In recent years, there has been a proliferation in the use of
illicit tax shelters by major U.S. corporations. This development has
created some concern that deliberate corporate noncompliance with the
intent of the tax laws may actually threaten the viability of the U.S.
tax system. As a result, the U.S. Department of Treasury has issued new
regulations designed to deter further expansion of these tax practices.
This paper addresses these concerns as well as possible remedies to the
problem.
Introduction to the Problem
According to the United States Department of Treasury, the
proliferation of illicit corporate tax shelters may be the most serious
compliance issue threatening the U.S. tax system today. The Treasury
Department estimates losses associated with illegal corporate tax
shelters at $10 billion a year and growing. While the percentage of
income paid in taxes by individuals has been on the rise in the past
decade, it has been just the opposite for corporate America. For
example, corporate taxes as a percent of profits fell from 26.6% in 1994
to only 21.8% in 1999 (Gleckman & Woellert, 1999). As another
indication of the problem, corporate tax receipts were down 2.5 percent
in 1999 when compared to 1998. This occurred even though the U.S.
economy was expanding and there was not a comparable decrease in
corporate profits. In contrast, tax revenues from individuals leaped by
6.2 percent in 1999.
There is little doubt that this reduction in corporate taxes is due
in part to the use of legitimate means, such as the proper use of tax
credits or the appropriate deduction of stock options exercised by
employees. However, the factor of most concern to the Treasury
Department is the rapid increase in the use of illegitimate tax shelters
by large companies. Illegitimate tax shelters differ from legitimate
ones in that they employ the use of accounting transactions that have no
separate, justifiable business purpose. These transactions are designed
solely for the purpose of manipulating income in order to reduce taxes.
For example, a U.S. corporation that owes taxes might arrange a business
relationship with an overseas company that does not owe taxes. To reduce
its tax liability, the U.S. company shifts its profits to the overseas
company. The U.S. company then receives the money back in ways that do
not count as taxable income, thus avoiding taxes on the original
profits. Another type of transaction that appears to be spreading
rapidly involves a U.S. company making two separate but equal loans at
equal interest rates to an affiliate abroad. Subsequently, the interest
on one loan is eliminated while the interest rate on the second loan is
doubled. The zero interest bearing loan is now counted as a loss on the
U.S. company's tax return, while the double interest rate loan on
the books of the overseas affiliate is not taxed in the U.S. Many big
accounting firms as well as Wall Street investment firms currently help
create and market such illegitimate tax plans for a fee. What concerns
the Department of Treasury and IRS officials is the apparent willingness
of prominent, reputable corporations to engage in such blatant tax
evasion practices. Until recently, these tactics were found only among
the most disreputable of companies.
Good Tax Planning Versus Illegal Tax Schemes
Maximizing after-tax profits for its shareholders is a legitimate
goal of a corporation. Since taxes represent one of the major expenses
of a corporation, it is appropriate for tax planners to take whatever
legal steps are possible to minimize these taxes. However, there is
increasing evidence that some tax planners are devising and promoting
tax schemes that are outside the realm of legal transactions.
Tax shelters are fundamentally different from tax breaks that are
commonly referred to as loopholes and corporate welfare. From time to
time, Congress will deliberately insert into the tax law loopholes or
provisions designed to benefit certain industries or even specific
companies. The motivation for these "tax loopholes" may be to
achieve political, economic, or even social objectives. Whatever the
motivation, the fact is that Congress intended these tax breaks to be
part of the tax law. In contrast to loopholes, tax shelters are
intricate plans designed to circumvent the tax laws. These tax schemes
are concocted by tax lawyers and accountants and then marketed to
corporate clients. Some are legal and some clearly are not. Some
companies and tax advisers are playing the "audit lottery",
hoping they can fashion a scheme so complicated that the IRS cannot
determine if it is illegal. In fact, some tax planners take advantage of
the inconsistencies in the U.S. tax code and create tax shelters that
are so complex that they almost defy description. Many of these
derivative type products have names like collars, swaps, straddles and
step-down preferred stock. These tax strategies are clearly designed to
create tax deductions that were never intended by Congress.
