradigms. Hamel and Prahalad (1995: 15) mention that
industry foresight is based on deep insights into the trends in
technology, demographics, regulations, and lifestyles that can be
harnessed to rewrite industry rules and create new competitive space.
It is possible for supply to create its own demand when strategists
are no longer solely customer-led but are product-led. This would run
against the grain of conventional thinking and practice. As Hamel and
Prahalad mention, "It is much in vogue to be customer-led. From
their bully pulpits, which today are likely to be worldwide satellite
hookups, CEOs tell the troops that everything begins with the
customer" (1994a: 67). The area of future opportunities is to look
for openings and chances outside the arena of existing competition. To
put the matter in perspective, most organizations are providing products
that customers can clearly articulate, coupled with producers that have
the ability to clearly respond to those articulations. Since the
articulation is clear, the competition is most intensive, and the
competitive space is crowded. However, in order to create new
competitive space, producers have to move beyond what is clearly
articulated by customers and producers.
Sony, one of the most formidable and innovative companies, follows
the philosophy of being ahead of the customer. Sony's visionary
former chairman, Akio Morita, had this to say, "Our plan is to lead
the public with new products rather than ask them what kind of products
they want. The public does not know what is possible, but we do. So,
instead of doing a lot of market research, we refine our thinking on a
product and its use and try to create a market for it by educating and
communicating with the public." Masaru Ibuka, the company's
co-founder agrees when he says, "Our emphasis has always been to
make something out of nothing." Consequently, we feel that the
areas unarticulated by customers and producers are where the maximum
opportunities lie. Figure 3, adapted and modified from Hamel and
Prahalad (1994b), presents the main features of our model.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
On the vertical axis are the articulated and unarticulated needs of
customers. On the horizontal axis are the articulated and unarticulated
abilities of producers. Most academics and practitioners focus on
quadrant 1, where clearly articulated needs of customers are coincident
with the clearly articulated abilities of producers. Quadrant 1 typifies
the conventional mindset that is trained on existing models, frameworks,
and paradigms. Much of business knowledge is simply descriptive in that
theories are used to understand the past and make sense of the past. The
predictive component of business theory is relatively limited as
existing theory is not a good predictor of the future. Many
organizations feel competitive pressures from unpredictable sources.
Music publishing companies did not feel the heat of competition from
their well-established and well-identified rivals. Rather, they felt
competitive pressures from Napster, an organization whose form, style,
and composition the established music firms had never conceptualized and
had no competitive response to, other than to take legal action.
Similarly, established booksellers were outflanked by the activities of
Amazon.com who competed on a front that established booksellers were
either unaware of or were completely blindsided to. Competing in
quadrant 1 can make an organization totally vulnerable to possibilities
that may exist outside the obvious. More recently, CNN reported that
young entrepreneurs in New York City are challenging Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). These entrepreneurs are offering free Internet service
in their neighborhoods because they have excess capacity from their
cable modem connections. These entrepreneurs are trying to force ISPs to
provide free Internet service in certain neighborhoods and public places
like parks, subway stations, and libraries. These entrepreneurs, in
seemingly guerilla-like operations, are creating competitive fronts for
traditional ISPs in areas that ISP organizations had not conceived of.
These challenges have to be met, as they are likely to affect the
revenue flow and viability of otherwise profitable ISPs.
The areas of opportunities lie in quadrants 2, 3, and 4.
Organizations (the producers of goods and services) need to make efforts
to explore opportunities outside of quadrant 1. In quadrant 2, producers
are ahead of customers and this usually happens when innovative and
creative organizations (like Sony Corporation) deliver products that are
outside the customers' articulated needs. Evidently, Sony
Corporation is a clear follower of Say's Law in the way it has been
introducing highly successful products for seemingly non-existent needs,
and creating entirely new customer segments and customer types.
Creativity and innovation allow certain organizations to succeed in
quadrant 2. The 3.5-inch disk in place of the 5.25-inch disk is
something producers launched in the market long before customers
articulated a need for it. Higher processing speeds, greater data
storage capacities, and more capable software are quadrant 2 products
that are invariably ahead of customers. The linkage between Say's
Law and quadrant 2 is obvious.
COPYRIGHT 2003 American Society for
Competitiveness Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2003, Gale Group. All rights
reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.