Means-plus-function clauses in patent claims: a tortuous path.

The courts should rule that the statutory definition of means-plus-function clauses defines in total what means-plus-function clauses cover, not simply what they "literally" cover, and that it does so independently of what an accused infringer may be doing. Moreover, the applicable equivalence standard should be the traditional doctrine of equivalents, as Congress provided in a clear mandate. (83)

VI. CONCLUSION

In 1952, Congress adopted a clear mandate to correct the apparent effect of the Supreme Court ruling in Halliburton, which was believed at the time to be a death knell for means-plus-function claiming. (84) The Patent Act of 1952 provided a statutory construction for means-plus-function clauses in patent claims based on the relevant structure in the patent specification and its equivalents. (85) Those associated with the drafting of the Act believed that the new "equivalents" provision in the Act introduced the traditional doctrine of equivalents. (86) Moreover, this type of equivalence was the only one in existence at the time.

Adherence to this doctrine would eliminate: (a) the double standard of equivalence; (b) the two-step analysis and the question of when the second equivalence analysis must be undertaken; (c) the rule that [section] 112, paragraph 6, concerns only literal infringement; and (d) the need for an alternative path of analysis depending on whether the accused device performs precisely the function claimed. (87)

Thus, the cure is a simple one. In keeping with the clear and long-standing mandate of [section] 112, paragraph 6, the means-plus-function clause should be accorded the scope of equivalence allowed by the traditional doctrine of equivalents, irrespective of the nature of the accused device.

(1.) 35 U.S.C. [section] et seq. (2000).

(2.) See Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 442 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).

(3.) 35 U.S.C. [section] 112, para. 6 (originally para. 3).

(4.) Id. (emphasis added).

(5.) See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946).

(6.) See id. at 7-8, 12-13.

(7.) Id. at 8-9.

(8.) Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997).

(9.) See 35 U.S.C. [section] 112, para. 6.

(10.) Id. The statute also refers to "material" and "acts" in addition to "structure." Id These terms are applicable when the claims are directed to compositions of matter or methods, respectively. For simplicity, this paper refers only to "structure," but the same analysis applies with respect to these other categories.

(11.) See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

(12.) Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

(13.) Id. at 1020 (Plager, J., additional views).

(14.) In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (quoting Ex parte Ball and Hair, 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 146, 148 (B.P.A.I. 1953)).

(15.) See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining the meaning of [section] 112, paragraph 6, and its mandatory effects).

(16.) D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

(17.) See id. This determination presumably resulted from using [section] 112, paragraph 6, to construe the means clause and then concluding that if the clause, so construed, is found in the accused device, there is literal infringement. An alternative, and more workable, construction of the section would have been to conclude that the "construed to cover" language in [section] 112, paragraph 6, means that the clause in question covers the scope defined by [section] 112, paragraph 6, and nothing more.

(18.) Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934. The court stated, "If the required function is not performed exactly in the accused device, it must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6, equivalency is not involved." Id. (emphasis in the original text). If this is so, what is involved? Without the protection of [section] 112, paragraph 6, are we back to Halliburton? Is there any basis jurisprudentially for simply adopting the "corresponding structure ... and equivalents thereof" standard, 35 U.S.C. [section] 112, para. 6, and then departing from the constraints of its protection?

(19.) The approach of considering the function of the accused device in construing claims under [section] 112, paragraph 6, is also inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's rule of interpreting claims generally. See Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("It is well settled that claims may not be construed by reference to the accused device").

(20.) The application of the doctrine of equivalents separately to each means-plus-function clause is consistent with the ruling by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem., that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied on a limitation-by-limitation basis, rather than finding overall equivalence to be sufficient. 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).

(21.) See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 38 (1929); Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1898); Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 299 (1889); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 547 (1870).

(22.) See Seymour, 78 U.S. at 547.

(23.) Sanitary Refrigerator Co., 280 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)) (emphasis added). (24.) See id. at 42-43.

(25.) Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419-21 (1908).

(26.) Id. at 420-21; Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946).

(27.) Cont'l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 419-20.

(28.) Id. at 420.

(29.) Id. at 417.

(30.) Id.

(31.) Id. at 421.

(32.) Id.

(33.) Id. (emphasis added).

(34.) Id. at 422.

(35.) Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1946).

(36.) Cont'l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 421.

(37.) Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 13-14.

(38.) See Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 998 n.5 (4th Cir. 1977).

(39.) See id.

(40.) H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. (1950).

(41.) Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).

(42.) H.R. 3760, 82nd Cong. (1951).

(43.) See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997) ("Congress enacted [section] 112, [paragraph] 6, in response to Halliburton ... which rejected claims that 'do not describe the invention but use "conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty."'").

(44.) Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 95 (1951).

(45.) Representative Joseph R. Bryson, Address Before the Philadelphia Patent Law Association (Jan. 24, 1952), reprinted in AM. PAT. L. ASS'N BULL., Feb. 1952, at 40, 45-46 (emphasis added), quoted in part in In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.11 (C.C.P.A. 1963).

(46.) L. James Harris, Assoc. Dir. of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Found. of The George Washington Univ., Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, Address Before the Patent Section of the St. Louis Bar Ass'n, reprinted in 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 687-88 (1955) (citation omitted).

(47.) See Hale Fire Pump Co. v. Tokai, Ltd., 614 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (applying the doctrine of equivalents to alleged infringement under [section] 112, paragraph 6); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 82 (Ct. C1. 1977); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) ("[T]his part of the statute reflects one facet of the judicially created doctrine of equivalents and it was the only part enacted into law by Congress."), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).

(48.) Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 28. The Court added, "We recognized this type of role for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank itself." Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950)).

(49.) See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1354-55, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

(50.) See id. at 1356; see also WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1352-54 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This being the state of the law, one might have a better chance of proving infringement when the function performed by the accused device is different from the claimed function (when the doctrine of equivalents applies), than when the function performed is the same as that claimed (when [section] 112, paragraph 6, equivalence applies).

(51.) 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

(52.) Id. (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610) (emphasis added).

(53.) Id.

(54.) See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 421 (1908).

(55.) Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30, 40 (1997).

(56.) 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

(57.) Id. at 975 n.4.

(58.) Id.

(59.) See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Federal Circuit adopts body of law represented by holdings of predecessor courts, but may overrule such precedent when sitting en banc).

(60.) See Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 975 n.4.

(61.) 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

(62.) See id. at 1043-44.

(63.) Id.

(64.) Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-30 (1997).

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