The rise and fall of Defense Manufacturing Technology programs.

The Department of Defense's Manufacturing Technology (Mantech) program was established in the late 1950s "in response to a growing need for advanced production processes in order to produce DOD material more efficiently and more effectively" (6, 8)

In 1975, the Secretary of Defense recognizing the Mantech program's potential value "directed the services to increase their emphasis on and support the ManTech program." (1)

In 1986, the National Research Council's Manufacturing Studies Board issued a report (3) that broadened the scope of the program to require a "total systems approach encompassing all design and manufacturing functions, operations of subcontractors, whims of customers as well as material transformation." The study said that manufacturing technology "is essential for maintaining a strong industrial base [and] is critical to weapon systems availability and affordability." It also directed the program to fund process technology development "best suited for long-range, generic problems." It said the Mantech program's continuation was "essential for maintaining a strong industrial base" and that it was "critical to weapon systems availability and affordability." (2)

A number of defense industrial base studies were conducted in the mid- to late-1980s addressing defense industrial competitiveness, all of which articulated the need to address the eroding industrial base and for DOD to address manufacturing process technology development up front in the early phases of science and technology." (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

During the mid-1980s, ManTech was moved from DOD's procurement operation to its R&D shop to take advantage of the program's potential impact on product design. In 1988, the Pentagon's top management team led by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Robert Costello created a Defense Manufacturing Board modeled after the Defense Science Board and established a Manufacturing Strategy Committee within the National Academy of Sciences. He also created a "Production Base Advocate."

Embedded within Costello's comprehensive plan was a strategic thrust establishing defense industrial base strategic plans and an "emphasis on developing manufacturing capabilities concurrent with the development of weapons systems and ensuring that industrial base issues benefit from the full spectrum of potential policy remedies."

In May 1989, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a major industrial base report (6) co-sponsored by Sens. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.). It found there to be an "erosion of the U.S. defense industrial base." Emphasis was placed on "the rush of commercial firms away from the defense business" further limiting the availability of leading-edge production capability. "Legislation, policies and programs designed to deal with the problems of the defense industrial base are needed," said the report. In the fiscal year 1991 science and technology budget as reported by Charles Herzfeld, Director of Defense for Research and Engineering, flexible manufacturing was added as one of DOD's "critical technologies." These technologies fit into five clusters--the third being materials and manufacturing processes. Herzfeld said the development of process technology "must be an integral part of the overall development of product technology." Furthermore, "innovative process technologies are a key to reversing long-term acquisition trends towards escalating unit costs, lengthening lead times and increasing difficulties in incorporating technological advances into systems." (10) A fifth cluster of critical technologies was added for "technical infrastructure, which included such technologies as modeling and simulation, information system and training systems." At the time, DARPA started to focus an extensive amount of its resources on manufacturing R&D, at a rate of more than twice what the ManTech budget had been.

Under the first Bush administration, a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar Advanced Manufacturing Initiative (AMI) was created, followed by the $475-million Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP). This program was passed in 1992 under the new Clinton administration with bipartisan support. In subsequent years, additional manufacturing technology funding was provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Advanced Technology Program (ATP), the Department of Energy's Technology Enabling Agility Manufacturing (TEAM) program, and the Agile Manufacturing program sponsored jointly by DARPA and NSF.

Industry and Congress--not the Department of Defense--pushed all of these manufacturing technology programs. During this time, Mantech funding stayed relatively constant. (11, 14)

On December 19, 1991, a Deputy Secretary of Defense memo introduced the new "Seven Major S&T Thrusts for Defense S&T." The seventh thrust was "Technology For Affordability." (13) By 1993, this thrust was established as the critical technology in the DDR&E's new Science & Technology Strategy. Michael McGrath, former Director of CALS, was appointed executive director of manufacturing at DARPA.

A formal Defense Manufacturing Science & Technology Integration Plan (14) was signed by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition on December 21, 1992. The strategy said that "in recent years, both DOD and industry have recognized that downstream benefits increase when process technology needs are addressed starting in the earliest stages of product development. Integrated product and process development (IPPD) is now a key element not only in acquisition programs, but also in the thrust areas of the new S&T strategy. DOD's investment in process technologies is expanding to cover the full spectrum of development and application stages, from S&T to acquisition to life cycle support and re-manufacturing." (12)

The result was three years of dramatically increased (by a factor of 10) funding for manufacturing R&D, which was mostly accounted for by DARPA's TRP and Advanced Technology Demonstration programs as well as efforts at other federal agencies like NIST and NSF. During those peak years of 1993 through 1995, until the bottom fell out in 1994, manufacturing science and technology funding was up 150 percent.

In February 1992, a DOD National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan (11) was created at the behest of Sen. Jeff Bingaman and the Senate Armed Services S&T subcommittee. This was preceded by the industry-developed "21st Century Manufacturing Enterprise Strategy Report" facilitated by the Agility Forum at Lehigh University, which became the vision for DOD's National Defense Manufacturing Technology (NDMT) Plan. Chuck Kimsey of the OSD chaired this top-down plan, which was jointly developed by DOD, other government agencies and industry. The NDMT Plan pinpointed a variety of issues: Next Generation Manufacturing Systems focusing on intelligent manufacturing systems; Enterprise Integration focusing on communication systems, knowledge-based electronic prototype simulation and closed loop process control; and Design For Manufacturing Tools focused on technologies for electronics packaging, composite fabrication and precision machining and forming. Two other thrusts included advanced materials R&D and environmental processes. (11)

In June 1992, the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET) established an interagency working group on Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT).12 Industry was asked to develop a Common Manufacturing Strategy, which was facilitated by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). The focus was on manufacturing design technologies, manufacturing technologies, supporting technologies and manufacturing infrastructure. The FCCSET submitted a 1994 federal interagency program on Manufacturing Science, Engineering & Technology (12) totaling $1.385 billion. Of that amount, DOD's Mantech program represented only $147 million. Other key DOD manufacturing R&D programs were DARPA's Advanced Electronics Manufacturing Program at $356.2 million and DARPA's Demonstrations of Technology Affordability at $83.1 million.

In January 1994, the National Center for Advanced Technologies (NCAT) issued its first report on the activities of the working groups on "Technology For Affordability." (15) It focused on IPPD, simplified contracting and dual-use manufacturing. It recommended that "technical risk, producibility and affordability be considered much earlier than in the traditional DOD S&T/acquisition process." The use of ATDs and ACTDs was recommended to pilot these new business practices on leading-edge technologies needed for defense. This report (15) was the premier to the two subsequent directives issued by Sec. of Defense William Perry, one on June 29, 1995, entitled "Specifications and Standards--A New Way of Doing Business," and the second on May 10, 1995, on implementing an "Integrated Product Process Development" management process and use of "Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)."

In April 1994, NCAT issued another report (16) "An Assessment of the MS&T Program in Today's Defense Manufacturing Environment." This report was produced by the NCAT Joint Defense Working Group consisting of manufacturing representatives from the leading aerospace and defense industry associations and the directors of ManTech programs from each of the Services and DLA. They recommended that manufacturing be treated as a "full spectrum program" with a dominant leadership role taken by the Office of Secretary of Defense.