Discipline, internal motivations, and cooperation in a rural production cooperative.

Abstract

A disciplinary system is an important mechanism to build the trust and commitment essential for maintaining effective organization for collective action. A case study in southern Brazil examines a situation in which the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement contributed to the decline of a cooperative, and asks why these activities were ineffectively applied. The literature suggests that the lack of application would be because the provision of monitoring and enforcement is itself a second-order public goods problem in which the whole cooperative benefits from the maintenance of discipline, but the costs fall on individuals who work to maintain it. This case study reveals contextual factors related to motivations for cooperation which may be more important in explaining the reluctance to impose discipline and the subsequent decline of trust and commitment among cooperative members. The study suggests that the components of an effective disciplinary system include rule formulation, monitoring and enforcement activities, accompanied by norms regarding the role of discipline in relation to overall cooperative objectives, and regarding the roles and responsibilities of leadership and general membership. A disciplinary system will be most effective when it is applied with attention to how it affects both external and internal motivations.

Un systeme disciplinaire constitue un important mecanisme pour betir la confiance et l'engagement essentiels au maintien de l'efficacite de l'organisation de l'action collective. Dans une etude de cas effectuee dans le sud du Bresil, on examine une situation dans laquelle le manque de supervision et de mise en application ont contribue au declin d'une cooperative, et l'on se demande pourquoi supervision et application n'ont pas ete exercees de maniere efficace. Dans la documentation, on laisse entendre que cela serait attribuable au fait que, bien que la supervision et la mise en application constituent en elles-memes des problemes de second ordre de nature collective par lesquels la cooperative profite du maintien de la discipline, il revient aux individus qui y travaillent de la maintenir. On revele dans cette etude de cas les facteurs contextuels lies aux motivations qui sous-tendent la cooperation, qui peuvent davantage expliquer la reticence C imposer une discipline, et le declin de la confiance et de l'engagement qui s'en suivent parmi les membres de la cooperative. On laisse entendre dans cette etude que les composantes d'un systeme disciplinaire efficace comprennent, entre autres, l'elaboration de regles, des activites de supervision et de mise en application, accompagnees de normes concernant le rfle de la discipline par rapport aux objectifs d'ensemble de la cooperative et concernant les rfles et les responsabilites de la direction et des membres. Uns systeme disciplinaire sera d'autant plus efficace lorsqu'il est mis en application en portant attention C la maniere dont cela aura une incidence sur les motivations, tant externes qu'internes.

Key words:

Landless Movement, cooperative organization, discipline, Brazil, agrarian reform

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Introduction

Small-scale democratically managed cooperatives have the potential to reduce rural poverty and landlessness, to increase the political and economic feasibility of land reform and small-scale, family agriculture, and to contribute to environmental sustainability and social and human development. This article relies on a case study of an agricultural production cooperative associated with the Movement of Rural Landless Workers (MST: Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) to explore the dynamics of internal governance of cooperatives. Understanding and improving the effectiveness of cooperation within cooperatives can improve the contribution of such organizations to the livelihoods of their members and to the human development of the societies in which they live.

National development strategies of the past five decades have often marginalized the poor, encouraged rapid urbanization, and neglected the needs and potential of rural areas (Reynolds 1996, Sachs 1999, Sen 1999). Various rural development approaches have sought to create opportunities for human development for rural populations, creating a dynamic, sustainable sector while reducing pressures on both cities (Schumacher 1974, Chambers 1997, Scoones 1998) and ecosystems. Land use and ownership reforms have an important role in reducing landlessness and rural poverty, and in generating widespread benefits from agriculture (Sen 1999).

For the rural poor, land is central both to economic well-being and security, and to political and social participation in a community. Land is a source of collateral, social status, and insurance against old age and shocks. It is also a basis for investment in physical and social capital; and a means to accumulate and transfer wealth. Finally, it is a source of food, employment and income potential (De Janvry et al. 2001a). Historical factors and significant market failures in the land sales, land rental and labour markets have concentrated land ownership and impeded both efficiency and sufficiency in agriculture (Holston 1991, Bryant 1998, Carter and Salgado 2001, De Janvry et al. 2001b). Where land and land-market reforms have been carried out, substantial barriers to small-scale, sustainable farming persist, and dynamic local economies do not develop easily within areas of subsistence agriculture (Carter and Salgado 2001, Deininger and Binswanger 2001, Wolford 2001).

Democratically-managed cooperatives can allow individuals and communities to capture and manage the benefits of land redistribution, thus contributing to a more sustainable form of rural development (De David 1992, Jonakin 1995). They allow farmers to work together to gain economies of scale, pool resources and risks, improve marketing, generate employment, and contribute to local economies and rural development efforts. Cooperatives can facilitate the provision of social services, particularly education, agricultural technical extension, transportation, and public health extension services. Cooperative production allows the diversification of production and the aggregation of value. The MST has offered a vision for agrarian reform in Brazil in which cooperation plays a key role in ensuring the economic success of small farmers, as well as generating social benefits and opportunities for human and political development (Dal Chiavon et al. 1999). The following sections explore some internal factors which may increase the likelihood of success for small-scale cooperatives, thereby contributing to sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor, enhancing agrarian reform programs, and building dynamic rural sectors.

The case study occurred over a period of twelve 12 months (2003-2004) at COOPCAL (described below), an agricultural production cooperative in southern Brazil, associated with the MST. The study was carried out through participant observation, key informant interviews and informal interviews with 15 families participating in (1) the cooperative over the interval. Validity was enhanced through verification of findings with the same informants. Some informants were also chosen from outside the community because of their association with the cooperative sector of the MST or their work with the community as representatives of the Brazilian land reform agency, INCRA. Six other communities were studied in less detail for comparison and contributed to the identification of discipline as a key problem at COOPCAL.

The case study confirmed the importance given to discipline in the literature on cooperation, but raised two issues about our understanding of disciplinary measures. First, while cooperation-enhancing mechanisms such as monitoring and enforcement clearly affect external motivations for cooperation, the study revealed that the use of monitoring and punishment also affects internal motivations for cooperation. Second, while problems in the implementation of disciplinary measures are often attributed to the existence of a second-order cooperation problem, a study of motivations reveals other explanations. Taken together, these two findings reveal that the impact of monitoring and punishment depends on a range of perceptions and conditions which together form a disciplinary system. A disciplinary system is a set of activities and understandings designed to achieve the objectives of the cooperative. The components of the system are identified below from the analysis of the case study.

Theoretical background

Interest in cooperation, both formal and informal, has generated theories about the mechanisms that promote and inhibit cooperation among individuals and groups (Axelrod 1984, Ostrom 1990, Ahn et al. 2001). Much of the theory focuses on understanding 'social dilemmas', in which the best possible outcome for all would be achieved through cooperation, but in which there exists a temptation to free-ride or shirk. Due to the possibility of exploiting the cooperation of others (greed), or of being exploited (fear), the rational individual is expected to refrain from cooperation by choosing the best individual action (Flache and Macy 2002). However, observation of daily and experimental behaviour reveals that people very often do choose to cooperate in such situations.