(48.) See, e.g., THOMAS HAMILL & PAUL T. BROWN, ESCAPE IN IRAQ:
THE THOMAS HAMILL STORY 246 (2004) (noting that Thomas Hamill, an
American held hostage by Iraqi terrorists, escaped to U.S. soldiers who
had been assigned to guard a crew while they repaired a pipeline damaged
during the insurgency).
(49.) See id.
(50.) Car Bomb Targets Iraqi National Guard, MSNBC, Sept. 15, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5949556/.
(51.) See George Orwel, Iraq Stresses Pipeline and Port Security to
Raise Oil Exports, OIL DAILY, July 11, 2005, at 1, available at
http://lexisnexis.com (follow "legal"; then follow "area
of law"; then follow "energy"; then follow "general
news and information").
(52.) Car Bomb Targets Iraqi National Guard, supra note 50.
(53.) See Iraq Pipeline Watch, supra note 13.
(54.) Orwel, supra note 51.
(55.) See Luft, supra note 14, at 43-44 (describing terrorist
attacks on oil pipelines in numerous countries).
(56.) War on Terrorism: Crisis at a Glance, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov.
27, 2001, at 7A.
(57.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (statement
of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS) (noting that, in a video released
in 2004, bin Laden stated his fighters were, "continuing ... policy
to make America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy").
(58.) Id. at 19.
(59.) Id. at 23. Dr. Luft also brought to the Subcommittee's
attention the level of sophistication and understanding of the terrorist
groups when he mentioned that a jihadist website stated, "The
killing of 10 American soldiers is nothing compared to the impact of the
rise in oil prices on America and the disruption that it causes in the
international economy." Id.
(60.) See infra Part II.B.1-2.
(61.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of
Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and
Nonproliferation) (stating that "[c]ombating this [oil terrorism]
threat should be part of our complex goal of improving our
[n]ation's energy security").
(62.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 19, 25
(statement of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS) (suggesting a
terrorist attack on Ras Tanura, the largest offshore oil loading
facility in the world, could be more economically devastating than a
"dirty nuclear bomb" strike on New York City).
(63.) SAFE is a nonpartisan organization whose goal is to reduce
United States dependence on oil and raise public awareness of the
related national security issues. SAFE, The Organization,
http://www.secureenergy.org/about_organization.php (last visited Jan.
27, 2007).
(64.) The National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) is a
bipartisan group of energy experts committed to addressing concerns
regarding oil security and the adequacy of energy supplies. SAFE,
Sponsors, http://www.secureenergy.org/shockwave_ sponsors.php (last
visited Jan. 27, 2007).
(65.) See SAFE, Overview,
http://www.secureenergy.org/shockwave_overview.php (last visited Jan.
27, 2007).
(66.) Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 5-6 (statement of
Robbie Diamond, President, SAFE).
(67.) Id.
(68.) Id. at 7-8.
(69.) Id. Scenario Three details the worst outcome in the exercise.
Id. Scenario One would result in $82 per barrel and $3.31 per gallon of
gas, and Scenario 2 would result in $123 per barrel and a gas price of
$4.74, according to the group. Id.
(70.) Id. at 9.
(71.) Id.
(72.) Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 6. Since writing
this Comment, Dr. Gates has become the Secretary of Defense.
(73.) Id. at 7. Dr. Gates' statement was corroborated by
actual events. See id. Mr. Diamond explained to the Subcommittee that
the group had decided on a predicted starting price of oil in December
2005 to be $58 per barrel. Id. Mr. Diamond noted that a short time prior
to conducting the exercise, news of al-Qaeda activity in Nigeria spurred
oil prices to reach $60 per barrel. Id. Furthermore, attacks on key oil
installations in the Niger Delta have cut Nigeria's oil production
by approximately ten percent and have been a major catalyst of world oil
prices reaching a four-month high as of Jan. 2006. See Lynn J. Cook,
Status of Hostages Held By Nigerian Rebels Murky, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 25,
2006, at A16; Segun Owen, Fearing Military Reprisals, Nigerians Flee
Delta, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2006, at A18. The group purported to be
responsible for the attacks is the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta, an ethnic Ijaw militia in Nigeria who demanded that Royal
Dutch Shell pay reparations in the amount of $1.5 billion for years of
alleged oil pollution to villages in the Delta region. See Owen, supra,
at A18. It seems the designers of the Oil Shockwave are even more
clairvoyant than originally thought regarding the effect disruptions in
Nigerian oil production could have on oil prices.
