Federal oversight of visas and research topics: making sacrifices for security.

The Federal Response to September 11, 2001: Increased Security

As the federal government implements multiple systems aimed at elevating national security by monitoring and regulating the flow of ideas and people into and out of the U.S., the question already is not one of whether these measures will negatively affect the U.S. education and research enterprise, especially in science and technology; but rather to what degree they will do so. As various arms of the nation's homeland security apparatus enact and pursue anti-terrorism policies and practices, researchers, administrators, and educators watch to see how these various measures will affect them. Beyond observation, however, many policies entail practices that require individuals and organizations to increase national security as well. As actions are taken to comply with these mandates, individuals have begun to debate governmental controls and their effect on international exchanges of ideas and people. Much of the argument over security appears to hinge on differences of opinion over the basic ideologies of openness versus protectionism. But, because of September 11, 2001, the stakes for choosing to act or not have risen precipitously.

Probably no one doubted the sincerity expressed by John Marburger, director for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), when he addressed the American Association for the Advancement of Science's (AAAS's) 28th Annual Colloquium on Science and Technology (S&T) Policy on April 10, 2003, regarding the state of U.S. science research and education in the face of heightened security. Focusing many of his remarks on the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on January 1, 2003, Marburger assured the audience that the Bush Administration "values the contribution foreign scientists and students make to the nation's scientific enterprise, to our economy, and to the appreciation of American values throughout the world" (Marburger 1).

According to Marburger, the Bush Administration maintains that "it is possible to take appropriate precautions against terrorism without inhibiting the numerous relationships with other nations that are essential in today's globalized technical society" (Marburger 1). Marburger's statement implies the inclusion of relationships that develop through research and education activities. Still, frequent reports on SEVIS's implementation indicate potentially harmful effects are only beginning to become evident. Marburger admitted that increased regulation has led to longer waits and potential discouragement, noting that after 9/11, the number of institutions certified to accept foreign students fell from 75,000 (in 2000) to 8,000 (Marburger 3). Clearly, a large decrease in numbers of schools able to accept students and scholars, with even stable numbers of applicants, could contribute to a backlog in processing applicants, since those applicants need to have an institution at which to attend classes or a degree program. Still, Marburger contended that rejection rates for visas have not increased so much as cases submitted for review have skyrocketed, overloading SEVIS and creating applicant backlogs. Another means for monitoring visa applications more closely is "code-named [Visas] MANTIS ... established under section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act," whose purpose "is to exclude applicants whom a consular official or, since March 1, the Secretary of Homeland Security, has reasonable grounds to believe intends [sic] to violate or evade laws governing the export of goods, technology, or sensitive information" (Marburger 4). According to Marburger, a recommendation for Visas MANTIS review is based on guidelines accompanying the Technology Alert List (TAL), which State Department officials compile and maintain with the input of other federal agencies which also assist in reviewing cases. As of August 2002, TAL categories were clarified, and cases reviewed under Visas MANTIS dramatically increased:

In calendar year 2000, about 1,000

cases were reviewed under [Visas]

MANTIS, and 2,500 the following year.

In 2002 the figure jumped to 14,000,

overloading the system last summer and

fall. Today the State Department estimates

that at any given time there are

about 1,000 visa applications in the

[Visas] MANTIS review process.

(Marburger 4)

Herein lies a major component of backlog to which critics have referred when discussing SEVIS, TAL, and other monitoring systems. To understand the systems designed to monitor the flow of individuals and sensitive information, one should remember the context in which these measures were developed and implemented: the September 11, 2001 tragedy, its effect on the American psyche, and the government's attempts to respond to this event.

One focus of this response was the student visa system, and a primary purpose for the legislative responses was to establish greater control over the flow of people, information, and products into and out of the U.S. The magnitude of this undertaking is reflected in the basic logistics pertaining to visa oversight in the U.S. According to Stuart Patt, a State Department spokesman, "Of the 5.8 million visas granted last year [2002], 16 percent went to students" (Giegerich 1), which is the number that roughly equates to the one million referred to by Marburger during his AAAS speech. Among this nearly one million individuals, according to testimony before the House Science Committee, which cited as a source the Institute of International Education (IIE), there were some "582,996 international students [who] attended colleges and universities in the United States in 2002" (Hearing Charter, House Committee on Science). Another IIE study listed the numbers of international researchers in the U.S. at over 86,000 in 2001/2002, up over 6,000 from 2000/2001 (IIE Open Doors 2002 Report).

The USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56 enacted on October 26, 2001) mandated the use of a database to monitor this population. In this way, SEVIS, initially a voluntary system, in July became mandatory and all colleges and universities were required to implement it by January 29, 2003 (Hearing Charter, House Science Committee). The implementation date was changed to February 15, 2003, and currently information on all foreign scholars and students must be maintained and updated in SEVIS by August 1, 2003 (Hearing Charter, House Committee on Science). Testifying before the House Science Committee about the implementation of SEVIS and the backlogs of those awaiting processing, David Ward, president of the American Council on Education and chancellor emeritus of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, focused on three areas in which the system was failing: technological flaws, lack of real time access to data, and inadequate training for those affected by the implementation (Testimony of David Ward).

One serious technological flaw of SEVIS cited by a number of critics was corruption of data. Sensitive and confidential data were incorrectly associated with a person and reportedly printed. Moreover, entry of large amounts of data was often unsuccessful. The ability for real time access to data never materialized (Testimony of David Ward). Consequently, critical access to data already entered was often not possible, a crucial problem for students and scholars with time-sensitive appointments or definite periods during which to begin and end their activities. As a result of this inaccessibility of data, at consulates and embassies, foreign students have been and continue to be rejected outright for visas.

According to Ward, solutions to such problems will not come easily. He conservatively estimated new records must be entered at a rate of "250,000 per month," or one million overall, for institutions to meet the August 1, 2003, deadline. Ward predicted that the system would not only fail to accommodate the information surge, but foreign students and scholars, college and university administrators, and immigration offices would become overwhelmed, which would lead to extreme difficulties in complying with the August deadline. Finally, according to federal law, a fee was to be charged for international students who register with SEVIS. No process has been established to levy or collect this fee (Testimony of David Ward).

Other monitoring systems have been criticized as well. For instance, all visas are initially evaluated against the principal database known as CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System), which matches applicant names against lists derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Criminal Information Base and other intelligence databases. A match on CLASS leads officials to refer that visa application to the State Department for more review. CLASS not only slows the visa application process by introducing another process but CLASS searches have been slowed because additions by the FBI after 9/11 doubled the number of records to almost 12 million (White and Peterson 1).