The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

(105.) [section] 70103(b)(2)(C).

(106.) [section] 70103(c).

(107.) Id.

(108.) [section] 70103(c)(3)(C)-(E).

(109.) See Barry Parker, The Progress of Port Security, SECURITY TECH. & DESIGN, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.iwsinc.com/News/A STD.cfm.

(110.) See id.

(111.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman, House Subcomm. on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation) (referring to language on a jihadist website suggesting the killing of American soldiers is secondary to raising oil prices through terrorism).

(112.) See id. at 1-2; Luft, supra note 14, at 42-43.

(113.) See Jeff Gosmano, Energy Industry Pleased With Security Steps Taken Since 9/11, OIL DAILY, Sept. 10, 2003 available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (follow "legal"; then follow "area of aw then follow energy' then follow general news and information").

(114.) Id.

(115.) Id.

(116.) 46 U.S.C. [section] 70103 (2002).

(117.) Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Strategic Plan FY 2004-FY 2008, June 17, 2004, http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20040617161057.Clean FY04--FY 08 SP 2-page-06-17-04v21.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).

(118.) See Gosmano, supra note 113 (noting the statement of the Director of the American Petroleum Institute: "Overall, what we're doing is to really try to develop a close partnership with the Department of Homeland Security").

(119.) Id.

(120.) 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.400(a) (2005).

(121.) 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.205(b)(2) (2005) (amended by 72 Fed. Reg. 3492-01 (Jan. 25, 2007) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.205(b)(2) (adding another requirement).

(122.) 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.220(b)(1) (2005).

(123.) See 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.305 (2005).

(124.) See Parker, supra note 109.

(125.) See Gosmano, supra note 113 (stating that certain energy companies think guarding pipelines is far too costly of an endeavor).

(126.) Maritime Security Hearings, supra note 101, at 22 (noting the amount of funding the federal government provided under the Port Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative). These programs were designed to help reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack on ports by providing funds for increased security. Id. The grant programs have been very successful, and the requests for funds from the maritime industry have surpassed their availability. Id.

(127.) Id.

(128.) Id. at 21-22.

(129.) See id., at 1 (noting that three years after the attacks of September 11th, maritime security is still a major national issue, and Congress and the Bush Administration have gone to great lengths to enhance port security).

(130.) See Parker, supra note 109 ("The MTSA's voluminous regulations do not make for easy reading.").

(131.) See id. ("The USCG guidelines require each [Facility Security] plan to discuss personnel identification, vehicle access control, perimeter fencing, alarm and communication systems and training.").

(132.) See Maritime Security Hearings, supra note 101, at 5 ("[T]he Brookings Institution has estimated that costs associated with U.S. seaport closures resulting from a detonated weapon of mass destruction could amount to $1 trillion."). Furthermore, another consulting firm to the government studied the possible costs of finding an undetonated weapon of mass destruction at a U.S. seaport and estimated the costs of a twelve-day port closure at $58 billion. Id.

(133.) See id.

(134.) See Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 4-5 (statement of Robbie Diamond, President, SAFE).

(135.) DOE Needs Prompt Action to Meet its New DBT, NUCLEAR NEWS, Sept. 2005, at 27 [hereinafter New DBT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05611.pdf (noting that the current Department of Energy (DOE) training of "contractor-operated protective forces will not be adequate to defeat the much larger terrorist threat contained in the October 2004 [design basis threat]"). This DOE elite force would eventually be transformed "from a contractor-operated force into a federal force." Id. However, the proposal for the development of this elite force is in the "conceptual phase" and it is unlikely this security force will be commissioned in the foreseeable future. Id.

(136.) See id.

(137.) Energy Security Hearing, supra note 3, at 25 (statement of Gal Luft, Executive Director, IAGS).

(138.) Maritime Security Hearings, supra note 101, at 22.

(139.) See Gosmano, supra note 113 (suggesting the United States is considering the policy of placing full time security on Iraqi pipelines for the deterrence of future attacks).

(140.) See, e.g., Klare, supra note 78, at 402-03, 423 (suggesting the current use of U.S. forces in oil-rich nations will lead to bloodshed and further anti-Americanism).

(141.) See 46 U.S.C. [section] 70103 (2002) (requiring the establishment of maritime security teams).

(142.) See New DBT, supra note 135, at 27 (noting the "significant commitment of resources" required for elite forces).

(143.) See 42 U.S.C. [section] 16041 (2005).

(144.) See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.

(145.) See Gosmano, supra note 113.

(146.) See 46 U.S.C. [section] 70103 (2004).

(147.) See 33 C.F.R. [section] 105.305 (2005).

(148.) See Maritime Security Hearings, supra note 101, at 22.

(149.) See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

(150.) See supra Part II.A.1-3.

(151.) See John J. Fialka & Russell Gold, Fear of Terrorism: Plans for Liquefied-Gas Terminals Put Off, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 15, 2004, at 7C (describing coastal towns in Mexico and California voting down efforts by Marathon Oil Corp. and Calpine Corp. to build liquefied natural gas terminals out of fear of possible terrorist strikes on the assets).

(152.) See European Platform, supra note 6 (describing the efforts of the European Platform of Energy Infrastructure Security). The European Platform of Energy Infrastructure Security recognized the importance of developing standards of energy security for the energy industry in Europe as a whole. Id. The Platform suggested the European Commission as the proper body for setting the standards for energy security systems, allowing individual nations to ensure their own compliance. Id.

(153.) See Gosmano, supra note 113.

(154.) United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/ unmember.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Since writing this paper, the number has grown to 193 nations. Id.

(155.) All the nations identified in Part II of this Comment as having suffered from acts of energy terrorism are members of the United Nations. See id.; see also supra Part II.A. 1-3.

(156.) See European Platform, supra note 6 (describing the cross-border nature of Europe's meshed energy grid); Luft, supra note 14, at 43-44 (describing the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline as spanning the borders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey).

(157.) S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333 (2003) (calling Resolution 1373 "the cornerstone of the United Nations' counterterrorism effort").

(158.) S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 157, [paragraph] 2.

(159.) See id. [paragraph] 6; Rosand, supra note 157, at 333. The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) is a committee consisting of all the members of the U.N. Security Council. Rosand, supra note 157, at 334. The CTC requires all U.N. member states to report the measures they have taken to implement Resolution 1373. Id. The CTC focused on fostering dialogue between the Security Council and U.N. member nations regarding the best methods to globally defend against terrorism. See id. at 335.

(160.) See Rosand, supra note 157, at 337 (describing the mission of the CTC). The author suggests the CTC is designed to bolster the infrastructure required to combat terrorism. Id.

(161.) See id. at 334 (discussing the difficulty of defining terrorism when dealing with a body comprised of multiple nations, recalling the old axiom, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter").

(162.) Id. at 335.

(163.) See id. at 337 (discussing the rounds of reports submitted by member nations).

(164.) See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2004) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/ Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf (stating the IAEA seeks to increase international awareness of the need to physically protect nuclear energy sources).

(165.) U.N. System Organizations, http://orgs.unsystemceb.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); see The "Atoms for Peace" Agency, http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (stating the IAEA is the international organization that works with its member nations "to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies").

(166.) See MATTHEW BUNN & GEORGE BUNN, IAEA, REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR THEFT AND SABOTAGE 1 (2001), http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/ Nuclear_Terrorism/bunn02.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter NUCLEAR THEFT AND SABOTAGE] (quoting IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, "The tragic terrorist attacks on the United States were a wake up call to us all.... We have to increase our efforts on all fronts ... from nuclear installation design to withstand attacks to improving how we respond to nuclear emergencies.").