The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for a male being a
farmer or otherwise self-employed is significantly different from zero
at the 1% level. Having this occupational classification reduces the
hazard of interstate migration by 83% for otherwise similar males, a
very large effect, suggesting the occupational structure of jobs is an
important factor affecting adult working-age males' tendency to
stay at a particular location. Union membership decreases the male
hazard of interstate migration, but the coefficient of UNION is
significantly different from zero at only the 9% level. A male who has
experienced unemployment is more likely to move, but the coefficient of
UNEM in the hazard function is significantly different from zero only at
the 7% level. Although we expressed uncertainty about the expected
effect of an adult male being married on his hazard of interstate
migration, being married actually reduces his probability of migration.
This suggests that wives, on average, are well matched to the location
where they are currently living. An adult male having an additional
school-age child reduces his hazard of interstate migration by 20%.
When interpreting the effects of amenities on the male hazard of
interstate migration, it is important to recall that the male's
real wage residual has been adjusted for the market's valuation of
these attributes at a new destination. Hence, the remaining direct
effects of local amenities on the hazard rate of interstate migration
capture effects that are not fully reflected in real wage differences,
largely the crime rate at the origin. Our results show that the
disamenity of having a higher local crime rate has a positive and
significant effect on a male's hazard of interstate migration. It
is significant at the 1% level, and at the margin a one percentage point
increase in CRIME increases the hazard rate for interstate migration by
about 7 %. None of the other amenity variables--PARKS, JAN, or
JULY--significantly impact the male hazard rate of interstate migration,
suggesting that these local amenities are adequately reflected in male
real wage differences.
As expected, a white working-age male has a significantly higher
hazard of interstate migration than does a nonwhite male, other things
equal; the hazard of interstate migration is 77% higher for a white than
nonwhite male.
Conclusions
This article provides new information on wage differentials of men
and on their hazard of interstate migration. In contrast to Roback
(1988), we find that the cost-of-living and location-specific amenities
account for some, but not all, of the regional differences in real wage
rates. Regional wage differences persist after controlling for local
amenities/disamenities--urbanization, crime rate, and natural amenities.
We used the difference between a male's actual real wage at the
origin and his predicted real wage in the national labor market to proxy
his wage incentive to migrate. This methodology has the advantage of
creating a wage differential for all sample males, irrespective of
whether they actually migrate. It also gets us free of endogeneity of
the wage in a new destination for those who move. We showed that an
increase in the male wage differential between origin and destination,
higher fixed costs associated with moving, such as being a farmer or
otherwise self-employed, or having school-age children, significantly
decreases working-age males' hazard of interstate migration.
Consistent with a range of migration studies, we find that males who
have more education have a higher hazard of interstate migration.
A high crime rate at the origin, a disamenity, has a direct
positive effect on the hazard of interstate migration. However, we find
that natural amenities do not directly affect the hazard of interstate
migration. This suggests that the local crime rate affects incentives to
migrate differently than natural amenities. Our hazard model shows that
migration is time dependent--the probability of a spell ending is low
upon arrival at a location, increasing until a male has spent six years
in residence, and thereafter, the likelihood of migration declines.
Because of significant migration fixed costs and the disamenity of a
high local crime rate, our results imply that interstate migration
cannot be expected to fully equalize male real wage rates across state
labor markets, which supports Roback's (1988) conclusion. Our
empirical results are for the most part econometrically strong, and we
feel quite confident generalizing them to U.S. adult working-age males
in later time periods.
State policy-makers should be concerned about our results. They
show that both cost-of-living and amenities impact spatial wage
differences. Hence, if a state has disamenities--a highly urbanized
population, high crime rate, or low January or July temperatures--wages
will need to be higher to attract and keep workers. States may choose to
pursue a high education policy, which will raise wage rates there, but
it will also increase the probability of outmigration. To offset this
effect, a state might pursue a policy that encourages self-employment of
these highly educated individuals, for example, easing occupational
licensing regulations and speedily issuing needed permits to start new
businesses because self-employed farmers and others become quite
immobile over time. These programs targeting the self-employed would be
most effective if they structured some benefits to be distributed during
year four through eight of residency, when the hazard of interstate
migration is peaking and after which the likelihood of interstate
migration declines dramatically. A state that has a high crime rate is
at a major disadvantage when trying to keep or attract residents, and
hence, investing in crime prevention could be a good long-term
investment. For example, our results suggest that crime prevention is a
better investment than state parks.
The authors thank Georgeanne Artz and Peter Orazem for helpful
comments, Cindy Pease for editorial assistance, and the Iowa Agriculture
and Home Economics Experiment Station for financial assistance.
[Received April 2005; accepted June 2006.]
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