Congressionally crafted definitions of cable, (1) information (2)
and telecommunications (3) service used by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") to make key policy and regulatory decisions
no longer provide clear direction in light of technological and
marketplace convergence. (4) The FCC cannot make bright line, either/or
distinctions between services, and because vastly different regulatory
burdens apply based on which classification the Commission picks,
marketplace competition can become distorted. (5) Often operators in the
Information, Communications and Entertainment ("ICE")
marketplace can secure a competitive advantage by successfully
qualifying for classification that triggers less regulatory burdens. (6)
Such regulatory arbitrage tilts the competitive playing field when
competitors offering functionally equivalent services bear higher or
lower regulatory burdens based on which service classification they
receive. (7)
Ironically, the FCC has facilitated such arbitrage in its response
to the perceived need for creating greater incentives for investment in
next generation networks (8) and a Congressional mandate to promote
"advanced telecommunications capability." (9) The Commission
now chooses to ignore or subordinate the telecommunications element of a
convergent broadband service, such as Internet access, and to emphasize
the largely unregulated information service that rides on the
telecommunications link. (10)
Technological convergence has outpaced the ability of both Congress
and the FCC to anticipate and respond to changed circumstances. (11) In
the absence of a rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934, (12) last
substantially amended in 1996, (13) the FCC must apply a limited number
of mutually exclusive service definitions to new services that frustrate
compartmentalization. Converged ICE services may incorporate two or more
regulatory classifications depending on how service providers and end
users configure services. Increasingly software and other applications,
riding on top of basic digital bitstream transmission, (14) can generate
services that integrate previously discrete telecommunications,
information and cable services. Similarly, ICE ventures seek to achieve
economies of scale and scope through vertical integration that combines
basic transmission of digital bits with software and other value adding
enhancements. (15)
Additionally, the apparent duty to shoehorn all services into one
category (16) has forced the FCC to make decisions that reclassify a
service. (17) For example, the FCC recently reclassified telephone
company provided "Digital Subscriber Link" ("DSL")
service as an information service, (18) despite having previously
identified it as a telecommunications service. (19) By ignoring or
subordinating the telecommunications component in DSL, the Commission
assumes it lawfully can reclassify it as an information service like
cable modem service, with necessary telecommunications bit transport
considered an integrated and subordinate component. (20)
Having static and limited regulatory classifications to work with
has also forced the FCC to acknowledge inconsistency in how it applies
the same Congressionally crafted service definitions. (21) For example,
the FCC has already deemed some types of Internet-mediated telephone
services as fitting within the information service classification. (22)
Other more sophisticated and versatile forms of Internet telephony,
commonly referred as Voice over the Internet Protocol
("VoIP"), may also fit within this category, (23) even though
the FCC may impose specific public safety and public interest
obligations under Title I authority. Notwithstanding existing and likely
future information service designations for VoIP, the FCC recently
acknowledged that for purposes of cooperation with law enforcement
agencies as mandated by federal law, VoIP operators provide
telecommunications services and must cooperate with law enforcement
officials seeking wiretaps. (24)
Adding to the confusion, the Supreme Court in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, (25) showed
significant confusion in understanding converging telecommunications and
information processing technologies. (26) The Court had to determine
whether cable television companies providing access to the Internet
offer an information service, subject to quite limited regulation, or a
telecommunications service, subject to possibly more government
oversight. (27) Both the majority opinion and a dissenting opinion used
curious analogies involving packaged services in automobile
manufacturing, pet stores, and pizzerias, as a way to conceptualize
converging telecommunications and information processing services. (28)
The use of simplistic but competing analogies within Supreme Court
opinions demonstrates how experts in the law struggle to conceptualize
information processing even as they appear to have little sense of how
most consumers will soon access ICE services and what kinds of
traditional consumer safeguards remain essential. The Brand X case will
provide the legal foundation for the FCC to abandon most regulations of
both telephone and cable television companies, based on the Supreme
Court's endorsement of limited regulation for information service
markets. (29)
How the FCC and the Supreme Court have responded to ICE convergence
provides a key case study for assessing the consequences of having to
apply congressionally crafted definitions that no longer provide the
foundation for different regulatory treatment. This article will
identify problems in the Communications Act of 1934 (30) and suggest how
a revised law might promote full and fair competition with limited
governmental interference. This article will consider the viability of
antitrust scrutiny in lieu of ex ante service specific regulation, and
initiatives in the European Union that rely on structural safeguards
that the FCC first used, but later abandoned. Additionally, this article
will recommend that legislatures and regulators combine greater
granularity and specificity in service definitions with more timely,
certain and calibrated assessment of market dominance and market
failure.
FINDING SIMILARITY IN PIZZA DELIVERY AND INFORMATION SERVICES
In Brand X, a majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the FCC's
information service classification for cable modem service. (31) Using
the Chevron (32) standard, which supports deferral to administrative
agency decision-making that reasonably interprets and implements
statutory language, (33) the Court cleared the way for the FCC to create
a lightly regulated information service "safe harbor" for both
cable modem and DSL high speed broadband access services.
A majority of the Court agreed that the FCC could reasonably have
concluded that cable modems solely provide an information service,
despite the use of telecommunications to link subscribers with content.
(34) Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal's prior determination that a separate and identifiable
telecommunications service element existed on grounds that the Chevron
precedent supported the FCC's statutory construction: "A
court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from unambiguous
terms of the statue and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."
(35)
The Court concluded that the Communications Act of 1934, (36) as
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (37) contained
ambiguities as to whether cable companies offered telecommunication
services in conjunction with their cable modem service. (38)
The majority used several analogies to support the view that the
FCC could lawfully ignore or subordinate the telecommunications
function. (39) The majority's analogies provided examples in which
a venture offers a number of services, many of which can be combined
into a consolidated package, and others that are made available, but
that are not essential. (40) In the former, the majority noted that car
dealers sell cars and not a collection of integrated components, such as
an engine and chassis. (41) The majority also rejected Justice
Scalia's analogies by noting that customers can pick up pizzas
rather than have them delivered, and similarly can purchase dog leashes
at pet stores without also having to purchase a dog. (42)
Because ambiguity exists as to the functional integration or
separateness of telecommunications, the Court majority gladly deferred
to the FCC. (43) The Court noted that the nature and scope of
integration between telecommunications and information processing
"turns not on the language of the [Communications] Act, but on the
factual particulars of how Internet technology works and how it is
provided, questions Chevron leaves to the Commission to resolve in the
first instance." (44) While engaging in the use of "warring
analogies," (45) the majority appears content on deferring to the
FCC's technical expertise in determining how best to implement
Congressional intent.
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