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A worthy ally? Reconsidering US-Libyan relations.


by Fang, Samantha
Harvard International Review • Spring, 2007 • AFRICA

In June 2006, the United States restored full diplomatic relations with Libya and removed it from the State Department's list of terrorism sponsors, ending decades of tense relations and US-imposed sanctions. Analysts hail Libya's stunning reversal from rogue state to purported friend as a victory of US diplomacy and cite the "Libya model" as a model for negotiations with other antagonistic states. This new rapprochement is a turning point in US foreign policy, and while there are risks of further fueling Islamic resentment and deepening Libyan autocracy, the benefits of a partner in the war on terror and of a public diplomacy coup greatly outweigh the costs.

In recent years, Muammar Qaddafi, the autocratic ruler of Libya, has taken clear steps to align himself with the United States in an effort to gain Western trust. His administration has repeatedly apologized for its past violence, accepted responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attacks, dismantled its weapons of mass destruction program in 2003, and cooperated with the United States in the war on terror. However, Libya's track record of human rights abuses is still among the worst in the world, calling into question whether the administration is worthy of US support. Freedom House gave Libya the lowest possible rating in all categories--political rights, civil liberties, and freedom--citing poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, domestic violence against women, the prohibition of independent human rights organizations, and the ban on independent press. Any form of political opposition is brutally and unsubtly quelled.

The United States and the European Union face the risk that their new diplomatic partnerships with Libya will help legitimize the regime and perpetuate the country's poor conditions. Libyan dissidents claim that Qaddafi will most likely use this new relationship to consolidate his political base and continue stamping out any possibility for political reform. There are also repercussions in the international arena. The United States has portrayed the war on terror as not only a military conflict but also an ideological struggle; current nation-building processes in Iraq and Afghanistan are inextricably linked with the words and values of "freedom," "liberty," and "democracy." In Libya, Qaddafi's eager suppression of the opposition Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), recognized as a terrorist organization, has only reinforced beliefs that US and EU motives are not those of building democracy but of self-interested security. Critics of a Western alliance with the Qaddafi regime claim that this "Western hypocrisy" further alienates the Muslim world and gives radical Islamists even more ammunition to attack the West.

Despite these drawbacks, there are key economic and strategic arguments for a stronger US-Libyan partnership. Since the restoration of diplomatic relations, US oil companies have begun moving into Libya to capitalize on the ninth largest oil reserve in the world. Libya's great promise of oil and its urgent need of foreign investment to develop its fledgling economy have led to a rush by Western governments to consolidate trade agreements with the Qaddafi administration. The German foreign minister has already expressed hopes that the country will join the EU-Mediterranean Partnership.

Furthermore, Libya's strategic location at the juncture of the Middle East and North Africa--two hotbeds of Islamic extremism--makes Libya a crucial ally in the war on terror. The growing influence of the LIFG and the vast unpatrolled deserts of northern Africa make the region a potential al Qaeda stronghold. The Qaddafi administration has already proven to be a reliable ally in the war on terror. One of the first countries to publicly condemn the September 11th attacks, it has provided extensive intelligence information to US and UK anti-terrorism efforts and has muted its criticism of US inaction in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Furthering the alliance with the Qaddafi regime would provide the United States with crucial intelligence and manpower needed for counterinsurgency efforts in the area.

Most importantly, US acceptance of Libya at this point has profound implications on ongoing diplomatic negotiations with rogue states such as North Korea. The Libya model is based on the idea of reciprocal unilateral measures. Libya's nuclear disarmament and present cooperation against terrorism merit reciprocity and recognition of good behavior; failure to do so by the United States would deter other potential allies from joining it in the future. "Western hypocrisy" is not a severe risk because the United States already has existing controversial close ties with states similar to Libya, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. The small marginal cost of hypocrisy is outweighed by the economic, military, and diplomatic benefits.

There is little evidence that stronger ties with Libya will further destabilize the region or increase Islamist extremism against the West. Though the United States and the West should continue to pressure the Qaddafi administration on its human rights abuses, it is beneficial and necessary that the United States continues to pursue its new relationship with Libya.

associate editor

SAMANTHA FANG


COPYRIGHT 2007 Harvard International Relations Council, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2007, Gale Group. All rights reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.


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