(74.) NATO Science for Peace and Security, NATO Forum on Energy
Security, http://www.nato.int/science/ news/2005/n050728a.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2007).
(75.) See Energy Security Forum, supra note 4.
(76.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 23, 25
(statement of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS) (calling the Forum
NATO's 'largest and most important annum gathering").
(77.) See id. (explaining that "decision-makers at the
ministerial level from ... partner countries" will be in attendance
with the purpose of engineering solutions to the issue of energy
security).
(78.) See Paul J. Nyden, Editorial, Oil, Blood, and the Future: We
Are Zooming to the End Faster than We Realize, Authors Conclude,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 28, 2005, at 1D. See generally Michael T.
Klare, The Bush/ Cheney Energy Strategy: Implications for U.S. Foreign
and Military Policy, 36 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 395 (2004)
(citing numerous instances of the U.S. military deploying to oil-rich
regions for purposes of security).
(79.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 1, 2 (statement
of Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and
Nonproliferation).
(80.) See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Energy Policy Act of 2005
Affects Many Environmental Laws, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 2005, at 3. (81.)
Id.
(82.) See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. [section] 16041
(2006).
(83.) Ron Gold et al., Energy Policy Act of 2005 Leaves US With
Open Issues, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 20.
(84.) See supra Part II.A.1-3.
(85.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 17, 19
(statement of Gal Luft, Executive Director, LAGS).
(86.) See Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-295, [section] 101, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
(87.) Id.
(88.) Id.
(89.) Id.
(90.) Id. It is important to note the term "facility," as
provided in the "Definitions" section of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA), includes "any structure or
facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Id. This
definition of the term "facility" has been codified under 46
U.S.C. [section] 70101.46 U.S.C. [section] 70101 (2002).
(91.) See Maritime Transportation Security Act [section] 106.
(92.) See 33 U.S.C. [section] 1502 (2004); Gearold L. Knowles,
Liquefied Natural Gas: Regulation in a Competitive Natural Gas Market,
24 ENERGY L.J. 293, 317 (2003).
(93.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70101 (2002).
(94.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (statement
of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS) ("Striking pipelines,
tankers, refineries and oil fields is easy and effective.").
(95.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70103(a) (2002). The maritime
transportation security plans have been codified under 46 U.S.C. section
70103 since the enactment of the MTSA. Id.
(96.) [section] 70103(a)(2).
(97.) [section] 70103(a)(2)(A).
(98.) [section] 70103(a)(2).
(99.) [section] 70103(a)(2)(D).
(100.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70106 (2002).
(101.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70101(5) (2002). Currently, the
department in which the Coast Guard operates is the Department of
Homeland Security. U.S. Coast Guard Fact File,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/ comrel/factfile/index.htm (follow
"Overview" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Prior to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard was
organized under the Department of Transportation. See Paul Davis, Semper
Paratus: The Coast Guard is "Always Ready" to Protect
America's Ports and Waterways, J. COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND
SECURITY INT'L, Fall 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (follow "area of law"; then follow
"Homeland Security"; then follow "general news and
information"). After September 11th, Congress and the Bush
Administration reorganized the Coast Guard under the Department of
Homeland Security. Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But
Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Maritime Security Hearings] (statement of Margaret T.
Wrightson, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues), available at
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO.05-448T. The MTSA, as a result,
effectively makes the Secretary of Homeland Security responsible for the
National Maritime Transportation Security Plans. [section] 70101(5).
(102.) See Davis, supra note 101 (explaining that the Coast Guard
is uniquely suited to combat terrorism given its dual nature as an armed
force and a law enforcement agency).
(103.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70103(b) (2002).
(104.) [section] 70103(b)(2)(B).
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