As discussed earlier, many corporate personnel are oblivious to CI
penetrations and breaches in corporate security. Furthermore, they
exhibit a reluctance to report its occurrence (Graham, 1998). Therefore,
it is imperative for organizations to routinely mount corporate security
penetration exercises using outside experts (Winkler, 1997; Hecht and
Murphy, 2000). The use of external consultants with a level of expertise
equal to that of CI operatives should expose potential weaknesses common
in most corporate security programs (Winkler, 1997). After concluding
the audit, non-punitive feedback should be given directly to
"targets" of the exercise. Security consultants should then
work with these employees to develop recommendations and procedures to
reduce the potential for future security breakdowns. Both the employees
and security consultants should then jointly present the recommendations
to top management. This participatory process may serve to (a) provide
an important validation of conclusions reached by the consultants; (b)
build an employee coalition supportive of the new security
recommendations; and (c) create a corporate culture which recognizes
that corporate security requires a multilevel system of empowerment in
order to be effective.
C: Computer Security And T: Telecommunications Security
In reviewing Security Magazine's 1999 survey of corporate
security executives, Somerson (1999) reports that computer security has
been protected through the use of document shredders, lockdown devices,
system alarms and password protection software. He also reports that
approximately 10 percent of these executives planned to bolster computer
security through the installation of biometric reading/scanning
technologies as authentication hurdles. These devices authorize computer
system/data access based upon matching a potential user' s
physiological characteristics against the known characteristics of valid
users. These scanning technologies range from fingerprint identification
to retinal/iris and voice pattern recognition (Desmarais, 2000;
Richards, 1999). For example, the U-Match Mouse (BioLink Technologies)
uses a patented fingerprint scanning technology that is incorporated
into a conventional 2-button mouse. As individuals attempt to activate a
computer system, their fingerprints are scanned and compared against a
5000 byte template that determines whether they are among the authorized
user cadre (Businesswire, 2000).
Security management hardware/software (e.g.: COBRA, DCOM, TINA), as
well as the installation of updated virus protection and firewalls, have
often been used to hinder cyber attacks stemming from port/network
scanning and spoofing (Gritzalis, Lladis and Oikonomopoulos, 2000).
Encryption technologies can provide defenses against password/packet
sniffing and data theft (Schultz, 1999). Additional password security
may be instituted through single-use passwords and eliminating passwords
subject to compromise through "dictionary programs" (Schultz,
1999; Hecht and Murphy, 2000).
Technological solutions have also been suggested to mitigate CI
problems attributable to the electronic monitoring of computer screen
emissions and telecommunications systems. The monitoring and
reproduction of computer screen emissions can be countered by
"hardening" computer systems through use of copper shielding
and performing sensitive activities in windowless lead-lined rooms
(Ward, 1993; Winkler, 1997; Fitzpatrick, 2000). Finally, the monitoring
of corporate telecommunications can be made more cumbersome by (1)
routinely sweeping corporate facilities for "bugs"; and (2)
requiring sensitive message traffic to be conducted at random time
intervals and over telephone exchanges not identified with the targeted
firm (Winkler, 1997; Fitzpatrick, 2000). In addressing the first of
these recommendations, corporate security experts find that CI
operatives often use shift changes to physically penetrate corporate
offices/facilities in order to plant surveillance devices. Therefore,
the sweeping of offices/facilities should be performed shortly after the
organization experiences major influxes and/or departures of personnel
(Winkler, 1997; Hecht and Murphy, 2000). Additionally, organizational
personnel conducting sensitive message traffic should have their
communications restricted to telephone lines not possessing the same 3
digit prefix shared by the majority of the firm's
offices/personnel. This creates uncertainty for CI operatives concerning
the how, when and where issues associated with bugging and surveillance
operations (Winkler, 1997; Fitzpatrick, 2000).
CONCLUSION
Virtual organizations represent a new form of organizational
structure designed to enhance competitiveness and strategic flexibility
through the extensive use of subcontracting, business partnering, and
information technologies. Many of these strategic advantages derive from
the ability of the virtual organization to freely exchange information,
resources, technologies and ideas across organizational boundaries. On
the other hand, the unique features of this organizational form that
serve to enhance competitiveness can also result in significant
intelligence vulnerabilities and the subsequent loss of strategic
advantage. Aggressive counter intelligence programs, such as the
FOG-PACT system outlined in this paper, have the potential for reducing
competitive intelligence vulnerabilities through (a) heightened
personnel security; (b) restrictions in both the access to and use of
information technologies; (c) the construction of contracts which
restrict the manner in which subcontractors or business partners utilize
proprietary information and intellectual properties derived from their
association with virtual firms; and (d) the hardening
computer/telecommunications systems from hostile penetration and
monitoring. However, the techniques designed to enhance corporate
security may also pose a significant competitive predicament for virtual
firms by restricting their ability to rapidly disseminate
information/ideas while benefiting from the creative
synergies/capabilities of their business partners. Indeed, one of the
key dilemmas facing virtual companies may be balancing this need for
openness and creative synergy with basic principles of corporate
security.
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