Contract enforcement, social efficiency, and distribution: some experimental evidence.

(0.003) N = 1,720 Log pseudo likelihood = -693.36 Pseudo [R.sup.2] = 0.37 Note: Double asterisks (**) indicate significance at 5% level. Single asterisk (*) indicates significance at 10% level. The estimation procedure is a probit regression with standard errors adjusted for clustering on experiments (in parentheses). Demographic variables for gender. age, GPA, and employment status are included as control variables but their coefficients were not reported. Table 5. Second-Stage Regression Regressors Private Public (A) (Dependent Var. = Surplus)

RC1 (dummy) -8.23 ** -34.35 **

(2.32) (6.86)

RC2 (dummy) -3.55 -9.08 **

(2.04) (3.45)

Lagged quality 4.21 ** 2.89 **

(0.62) (0.73)

Length of private relationship. 0.403 -0.14

(0.28) (0.60)

Lagged price deviation -0.30 * 0.02

(0.15) (0.18)

Inverse Mills Ratio 0.48 0.04

(0.41) (0.19)

Period 1.31 0.83

(1.03) (0.57)

Period2 -0.10 * -0.04

(0.06) (0.03)

Constant 30.79 ** 35.61 **

(12.23) (7.73) N 590 1,130 [R.sup.2] 0.48 0.66 (B) (Dependent Var. = Buyer Profits)

RC1 (dummy) -16.20 ** -45.18 **

(2.96) (9.58)

RC2 (dummy) -0.69 -9.03

(3.88) (5.91)

Lagged quality 3.14 ** 1.96 **

(0.55) (0.84)

Length of private relationship -0.85 -1.33

(0.54) (1.28)

Lagged price deviation -0.23 ** -0.005

(0.11) (0.13)

Inverse Mills Ratio 1.00 -0.09

(0.65) (0.35)

Period 2.06 * 2.01 **

(1.08) (0.58)

Period2 -0.10 * -0.07 **

(0.05) (0.03)

Constant 14.38 17.25

(24.38) (13.76) N 590 1,130 [R.SUP.2] 0.41 0.64 (C) (Dependent Var. = Seller Profits)

RC1 (dummy) 7.97 ** 10.83

(1.75) (8.49)

RC2 (dummy) -2.87 -0.06

(3.77) (3.05)

Lagged quality 1.08 ** 0.93

(0.30) (0.75)

Length of private relationship 1.25 ** 1.19

(0.36) (0.96)

Lagged price deviation -0.07 0.03

(0.09) (0.11)

Inverse Mills Ratio -0.53 0.12

(0.39) (0.23)

Period -0.76 -1.18 **

(0.85) (0.47)

Period2 -0.003 0.03

(0.05) (0.03)

Constant 16.41 18.36

(23.30) (10.63) N 590 1,130 [R.sup.2] 0.27 0.64

Chow Tests for Regressors Differences in R (A) (Dependent Var. = Surplus)

RC1 (dummy) 26.48 **

(7.83)

RC2 (dummy) 5.76

(3.77)

Lagged quality

Length of private relationship.

Lagged price deviation

Inverse Mills Ratio

Period

Period2

Constant N [R.sup.2] (B) (Dependent Var. = Buyer Profits)

RC1 (dummy) 29.39 **

(8.92)

RC2 (dummy) 9.12 *

(5.09)

Lagged quality

Length of private relationship

Lagged price deviation

Inverse Mills Ratio

Period

Period2

Constant N [R.SUP.2] (C) (Dependent Var. = Seller Profits)

RC1 (dummy) -2.91

(8.26)

RC2 (dummy) -3.36

(4.12)

Lagged quality

Length of private relationship

Lagged price deviation

Inverse Mills Ratio

Period

Period2

Constant N [R.sup.2] Note: Standard errors are robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on sessions. Demographic variables for gender, age, GPA, and employment status are included but their coefficients were not reported.