Cross-border unitization and joint development
agreements: an international law perspective.
by Bastida, Ana E.^Ifesi-Okoye, Adaeze^Mahmud, Salim^Ross, James
^Walde, Thomas
The agency held exclusive mineral and oil titles and could act
alone or in association with other companies or international
organizations, but was subject to the guidance and instructions of the
joint governmental authority consisting of the heads of the impacted
governments or their delegates. (355) The applicable law with regards to
mining and petroleum was the law of Senegal, with the law of
Guinea-Bissau applying to the fishery resources. (356)
g. Argentina-U.K. Joint Declaration, 1995 (357)
The history of this area reflects the long-standing dispute between
Argentina and the United Kingdom over sovereignty of the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, which culminated in war in 1982. (358)
Subsequently, there was a series of agreements, mainly with respect to
fishing, in the disputed area between the islands and Argentina. These
agreements were followed on September 27, 1995, by the Joint Declaration
on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic.
(359) This declaration defined a "Special Area" to the
southwest of the islands within which the states agreed to cooperate in
the exploration for and exploitation of hydrocarbons. (360)
As is usual in such agreements, it is without prejudice to any
sovereignty or maritime delimitation claims by the states. The
declaration indicates that nothing in the conduct or content must be
interpreted as a change in the position of either party with regard to
the sovereignty, territorial, or maritime jurisdiction over the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands,
and the surrounding maritime areas. (361) However, "the two
[states] agreed to cooperate in order to encourage offshore activities
in the [specified area.]" (362) Exploration for and exploitation of
petroleum was to be implemented:
(i) "[B]y means of the establishment of a Joint Commission,
composed of delegations from both sides;" and,
(ii) "[B]y means of coordinated activities in up to 6
tranches, each of about 3,500 square kilometers." (363)
The Joint Commission was to submit recommendations and proposed
standards for the protection of the marine environment to both
governments, to coordinate activities in the tranches through an
established subcommittee, to promote the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum, and to submit recommendations on any related
matters that may arise in the future. (364)
A subcommittee acting under the supervision of the Joint Commission
was in charge of coordination of activities in the tranches. (365) It
was established to encourage activities in each tranche by means of
joint ventures; seek nominations from companies; make recommendations on
proposals to both governments for development projects; seek
coordination of all aspects of operations such as level of fees,
royalties, charges, taxes, the harmonization of timing, commercial terms
and conditions, and compliance with recommended standards; and recommend
additional tranches on the basis of geological data known to both sides.
(366) The expectation was that joint petroleum development would proceed
on a 50:50 licensing basis between the Falklands/Malvinas Islands
government and the Argentina government. (367)
The joint declaration did not specify the duration of the
arrangement and did not provide for criminal jurisdiction over
exploration and exploitation in the Special Area.
h. Timor Sea Treaty (Australia-East Timor), 2001 (368)
The validity of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and
Indonesia had been called into question by several political events.
Portugal had challenged Indonesia's authority to conclude such a
treaty as, in its view, the annexation of East Timor was illegal under
international law. (369) Then in 1999, the East Timorese people voted
for independence and this set a chain of events in motion for a
renegotiation of the treaty. (370)
The United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor
(UNTAET) took over government functions on behalf of East Timor on
October 25, 1999. (371) An MOU was agreed between UNTAET and Australia
on February 10, 2000, and was to take effect on October 25, 1999. The
MOU permitted the continued operation of the JDZ established between
Australia and Indonesia in 1989, with UNTAET representing the position
of East Timor. (372) The sharing basis of 50:50 of the prior
Australia-Indonesia agreement (373) was maintained by this temporary
arrangement. (374) However, in March 2000, negotiations were started
between UNTAET (with representation from the East Timor Transitional
Administration) and Australia, and this led to another MOU on July 5,
2001. (375) The second MOU provided for a continuation of the joint
development principle over the renamed JPDA, covering only Area A of the
Australia-Indonesia agreement, but with a significantly modified basis
for sharing of benefits: ninety percent to East Timor and ten percent to
Australia. (376)
On achieving full independence on May 20, 2002, East Timor (now the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) signed the Timor Sea Treaty with
Australia, replacing the interim agreement between UNTAET and Australia.
