Assessing the distributive impact of a revenue - neutral shift from a uniform property tax to a two-rate property tax with a uniform credit.

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a long history of depending upon property taxation to help pay for local government services, and that fiscal tradition continues to this day. During 2000-01, for example, property taxes comprised 72.9 percent of the tax revenues collected by local governments across the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, Table 1). At the same time, the property tax fosters widespread voter discontent, in large part because of its perceived inequities (Youngman, 2002). This discontent, in turn, has fueled a number of efforts at the state level to reform the local property tax (Duncombe and Yinger, 2001).

This paper argues that there is a strong case for adopting a particular version of property tax reform: a two-rate property tax with a uniform credit on each tax bill. Many authors have already pointed to various economic benefits from cutting the tax rate on building values and simultaneously raising the tax rate on land values to achieve revenue neutrality. Brueckner (2001) makes the theoretical case that taxing land values more heavily might promote denser patterns of land use and, thereby, help to prevent socially excessive rates of land development. Tax simulations by England (2003) indicate that taxing land values instead of property values could stimulate commercial and industrial activity, thereby promoting income and employment growth. Plassmann and Tideman (2000) report empirical evidence that two-rate property taxation has actually encouraged construction in various Pennsylvania cities. Oates and Schwab (1997) suggest that nonresidential construction in Pittsburgh received a boost from split-rate taxation during the 1980s. (1) For other analyses of two-rate taxation, see the anthology edited by Netzer (1998).

If the theoretical and empirical case for adopting two-rate property taxation is so strong, then one needs to explain why so few jurisdictions in the United States have actually embraced this type of property tax reform. Until recently, the only examples have been in Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh and Scranton implemented split-rate taxation in 1913, and Harrisburg followed decades later in 1975. During the closing decades of the 20th century, another dozen Pennsylvania cities followed the lead of their more populous neighbors (Hartzok, 1997, Table 1). In 2002, the Commonwealth of Virginia enacted a bill permitting Fairfax City to adopt a two-rate property tax.

A general reason for the limited adoption of two-rate property taxation is that tax reforms always redistribute income and net worth among taxpayers. Those who stand to lose from tax reform can be counted upon to oppose adoption even if implementation of the reform proposals would improve efficiency of resource allocation and increase society's real income (Felder and Schleiniger, 2002; Kochanowski, 1991).

Where property tax reform is at stake, however, there is a more specific obstacle to changing the tax system: Many homeowners who face higher tax bills after property tax reform will not move because of potential search costs, moving expenses, realtor fees, real estate transfer taxes and loss of neighborhood ties (Englund, 2003, p. 938). Hence, these homeowners would experience a substantial drop in disposable income and consumption as a result of tax reform and, thus, are likely to oppose its adoption in the first place. On the other hand, those homeowners who are willing to move in order to avoid paying a higher property tax bill would face tax capitalization effects in the housing market. This prospect could also provoke opposition to tax reform.

Of course, legislators have already grappled with alleged inequities of the property tax by enacting circuit-breakers for low-income renters and homeowners, homestead exemptions, and elderly homeowner exemptions (Plummer, 2003; Duncombe and Yinger, 2001). In the remainder of this paper, we will argue that the distributive implications of two-rate property taxation have to be taken into account if it is to gain widespread political support. More specifically, we propose that a revenue-neutral shift to two-rate taxation of real estate needs to be accompanied by introduction of a tax credit provision in order to mitigate the regressive tendencies of this form of tax reform.

CALCULATING POST-REFORM TAX CHANGES

Consider the following set of variables:

n the number of taxable parcels in a jurisdiction;

[L.sub.i] the assessed land value of parcel i;

[B.sub.i] the assessed building value of parcel i;

[tau] the original uniform property tax rate;

[[tau].sub.L] the new tax rate on land values;

[[tau].sub.B] the new tax rate on building values; and

C the standard credit available to every taxable parcel.

Let us make the following set of tax policy assumptions:

1. Property tax reform shifts the statutory tax burden towards land values"

[[tau].sub.L] > [tau] > [[tau].sub.B] [greater than or equal to] 0, C [greater than or equal to] 0.

2. After implementation of tax reform, the individual tax payment cannot be negative. This nonnegativity condition can be represented by the following function, where 1 indicates a tax payment and 0 indicates no tax payment following property tax reform:

[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]

3. Property tax reform results in aggregate revenue neutrality, at least until property reassessments take place:

[n.summation over (i=1)] [tau] ([L.sub.i] + [B.sub.i] = [n.summation over (i=1)] ([[tau].sub.L][L.sub.i] + [[tau].sub.B][B.sub.i] - C) x [I.sub.i].

Given this trio of policy assumptions, what can one say about the change in tax payment that a property owner would face after adoption of property tax reform? As demonstrated in the appendix to this article, we can expect a specific set of impacts that depend upon a parcel's value ratio ([B.sub.i]/[L.sub.i]) and its land value.

* If the value ratio of a parcel is greater than the aggregate value ratio for all taxpaying parcels, then a parcel's tax change will decline in magnitude (and perhaps become negative in sign) as the building tax rate ([[tau].sub.B]) falls.

* If a property's land value is greater than the average land value for all taxpaying parcels, then a larger (maximum) tax credit will increase the tax change for this parcel.

* For a particular combination of tax rates and credit level, a higher land value tends to increase the owner's tax change and a higher building value tends to lower the owner's tax change.

ACCURACY OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS

Before proceeding to a discussion of tax reform simulations for a small city in New England, we must first address a thorny methodological issue--the degree of accuracy of existing land and building assessments. Some jurisdictions report only the total assessed values of properties, but others purport to have separate values for buildings and sites. If one intends to tax structures and land at different rates, then one obviously needs to have separate building and site values for each parcel.

Several authors have claimed that the land and building values reported by local tax assessors are nearly worthless. Mills (1998, p. 44), for example, says that in some communities, "separate assessments are made of site and structures, but they are made by arbitrary rules, such as that sites are [valued at] 20 percent of total property value." Netzer (1998, p. 119), in a similar vein, comments that "because tax bills ... are [currently] based on the total value of the parcel, the assessor has no reason to waste time on a careful separation of land and structure values. This is reinforced by the fact that state laws do not encourage appeals of land and structure values separately ..."

To the extent that these claims are true, the implementation of two tax rates and a credit would have to be preceded by revaluation of the land component of taxable properties according to their "highest and best uses." Of course, recent sales data for raw land could be used for this purpose. However, for developed land, a less direct approach would be required. Mills (1998, pp. 45-6) has proposed that hedonic models could be used to statistically estimate site and structure values for developed properties. Gloudemans (2001) has performed such an analysis using data for Boise, Edmonton and suburban Denver. His preliminary results are promising and could be extended to other urban areas. Anas (1998, p. 58) suggests that a municipal land authority could acquire vacant buildings, demolish the structures and sell the sites in order to generate urban land price data for assessment purposes.

But are existing assessments of land and building values totally arbitrary? Perhaps not. If it can be shown that the land assessments presently used for tax purposes correlate with the determinants of land prices in the real estate market, then those land assessments could be used to implement a program of property tax reform. After analyzing data for all the towns and cities in New Hampshire, we have concluded that the land value assessments reported by tax assessors do reflect market conditions to some degree and, hence, could be used to approximate the market value of land parcels in each locality.