In recent months, the IRS has won a number of big cases in federal
Tax Court. For years the Tax Court was reluctant to rule against
companies using tax shelters. But recently, federal judges seem to be
losing patience with the proliferation and blatant nature of these
shelter schemes (Gleckman & Woellert, 1999). In 1999 the tax court
found that UPS engaged in a long-term tax "sham" that helped
them to evade more than $1 billion in taxes. Also in 1999, the Tax Court
found sufficient facts to indicate that Compaq Computer engaged in an
abusive tax shelter transaction (Luscombe, 1999). The essence of the
transaction was that Compaq purchased and sold the same securities
within an hour to obtain a $3.4 million foreign tax credit. The Court
found that there was no business purpose and no economic substance to
the tax shelter, and that it was undertaken only to reduce the tax bill
of the corporation. The Tax Court not only denied the credit, but also
ruled in favor of the IRS that a 20% negligence penalty should be
imposed.
"Pushing the Envelop"
"Sham" tax shelters that have been identified by IRS
audits have been repeatedly ruled illegitimate by the tax courts.
However, because of limited resources the IRS may find only 1 in 10 of
such tax shelters. This low probability of being discovered has
apparently emboldened many companies to risk being caught. The
complexity of the tax law entices corporations to manipulate
transactions with the intent of reducing taxes. Because of competitive
pressures, CFOs do not want their corporation to be the one reporting
the highest effective tax liability. An added factor today is the
existence of tax planners who actively promote their products to
corporations. Thus, CFOs are afraid of being left behind by their
competition in the effort to minimize taxes.
In letters sent out to potential tax clients, one Big Five
accounting firm offered a proposed tax strategy to eliminate the
company's state and federal income taxes for a contingency fee of
30% of the tax savings, plus out-of-pocket expenses. Another Big Five
accounting firm hired 40 new professional salesmen to market tax
shelters to companies that were not current clients. And yet another Big
Five firm requires its staff to come up with one new tax shelter idea
per week to keep abreast of the competition (Novack & Saunders,
1998). Large Wall Street investment firms as well as large accounting
firms identify weaknesses in the tax code and devise tax schemes that
are now being aggressively sold to thousands of potential corporate
clients. Are they legal? Will they hold up in tax court? Some will and
some will not, but the tax strategies rely on the sophistication of
modern corporate finance to deter detection by the IRS.
What's driving this frenzy of tax shelters? It is of course
money. Reluctant at first to use questionable tax shelters, many
respectable accounting firms, law firms, and corporations have yielded
to competitive pressures. Accounting firms can earn hundreds of
thousands of dollars as commissions on the amount of taxes avoided by
tax shelters. Law firms can charge hundreds of thousands of dollars for
writing opinion letters stating that these shelters are likely to
succeed. And once corporate officials see how much tax savings is at
stake, their inhibitions are reduced. They try the tax scheme, become
more comfortable with it, and continue to use it.
Efforts to Remedy the Problem
The primary efforts to confront the tax shelter issue have been in
the tax courts. The IRS has generally met with success, but only at a
great expense of time and money. The Treasury Department has called for
new laws that attack not only specific tax shelter transactions, but
also the corporate tax shelter industry in general (Luscombe, 1999).
These proposals include expanding the definition of a corporate tax
shelter, increasing disclosure requirements, and increasing
understatement penalties. In addition, the Treasury would like to see
laws that have potential consequences for creators, promoters, and
others involved in illegal tax shelter transactions. For example, the
Treasury has called for Congress to pass a 25 percent excise tax on fees
collected by firms arranging illicit tax shelters. Further, the Treasury
would like Congress to double the penalty on taxes improperly avoided
from the current 20 percent to 40 percent.
COPYRIGHT 2001 California State University, Los
Angeles Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2001, Gale Group. All rights
reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.