Beretta acquired its first numerically controlled (NC) machines in
1976. These machines functioned automatically, performing operations and
changing tools according to numerically coded instructions. Although
this technology had begun to spread through Italy at the beginning of
the decade, its presence was isolated. Its primary users were companies
that manufactured small quantities of products of high value. With the
introduction of microprocessors, controllers went down in cost and up in
reliability, making NC technology viable for large scale use. Beretta
introduced these systems into the high volume production (200 to 400
pieces per day) of small- to medium-size products.
Beretta regarded the automation of tool changing as the single most
significant benefit of NC technology. Automated tool changing meant that
what had formerly required a transfer line could now be accomplished
with a single machine. NC machines (see Figure 7.1), which combined the
versatility of general-purpose machines and the productivity of
special-purpose machines, also overcame limitations imposed on
particular components by the specialization of transfer lines. But they
were expensive. At the time, the best Beretta was able to obtain was a
four-year payback, and some had an eight-year payback.
[FIGURE 7.1 OMITTED]
"As you can see," said company president Ugo Beretta,
"it was not what you would call a brilliant investment. But we had
to do it sometime. We could have waited, but we could not turn back the
clock. It was a very new technology, with electronics and computers, and
we had to understand it. Instead of waiting, we decided we would go
ahead and buy a machine tool company and learn the new technology. So we
bought MIVAL, a small machine tool company with expertise in this
field." (1) The effects of numerical control at Beretta are
summarized in Table 7.1.
Numerical control had evolved out of a program funded by the United
States Air Force in the late 1940s for making complex shapes. Although
the first commercial products were offered a decade later, there was no
significant penetration of NC systems until controllers became more
economical and reliable in the 1970s. Although self-directed
machines--automation--went back many decades, a critical distinction
between NC and earlier automation was that the sequence of tasks could
be easily altered or replaced by loading a new program.
The work cycle of NC machines--the set of motions that determines
the selection of tools, their proper positioning in three dimensions
relative to a workpiece, feeding of workpieces, flow of coolant, and so
forth--was recorded as a series of codes initially on punch tapes, then
on magnetic tapes. This information, called a part program, was passed
to the "programmable controller," a crude special-purpose
computer that processed the information and issued signals to the
various motors on the machine to position the machine axes accurately
and precisely, and cut the workpiece. The motions a machine tool must go
through to produce a part must be described in detail, mathematically.
This reduces the entire process of producing a part, including the skill
of the machinist, to a formal, abstract expression, which, when coded
and translated by a microprocessor, activates a machine's controls.
Every machine movement, however slight, has to be formally, explicitly,
and precisely articulated. With such programmable automation, a switch
in products no longer entails physical setup changes to retool or
readjust the configuration of the machines, only a switch in programs.
Thus, NC technology combines the versatility of general-purpose machines
with the precision and control of special purpose, or self-acting,
machines. [31]
"In the past," observed The American Machinist in 1973,
humans were both translators and transmitters of information:
the operator was the ultimate interface between design intent, as
incorporated in a drawing or instruction, and machine function.
The human used mental and physical abilities to control machines.
Today, computers are increasingly becoming the translators and
transmitters of information, and numerical control is perhaps most
representative of the kind of control that plugs into the greater
stream with a minimum of human intervention. Historically,
numerical control certainly has been the most significant development
of the electronic revolution as it affects manufacturing.
Quoted in [29, p 221]
NC technology, after two decades of disappointment, came into its
own with the advent of microprocessors. Microprocessor technology made
controllers at once extremely powerful and relatively inexpensive and
its greater computer power made possible sophisticated, yet flexible and
"user friendly," operator interfaces. (2) It also made
possible advanced control techniques including allowing NC machines to
record utilization and cutting tool life, reduce set-up efforts and
time, compensate for errors, inspect surfaces and make automatic
adjustments, allow operators to modify their programming on the shop
floor, record events of the last minute or two prior to a failure, and
perform self-diagnosis. Coupled with greater sophistication in machine
tool design, numerical control using microprocessors made possible the
development of standalone machining and turning centers capable of
shift-long, untended operation.
The early problems of NC technology were partially due to limited
formal knowledge of the machining process. A lot of the knowledge
possessed by skilled machinists, such as when and how to make "on
the fly" adjustments, was tacit or otherwise not accessible to
programmers. (3) This limited understanding of contingencies and
variations in factors such as machinability, tool wear, and part
material properties significantly constrained early implementations of
NC technology. But with effort, over time more of the tacit knowledge
implicit in operator skills became precise, explicit knowledge that was
used to develop procedures capable of avoiding or dealing with a variety
of contingencies.
7.1. NC Technology at Beretta--From Synchronous to Cellular
What happened to the organization of work in the Beretta plant
after the installation of NC machines is interesting. In the
transfer-line the average cycle time for a product was two minutes. Half
of this was attributable to the machine, the other half to the operator.
With the automation of tool changing, a variety of operations could be
done by a single machine, but the overall cycle time increased. The
cycle time required by an equivalent NC machine to perform the
operations that previously required three machines would be 3.6 minutes,
only .6 of which would be operator time. Thus, one NC machine replaced
three machines, but took almost twice as long to produce a single part.
One can see that an operator of this NC machine would be idle 85%
of the time (3 minutes out of 3.6 minutes). By allocating two machines
to each operator, he would be busy 1.2 minutes while the cycle time
would still be 3.6 minutes. Thus his idle time could be reduced to 66%.
The greater the machine component of the cycle time, the larger the
cluster of machines it makes sense to put around the operator. This
leads to a cellular rather than synchronous plant layout.
In a synchronous line with two-minute cycle times, an operator
performed a fixed, unchangeable routine. The nature of the work was
determined by "hard automation," the jigs, fixtures, and cams
that governed the performance of the operation. With hard automation,
considerable effort was expended to get the jigs and fixtures right the
first time. "Quality" was front-end loaded in the hardware
design and quality control was a process of monitoring and tending the
machines and tools.
The scope of activity at any given workstation was very small and
the machine established the pace of work. The principal intellectual
activity on the line consisted in monitoring machine performance and
diagnosing problems when they occurred. Because a problem at any one
station on a synchronous line could stop all subsequent operations, thus
exacting a high cost in productivity, a large and centralized set of
resources was allocated to problem solving. At Beretta this allocation
was seen in the growth of the Quality Control department.
A cellular plant layout significantly increases the scope of
activities for which an operator is responsible. The twelve operator
stations in the barrel line layout shown in Figure 7.2 are responsible
for one hundred and sixty-eight operations, an average of fourteen
operations each. This compares with an average of three operations per
person on a typical indexing machine in a transfer line used to
manufacture, for example, the Garand rifle. Thus, we have a five-fold
increase in the scope of activities.
[FIGURE 7.2 OMITTED]
We find, too, that the nature of the work changes. An NC operator
works not with physical objects, but with information. The object of
attention and medium of work is a computer program. Whereas the operator
on a synchronous line was interested in observing the behavior of a
process, the operator in a manufacturing cell composed of NC machines is
interested in observing the behavior of a procedure.
7.2. Softening "Hard" Automation
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