The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

Similar to the MTSA calling for Coast Guard Maritime Security teams to defend port and port facilities from maritime terrorism, the Department of Energy (DOE) suggests elite forces, modeled after U.S. Special Forces, be employed to protect nuclear energy sites from terrorism. (135) Though this proposed development of an elite force was suggested specifically to secure nuclear energy facilities, (136) it is significant that the DOE is contemplating the use of security forces specifically trained and equipped for the protection of energy infrastructure. This DOE suggestion may demonstrate a willingness to mandate the training and equipping of forces specifically organized to secure energy infrastructure.

The grave evidence of the Oil Shockwave exercise suggested an attack on a particular oil facility could have a more severe economic effect than a nuclear terrorist strike. (137) It may, therefore, be an economically responsible endeavor to enact federal legislation mandating the development of a security force to secure non-nuclear assets and energy infrastructure not located on waterways. Furthermore, if Congress is willing to spend $560 million over three years and to contemplate expenditures of up to $7.3 billion over the coming decade on port security, (138) then in light of the economically catastrophic Oil Shockwave assertions, federal legislation for energy security forces should be forthcoming.

Moreover, it is currently U.S. policy that American soldiers safeguard energy infrastructure in Iraq, (139) so a lack of a federally mandated energy infrastructure security force on U.S. soil seems incongruous. Because U.S. Special Forces' soldiers were in Colombia to secure a pipeline and the DOE suggested the development of an elite unit for the security of nuclear energy assets, it appears the U.S. government already deems security of energy infrastructure an undertaking worthy of a specialized security force. Again, there exists the argument that the U.S. military should not be used to secure energy assets; (140) however, the MTSA federally mandated a branch of the armed forces--the U.S. Coast Guard--to secure ports and port facilities, which include energy assets. (141)

Development of a federal energy security force may be a costly proposition. (142) Nevertheless, it seems the building block ideas and organizational framework already exist, as demonstrated by actions of the Coast Guard and DOE. Therefore, unified federal legislation setting forth U.S. energy security policy should call for energy security teams who are trained and equipped to respond to acts of energy terrorism.

In sum, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 failed to set forth significant national policy in regard to security of non-nuclear energy infrastructure. (143) The use of U.S. forces abroad and domestically in securing energy assets demonstrates the federal government's interest in the protection of energy infrastructure. The enactment of the extensive provisions of the MTSA to secure energy facilities on waterways further demonstrates this interest. (144) The desire of terrorist organizations to attack energy assets and the extensive economic damage that such strikes could cause are ample evidence of the need for federal energy security policy.

The MTSA details a comprehensive policy for maritime security from which regulations have been promulgated to ensure its execution. (145) A national energy security policy should be modeled after the MTSA and executed in the same manner. The multiple security plans of the MTSA (146) could be directly applied to energy security. A responsible Secretary could develop a national energy security plan and require the implementation of various levels of subordinate plans. This would be an excellent way of delegating responsibility of individual energy facility security to operators and owners--as in the MTSA. (147) An energy security force could be developed or an existing security force could be reorganized to respond to acts of energy terrorism just as the Coast Guard has been under the MTSA.

A system of federal grants could help the energy industry comply with energy security regulations, similar to the Port Security Grant Program. (148)

The MTSA initiated the trend of securing energy infrastructure in the United States, but its regulations do not reach beyond the nation's waterways. (149) Federal energy security legislation is needed to continue where the MTSA ceases to be effective. If federal policy is needed in response to the threat of maritime terrorism, then it is also needed for energy terrorism. Federal energy security policy should be foremost in the minds of the members of Congress, and the MTSA should serve as a model for this much needed legislation.

B. The International Need for Effective Energy Security: The United Nations' Next Big Initiative?

Energy terrorism is not a threat the United States faces alone. The examples of energy terrorism in Iraq, Colombia, and Russia demonstrate the effect this issue has on the international community. (150) International energy trade is negatively affected, (151) and therefore, it has become necessary to develop methods of dealing with energy terrorism on a worldwide scale. Members of the energy industry recognize this need for security of energy assets and have taken steps to work with international governing bodies in developing energy security systems. (152) This effort is a positive sign, much in line with the U.S. energy industry taking initiative after the September 11th attacks to ensure its individual security. (153) Nonetheless, regional energy infrastructure security systems are not sufficient to guarantee the protection of energy assets on a global scale. The energy industry worldwide needs to be assured that a uniform energy infrastructure security policy exists, as does the United States.

The United Nations is a uniquely suited body to develop international guidelines for energy asset security. The United Nations is currently made up of 192 member nations, (154) many of which suffer the effects of energy terrorism. (155) Furthermore, the cross border nature of many energy assets (156) necessitates a body capable of developing internationally applicable energy asset security policy.

1. Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee

The United Nations responded quickly to the terror attacks of September 11th by adopting Resolution 1373. (157) The Resolution is a call to member states to refrain from supporting terrorism or providing a safe haven to those who do. (158) The Resolution also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), (159) a largely powerless organization lacking the capacity to respond to terrorism or to sanction terror-sponsoring states. (160) The Resolution did not, however, define the term "terrorism." (161) The United Nations will not be effective in the fight against energy terrorism if it cannot clearly define the term. Nonetheless, the CTC may be the organization best suited to begin discussions of establishing an international framework for energy infrastructure security. The CTC has been in dialogue with all U.N. member nations and has received updates detailing their individual approaches to instating the provisions of Resolution 1373. (162) If member nations have been willing to provide detailed plans for combating terrorism, even without a definition for the word, (163) it seems those nations would also be willing to provide suggestions for a system of securing energy infrastructure.

2. The IAEA and International Nuclear Energy Security

Similar to the U.S. government, the international community recognizes the importance of nuclear energy infrastructure security. (164) The IAEA, organized under the United Nations, (165) recognized, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, (166) the importance of the physical security of nuclear energy facilities. (167) The IAEA developed a system of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans that provide member nations a clearly defined framework for strengthening nuclear security. (168) To further assist nations in implementing their plans for nuclear security, the IAEA developed various service organizations that will review and assess member nations' current nuclear physical security systems. (169)

Moreover, the IAEA drafted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (170) The Code states that IAEA member states should have legislation detailing the safety and security requirements of radioactive sources. (171) This Code also requires the nuclear energy regulatory bodies of member nations to establish guidelines for the security of radioactive material and to have the authority to demand nuclear facility security plans from facility owners and operators. (172)