Cross-border unitization and joint development
agreements: an international law perspective.
by Bastida, Ana E.^Ifesi-Okoye, Adaeze^Mahmud, Salim^Ross, James
^Walde, Thomas
International custom has historically been the core source of
international law, and has remained so in some areas of the law despite
efforts of codification and creation of multilateral treaties in
important subjects. (23) International custom derives its force from two
essential elements: the concurrence of uniform state practice and a
subjective belief that adherence to these rules is obligatory (opinio
juris). (24) Actual state practice is the basis for customary law; this
can also be found in the writings of learned international lawyers and
in judicial decisions of national and international courts. (25)
Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) can be
evidence of customary law as they reflect the views of the majority of
member states. (26) Their normative value might be determined, inter
alia, on the basis of their general acceptance. (27)
It is important to note that the decisions of the ICJ are "not
governed by the principle of stare decisis." (28) Article 59 of the
Statute of the ICJ states that Court decisions are not binding except
between the parties to a case and in connection to that particular case
only. (29) However, this does not mean that the Court ignores precedent.
As quoted above, Article 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ requires
the Court to apply judicial decisions, subject to the provisions of
Article 59, as a "subsidiary means" for the determination of
rules of law. (30) It uses precedent as a persuasive argument rather
than a binding one. From a practical standpoint, if the Court does not
follow previous case precedent in rendering a decision, then those prior
cases are likely to be distinguished from the case currently before the
Court. (31)
B. Sovereignty, Territory, and Boundaries
Sovereignty, territory, and boundaries are key concepts of public
international law. They define essential attributes of a state, the
primary subject of international law. (32) Sovereignty represents
"the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which
governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform
legal personality." (33) Sovereignty means that states have
"1) jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the
permanent population living there; 2) a duty of non-intervention in the
area of exclusive jurisdiction of other States; and 3)the dependence of
obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of
the obligor." (34) Furthermore, "[t]he territorial sovereignty
of states extends to the mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of
their land territory and territorial sea to an unlimited depth."
(35) States have exclusive sovereign rights rather than full territorial
sovereignty over mineral resources located in the continental shelf.
(36) Sovereign rights of a coastal state for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting the natural resources extend to the EEZ. (37)
Territorial integrity is a "necessary corollary to the
principle of territorial sovereignty." (38) It protects the
sanctity of a state's territory from unauthorized invasion or
interference from operations conducted in another state. (39) It follows
that no state may exercise rights over mineral resources of other states
without their consent. (40)
The fundamental principle is that territorial sovereignty of states
does not extend beyond their borders; each state exercises exclusive
authority on its own territory and any infringement across an
international boundary would constitute a violation of another
state's territorial sovereignty or exclusive sovereign rights. (41)
II. DELIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES
"Maritime boundary delimitation is as old as the concept of
offshore jurisdiction itself." (42) Subsurface petroleum deposits
located offshore pose a set of problems that usually concern the
delimitation of the boundaries of the continental shelf and the EEZ
between the bordering states. (43)
A. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
"The concept of national jurisdiction over a continental shelf
beyond the territorial sea is relatively modern in origin, usually being
traced to the 1945 Truman Proclamation." (44) The 1940s and 1950s
saw pressures on the legal structure that previously had recognized only
the three mile territorial sea limit, and even that was not universally
accepted. (45) Coastal states became interested in gaining control over
an extended area of the sea and its resources. (46) The Truman
Declaration of 1945 was a major influence in boundary delimitation. The
Truman Declaration proclaimed, "[T]he Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coast of
the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its
jurisdiction and control." (47) Because of the likely existence of
oil resources, it also included a provision, that "[w]here the
continental shelf extends to the shores of another State ... the
boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State
concerned in accordance with equitable principles." (48)
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (49) seemed to
depart from the principles of the Truman Declaration. Instead, following
deliberations by the International Law Commission (ILC) that examined
several methods of delimitation, the Geneva Convention stated:
In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary [between adjacent nations] shall be
determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured. (50)
Similarly this principle, known as the equidistance principle, is
further explained in Article 6(1):
[W]here the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more States whose coasts are
opposite each other.... In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured. (51)
The Geneva Convention defined the continental shelf as:
[T]he seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas. (52)
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ stated that the
Truman Declaration's principle of delimitation by mutual agreement
and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles had become the
basis of the subject. The ICJ further decided that the ILC had not
intended the equidistance principle to be a departure from the Truman
Declaration: the "special circumstances" exception in Article
6 equated to the Truman Declaration's words effected on
"equitable principles." (53) This led the Court to the
conclusion that there was no obligatory rule of continental shelf
delimitation. (54) The ICJ defined the continental shelf of the coastal
state as a '"[n]atural prolongation of its land
territory' existing 'ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of
its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it an exercise of
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting
its natural resources."' (55)
The rules regarding continental shelf delimitation were clarified
in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
(56) UNCLOS stated:
[A coastal state is entitled to a continental shelf
extending] throughout the natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance [subject to
delimitation with opposite and adjacent states with an
entitlement over the same area of the continental
shelf.] (57)
The outer limit of the continental shelf is subject to an overall
maximum of 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500
meter isobath. (58) UNCLOS stressed that the coastal state is entitled
to exercise sovereign rights "for the purpose of exploring [the
shelf] and exploiting its natural resources." (59) These rights are
exclusive and no other state may carry out such activities without the
express consent of the coastal state. (60)
In the Malta-Libya Continental Shelf Case the ICJ recognized for
the first time the continental shelf concept from UNCLOS as part of
international customary law. (61) As a result, each coastal state,
whether or not a signatory to UNCLOS, was entitled to a 200 nautical
mile legal continental shelf, regardless of whether the shelf was
continuous or extended that far. (62) For those states fortunate enough
to have a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, natural
prolongation of their land territory remains the criteria, subject to
Article 76, which determines the limits of their claims. (63)
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