The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

The NATO Forum on Energy Security Technology demonstrates international willingness to confront the issue of energy asset security. (199) NATO involvement in energy infrastructure security suggests this issue has already become one of military significance. (200) The fall of the Soviet Union caused NATO to refocus its efforts on crisis management in its sphere of influence. (201) NATO convening in such a significant manner suggests the organization already views energy asset security as a crisis that may threaten the overall security of the region. (202) The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the Commander of the United States European Command, General James L. Jones, in reference to the NATO Forum, stated:

Today's global energy systems were not built with

security in mind and are more vulnerable than ever

before. The new and lethal challenges of the 21st

Century make them attractive targets. The

international community must work together to protect

these systems because energy security is key to regional

security.

The disruption of critical energy infrastructure has the

potential to impact us militarily, politically, and

socially. As we have all witnessed during the aftermath

of Hurricane Katrina, a disaster in one location affects

us all. We must work together to protect critical

infrastructure throughout the world. (203)

It seems NATO has identified energy infrastructure security as an issue requiring international attention. General Jones's statement suggests military officials recognize energy security as a geopolitical and military issue. The United Nations must assert itself quickly if it is going to categorize energy infrastructure security as a regulatory issue that, similar to nuclear energy security and maritime security, can be dealt with through the establishment of a structured international legal framework.

IV. CONCLUSION

Terrorist organizations have targeted energy infrastructure worldwide and made it clear they intend to continue similar strikes. The war in Iraq and the recent hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico remind the world of the consequences of an energy shortage and draw attention to the issue of energy asset security. (204) The United States enacted the MTSA to protect its ports from maritime terrorism but has not enacted similar legislation to safeguard energy infrastructure from acts of terrorism. The United States is in need of cohesive federal energy infrastructure security legislation providing guidelines to the energy industry and requiring a national energy security plan. The MTSA set the groundwork for security legislation and can serve as a model for Congress in enacting federal energy security policy.

The United Nations must take the lead internationally in establishing a framework for insuring the security of energy infrastructure among member nations. If the United Nations deals with the issue of energy infrastructure security as the IAEA and IMO dealt with nuclear energy security and maritime security respectively, it must develop a clear standard of security for energy assets applicable to member nations. The responsibility of enacting international energy infrastructure security policy and monitoring its implementation should not be abdicated to regional organizations. The United Nations must initiate this effort quickly if energy security is ever to be viewed as a regulatory issue; otherwise, various political and military bodies may develop their own methods of securing energy infrastructure.

(1.) See Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001, http://thomas. loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). This website tracks the legislation related to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and demonstrates the vast amount of antiterrorism legislation promulgated since that day. Id.

(2.) See, e.g., Post-Rita Gas Prices Up Another 10 Cents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2005, at 18.

(3.) See Terrorist Threats to Energy Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Comm. on H. Comm. Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Energy Security Hearing] (statement of Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation) (suggesting a "terror premium" is being added into oil prices).

(4.) See id.; see also Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), NATO Forum on Energy Security & Technology, http://www.iags.org/natoforum.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Energy Security Forum] (discussing the NATO Forum that specifically addressed the issue of energy security).

(5.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS).

(6.) See Interview by Europe Energy with Geert Joosten, Chairman of the European Platform of Energy Infrastructure Security (Sept. 9, 2005) [hereinafter European Platform] (discussing the European Commission's policy toward energy security).

(7.) See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. [subsection] 15801-16524 (2005).

(8.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation) (referring to a posting on an al-Qaeda website entitled "Map of Future al-Qaeda Operations" claiming Middle East oil facilities would continue to be priority targets).

(9.) See Energy Security Forum, supra note 4.

(10.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 5-8 (statement of Robbie Diamond, President, Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)) (describing the study's three scenarios).

(11.) See Energy Security Forum, supra note 4.

(12.) See infra Part II.A.1-3.

(13.) See IAGS, Iraq Pipeline Watch, http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Iraq Pipeline Watch] (listing various attacks on oil installations in Iraq since 2003).

(14.) See generally Gal Luft, Pipeline Sabotage is Terrorist's Weapon of Choice: Assaults on Oil Infrastructure Have Added a Fear Premium of Roughly $10 Per Barrel, PIPELINE & GAS J., Feb. 2005, at 42-44 (describing attacks on energy assets in nations around the world).

(15.) See infra Part II.A.1-3.

(16.) T. Christian Miller, U.S. Troops Answered Oil Firm's Pleas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at A18 [hereinafter Miller, Troops].

(17.) See id. ELN are the Spanish initials for National Liberation Army. Id. FARC are the Spanish initials for Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Sharon Behn, Colombian Violence Spills Over, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A1.

(18.) See Miller, Troops, supra note 16.

(19.) Id.

(20.) Luft, supra note 14, at 42.

(21.) Miller, Troops, supra note 16.

(22.) Id.

(23.) Id.

(24.) Id.

(25.) Id.

(26.) Id. (stating that Occidental pledged $800,000 of support for the team; however, Occidental executives said they paid far less than this amount). Furthermore, Occidental had been making payments of between $5 and $15 million a year for security expenses and reimbursement to the Colombian military. Id.

(27.) E.g., Don Van Natta & Lizette Alvarez, A Day of Terror: Attack on Military, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5.

(28.) See Miller, Troops, supra note 16.

(29.) Id. (noting that 2,000 Colombian soldiers have been trained in pipeline protection); see also Ana Carrigan, War and Hope in Colombia, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at 6 (suggesting U.S. Special Forces soldiers are guarding the Occidental pipeline themselves).

(30.) Miller, Troops, supra note 16. But see Carrigan, supra note 29 (suggesting the Colombia-U.S. effort has largely failed and that the oil-rich region is more violent now than it has been in the past).

(31.) Terrence Murray, Rebel Group's Plea to UN Could Offer Hope to Colombian Oil Production, OIL DAILY, Dec. 30, 2004.

(32.) Id.

(33.) Luft, supra note 14, at 43.

(34.) Id.

(35.) See Roman Kupchinsky, Chechnya: Stolen Oil and Purchased Guns, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Oct. 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/ 2005/10/mil-051025-rfer104.htm (describing the Chechen rebels' activity of selling stolen oil "to line ringleaders' pockets, as well as to finance terrorist activities and bribe government officials").

(36.) Id.

(37.) Id.

(38.) See Luft, supra note 14, at 42-43.

(39.) See id.; see also Iraq Pipeline Watch, supra note 13 (delineating each terrorist attack on oil infrastructure since the end of major combat operations in Iraq).

(40.) See Luft, supra note 14, at 42-43.

(41.) See Paul Sampson, Iraq: Rivalry and Horse-Trading, ENERGY COMPASS, Feb. 25, 2005, at 1, available at http://lexisnexis.com (follow "legal"; then follow "area of law"; then follow "energy"; then follow "general news and information").

(42.) Luft, supra note 14, at 43.

(43.) Id.

(44.) Iraq Pipeline Watch, supra note 13 (describing the various energy installations that have been attacked).

(45.) Id.

(46.) T. Christian Miller, The Conflict in Iraq: To Rebuild Amid Danger, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A4.

(47.) See Iraqi Interim Government Threatened by Sabotage, Violence: Oil Exports, Electricity Disrupted, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June 17, 2004, at 433A1 (noting the attack on General Electric employees after the company announced it would not pull out of Iraq); see also Iraq Pipeline Watch, supra note 13 (describing the numerous Iraqi oilmen who have been killed in the line of duty).