The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

The great lengths to which the IAEA has gone to ensure nuclear energy security demonstrates the Agency's commitment to the issue. The IAEA has been particularly focused due to the evidence that terror organizations have sought to obtain nuclear material for the purposes of terror strikes. (173) The terrorist attacks on non-nuclear energy assets worldwide and the evidence that, in some instances, attacks on particular non-nuclear energy infrastructure could have a more catastrophic effect than a nuclear strike (174) suggest that the United Nations should take the security of non-nuclear energy assets as seriously as the security of nuclear material. A U.N. agency should take the initiative in developing energy infrastructure security plans for member states similar to the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans developed by the IAEA. (175) Additionally, member nations could benefit from the expertise of international services to assess and review the physical security of energy infrastructure, similar to the IAEA's International Nuclear Security Advisory Service and International Physical Protection Advisory Service. (176) Moreover, given the international nature of energy infrastructure, (177) it is particularly necessary for the United Nations to develop a set of uniform guidelines dealing with the security of energy assets.

Despite the need for uniform international energy infrastructure security guidelines and the continued terrorist targeting of energy assets worldwide, there is not an agency specifically regulating energy policy among member states of the United Nations. (178) The United Nations recognized, through the IAEA, the need for nuclear energy security; however, it must heed the continuous terrorist strikes against non-nuclear energy assets and develop an international policy of energy infrastructure security.

3. The IMO and International Maritime Security

Much like the United States, the international community recognized the necessity of codifying maritime security policy, (179) but failed to act similarly in regard to energy infrastructure security. The IMO established the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) (180) with the express intent of establishing a uniform international maritime security system:

The objectives of this Code are to establish an

international framework involving co-operation

between Contracting Governments, Government

agencies, local administrations and the shipping and

port industries to detect/assess security threats and

take preventive measures against security incidents

affecting ships or port facilities used in international

trade; to establish the respective roles and

responsibilities of all these parties concerned, at the

national and international level, for ensuring maritime

security; to ensure the early and efficient collation and

exchange of security-related information; to provide a

methodology for security assessments so as to have in

place plans and procedures to react to changing security

levels; and to ensure the confidence that adequate and

proportionate maritime security measures are in

place. (181)

The ISPS Code and MTSA closely parallel one another and were drafted to achieve largely the same goal of establishing a cohesive policy of maritime security. (182)

Similar to the MTSA, the ISPS Code requires a series of security plans for ports and port facilities. (183) Unlike the MTSA's requirement for a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, (184) however, the ISPS Code does not require an international maritime transportation security plan--it focuses on plans for individual ships and port facilities. (185) Nevertheless, the ISPS Code requires member nations' active involvement in the assessment and testing of the ship and port facility security plans. (186) Also, much like the MTSA, the ISPS Code requires ship and port facility officers to be active in enhancing and testing the security of their assigned assets. (187)

The IMO enforces the ISPS Code by publishing a list of ports that maintain a proper Port Facility Security Plan and a list of vessels that do not have the certification required under the Code. (188) If a particular vessel does not have the appropriate certification or embarked from a port lacking a proper security plan, then member nations can deny that vessel port entry. (189) Effectively, the IMO encourages even nonmember nations to comply with the provisions of the ISPS Code by potentially denying them the ability to conduct certain maritime transactions if they do not obey the Code.

Energy asset security is equally as important as maritime security to warrant its own international guidelines. The United Nations should promulgate international energy infrastructure security legislation similar to the ISPS Code. A single unifying body must require member nations to develop basic energy facility security plans. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated their willingness and ability to strike energy infrastructure around the world, and the energy industry should be assured that its assets are being adequately protected. An international energy infrastructure security framework requiring the establishment and assessment of individual energy facility security plans may help to systematically prevent acts of energy terrorism throughout member nations by insuring a minimum security standard for all energy assets.

Additionally, a system of enforcement similar to the ISPS Code should be established. This system would be particularly effective in the energy field given its international nature. Nations that refused to comply with the international energy asset security provisions would be faced with the possibility of losing crucial foreign energy contracts. If the energy industry was provided lists of recalcitrant nations, as the case in the enforcement of the ISPS Code, (190) then it may be more wary of the nations with which it does business.

The United Nations, through the IMO, recognized the need for further measures of maritime security after the September 11th attacks. (191) The response was the establishment of a unified maritime security code applicable to member nations. (192) The terror attacks worldwide on energy infrastructure demonstrated a similar need for cohesive international energy asset security policy, but the United Nations has not responded as they did to the threat of maritime terrorism. The IMO developed a workable code for insuring the security of ports and port facilities of member nations. The United Nations should use the ISPS Code as model legislation in developing international energy infrastructure security policy.

4. NATO Initiative in International Energy Security

Despite the need for a unified international energy infrastructure security policy, it is highly unlikely the United Nations will be the organization where the policy originates. Though it may be uniquely qualified to identify the problem of international energy terrorism and develop a framework for ensuring the security of energy assets at least located in member nations, the United Nations will likely remain immobile in such an effort given its response to terrorism in general. The United Nations reacted quickly to the terrorist strikes on September 11th by enacting Resolution 1373 and creating the CTC. (193) In spite of this quick reaction, the Resolution failed to even define the term "terrorism," and the toothless CTC is unable to respond directly to acts of terrorism. (194) The IAEA and the IMO, two major specialized agencies of the United Nations, recognized the specter of terrorism in their respective fields and responded with international security legislation. (195) Nevertheless, the United Nations has not established international energy infrastructure security policy.

The United Nations' failure to respond to the rampant acts of energy terrorism worldwide has compelled nations to act on their own behalf in regards to energy infrastructure security. (196) Some critics expressed displeasure over the projection of power to ensure the security of energy sources. (197) Nonetheless, without international guidelines insuring the security of energy assets, at least within U.N. member nations, it may be necessary for a nation to intervene militarily to protect vital energy infrastructure. An international energy infrastructure security framework preventing noncompliant nations from engaging in the energy trade, like the ISPS Code, (198) may supersede the possible need for military intervention.

Additionally, if the United Nations does not take the lead in establishing international energy asset security policy, this may grow from a regulatory issue to a geopolitical and military issue. As discussed, the IAEA and the IMO have taken nuclear energy security and maritime security, respectively, and established frameworks with which member nations are obliged to comply. If the United Nations allows international energy infrastructure security to remain unregulated, then other organizations may take the initiative on the issue.