The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

The U.S. administration responded to these attacks. One mission of the U.S. soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom has been to protect Iraq's oil infrastructure. (48) This military mission included infantry soldiers guarding pipelines, (49) the Army Corps of Engineers working on damaged pipelines, (50) and the U.S. Navy maintaining a presence in the Basra port facility. (51)

United States forces are not acting alone in protecting Iraqi pipelines. The Iraqi government has deployed local security guards to protect pipelines, (52) many of whom have lost their lives. (53) Moreover, the Iraqi Oil Ministry has recently been developing new pipeline security measures, fencing off 435 miles of the Kirkuk pipeline and deploying 1,500 Iraqi troops along its vast expanse. (54)

B. The Future ... It's Shocking

There are many other instances of terrorist groups targeting energy assets around the world. (55) The specific examples mentioned demonstrate the willingness and ability of terrorists to target energy assets, and their threats of future attacks suggest they will continue. Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned energy companies of Osama bin Laden's approval of targeting natural gas pipelines and facilities in North America if he were detained or killed. (56) This statement was not made offhandedly. Al-Qaeda's leader is well aware of the impact that targeting energy assets can have on the United States and the world. (57) Other terrorists have followed bin Laden's lead and recognized oil as "the provision line and the feeding artery of the life of the crusader nation." (58) With this in mind, terrorist websites have called on "our brothers in the battlefields to direct some of their great efforts towards the oil wells and pipelines...." (59) These threats clearly caught the attention of experts and legislators worldwide. (60)

1. The Oil Shockwave

Experts in the private sector and some legislators have been attempting to raise awareness of the importance of energy security. (61) These experts and legislators recognize the destructive power terrorist organizations can have by targeting energy assets and are heeding the threats of future attacks. (62)

In response to terrorist attacks and the continuing threats on energy infrastructure--specifically oil assets--the organization Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE), (63) in conjunction with the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP), (64) conducted a simulation exercise entitled Oil Shockwave in June 2005. (65) This exercise involved former top government officials including two former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (66) The participants acted as advisors to the President in response to a series of hypothetical situations that would potentially reduce worldwide oil production. (67)

The Oil Shockwave scenarios were as follows: 1) in December 2005, violence and unrest in Nigeria caused 600,000 barrels of oil per day to be taken off the market and a severe winter in the northern hemisphere increased demand to 700,000 barrels per day, 2) in January 2006, coordinated terrorist attacks on oil infrastructure in both the United States and Saudi Arabia drive the oil shortage to 3.4 million barrels per day, and 3) in June 2006, a terror campaign targeting foreign nationals in Saudi Arabia is commenced. (68)

The group predicted the price of oil to skyrocket to over $160 per barrel causing the price of gasoline to rise to $5.74 per gallon in scenario number three. (69) The group then analyzed the economic effects of oil prices reaching $120 per barrel within the context of the fictionalized circumstances. (70) Some of the more notable impacts were an estimated two million jobs lost in 2007 and a $2,680 increase in annual gasoline costs to the average American household. (71) Dr. Robert Gates, the former head of the CIA and the former president of Texas A&M University, (72) participated in Oil Shockwave and stated, "IT]he scenarios portrayed were absolutely not alarmist; they're realistic." (73)

2. The NATO Forum on Energy Security Technology

Along with the Oil Shockwave exercise, an additional indicator of the growing importance of energy security is the NATO Forum on Energy Security Technology held in February 2006. (74) Some of the Oil Shockwave participants attended the NATO Forum along with the Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command, the deputy prime minister of the Czech Republic, and a former U.S. National Security Advisor. (75) The willingness of NATO to dedicate such a significant platform solely to energy security highlights this topic's burgeoning international recognition. (76) The suggestions made and decisions reached at this conference could indicate the direction participating organizations and nations will take regarding energy security. (77)

Recent works discuss the significance and debate the appropriateness of the use of the U.S. military in the security of worldwide energy facilities. (78) This Comment will not specifically address that issue. Regardless, it seems clear that terrorist organizations recognize the severe impact the destruction of energy assets can have on any nation. (79) Arguably, the United States will not be the only nation facing the decision of using force to protect international energy assets. This Comment suggests that without clear international guidance from the United Nations, individual nations and other multinational organizations may feel empowered to protect energy infrastructure as they see fit.

III. THE NEED FOR ENERGY SECURITY POLICY

A. United States Energy Security Should Not Stop at the Coastline: Congress Should Model Federal Energy Security Legislation After The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

The President recently signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 into law. (80) The Act has already been touted as some of the most significant energy legislation of the past seventy years. (81) Conspicuously lacking from the Act is any mention of energy security outside of securing nuclear energy facilities. (82) This is the only legislation since 1992 dealing explicitly with energy policy. (83) That the previously mentioned terrorist incidents targeted at energy assets have taken place in this thirteen year interim period (84) makes the Act's lack of energy security provisions all the more apparent and troubling. In light of the increasing terrorist activity against non-nuclear energy assets, (85) federal legislation is desperately needed to ensure uniform energy security regardless of the type of asset.

Congress apparently recognized this terrorist threat to energy assets in the maritime context and enacted the MTSA. (86) The MTSA states in its findings, "The United States is increasingly dependent on imported energy for a substantial share of its energy supply, and a disruption of that share of supply would seriously harm consumers and our economy." (87) The MTSA also states, "Ports are often very open and exposed and are susceptible to large scale acts of terrorism that could cause a large loss of life or economic disruption." (88) The legislation's discussion of U.S. dependence on foreign energy, and the importance of port and port facility security in such close proximity, suggests Congress was aware of the need for further protection of energy assets. The issue is to determine why federal legislation to protect energy infrastructure has not expanded beyond the realm of U.S. ports.

The MTSA lists a set of desired outcomes "in the best interests of the United States." (89) Some of these outcomes include improved port security through "communication among law enforcement officials responsible for port security," the formulation of "requirements for physical port security, ... the establishment of security programs at port facilities," and the provision of "financial assistance to help the States and the private sector [to] increase physical security of United States ports." (90) It seems these are the type of objectives Congress would also have for energy facilities throughout the nation, but such provisions were absent from the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

Significantly, the MTSA includes the Extension of Deepwater Port Act to Natural Gas. (91) The MTSA amends the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 to define a deepwater port as including natural gas facilities and not solely oil facilities. (92) This MTSA amendment effectively extends the number of energy port facilities that are included in MTSA security requirements. Because Congress is willing to extend security legislation to energy facilities either "located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," (93) it should be willing to extend a national energy security policy to energy infrastructure across the nation. Terror organizations have recognized all energy assets as highly lucrative targets, (94) and it is necessary to extend the level of security provided by the MTSA to energy facilities located on waterways to all energy infrastructure.

1. Layers of Security Plans