(377) An Exchange of Notes on the same date allowed the continued
operations until the treaty was ratified by both states and came into
force on May 20, 2002. (378)
Administration of the JPDA is based on a three-tiered structure,
with a Ministerial Council, a Joint Commission, and a Designated
Authority. (379) The Ministerial Council consists of an equal number of
Ministers from each state, but East Timor has the right to appoint one
more commissioner than Australia to the Joint Commission. (380)
"The Joint Commission shall establish policies and regulations
relating to petroleum activities in the JPDA and shall oversee the work
of the Designated Authority." (381) After the first three years of
the treaty, unless otherwise agreed, "the Designated Authority
shall be the East Timor Government Ministry responsible for petroleum
activities or, if so decided by the Ministry, an East Timor statutory
authority." (382) The Designated Authority is responsible to the
Joint Commission and carries out the day-to-day regulation and
management of petroleum activities. (383)
The treaty is explicitly based on the 1982 UNCLOS requirement for
states with opposite or adjacent coasts to enter into "provisional
arrangements of a practical nature," pending agreement on boundary
delimitation. (384) As is usual in JDZ treaties, the agreement is
without prejudice to the eventual delimitation. In this case, however,
the treaty is automatically terminated if agreement is reached on the
permanent seabed delimitation prior to its duration of thirty years.
(385) Notwithstanding any termination of the treaty, ongoing petroleum
activities "shall continue even if the Treaty is no longer in force
under conditions equivalent to those in place under the Treaty."
(386) Negotiations on permanent maritime delimitation between the two
states are ongoing, though reports indicate that little or no progress
has been made due to the diametrically opposed views of the two states.
i. Nigeria-Sao Tome e Principe, 2001 (387)
The two states were unable to reach agreement on their maritime
boundary due to their conflicting positions. In 2001, they established a
JDZ in their overlapping EEZs covering seabed, subsoil, and adjacent
waters. (388) The zone extended from the median line towards Sao Tome e
Principe and provides for a 60:40 split in favor of Nigeria. (389) As is
usual for JDZ agreements, the treaty contained a "without
prejudice" clause stating that nothing in the treaty shall be
interpreted as a renunciation of any right or claim to the area in whole
or part. (390)
As with the Timor Gap Treaty, this treaty established a Joint
Ministerial Council (391) as well as a Joint Authority. The Joint
Authority was governed by a board made up of four executive directors;
two appointed by the heads of state of each state. (392) The Joint
Authority was responsible to the Ministerial Council. (393) The Joint
Authority had juridical personality in international law and under the
law of each of the states, and legal capacities under the law of both
states as were necessary for the exercise of its powers. (394)
The Joint Authority was to prepare, for the approval of the
ministerial council, a regulatory and tax regime consistent with this
treaty, which became the applicable law relating to the exploration for
and exploitation of petroleum in the JDZ. (395) This was prepared in
2003. (396) Only petroleum activities undertaken in the JDZ pursuant to
a petroleum development contract between the Joint Authority and one or
more contractors were valid. (397) The 2003 licensing round with nine
blocks on offer received thirty-three bids from twenty-three companies.
(398)
C. General Structure of Agreements
Establishing the area to be covered by a joint development
agreement is not a trivial exercise. Although such agreements are
invariably without prejudice to subsequent delimitation, it is important
that each state ensures that its claim is reflected in the area covered
by the JDZ, to the extent that the claim is valid under international
law. In some cases, it may be appropriate to establish more than one
zone in the agreement, with different terms applying to each area.
Existing joint petroleum development agreements show a wide
variation in structure. However, six major issues can be identified as
being particularly important for any such agreement. These key issues
are the (i) sharing of resources, (ii) management of joint development,
(iii) applicable law, (iv) operator and position of contractors, (v)
financial provisions, and (vi) dispute resolution. (399)
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