In June 2006, the United States restored full diplomatic relations
with Libya and removed it from the State Department's list of
terrorism sponsors, ending decades of tense relations and US-imposed
sanctions. Analysts hail Libya's stunning reversal from rogue state
to purported friend as a victory of US diplomacy and cite the
"Libya model" as a model for negotiations with other
antagonistic states. This new rapprochement is a turning point in US
foreign policy, and while there are risks of further fueling Islamic
resentment and deepening Libyan autocracy, the benefits of a partner in
the war on terror and of a public diplomacy coup greatly outweigh the
costs.
In recent years, Muammar Qaddafi, the autocratic ruler of Libya,
has taken clear steps to align himself with the United States in an
effort to gain Western trust. His administration has repeatedly
apologized for its past violence, accepted responsibility for the 1988
Lockerbie terrorist attacks, dismantled its weapons of mass destruction
program in 2003, and cooperated with the United States in the war on
terror. However, Libya's track record of human rights abuses is
still among the worst in the world, calling into question whether the
administration is worthy of US support. Freedom House gave Libya the
lowest possible rating in all categories--political rights, civil
liberties, and freedom--citing poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest
and detention, torture, domestic violence against women, the prohibition
of independent human rights organizations, and the ban on independent
press. Any form of political opposition is brutally and unsubtly
quelled.
The United States and the European Union face the risk that their
new diplomatic partnerships with Libya will help legitimize the regime
and perpetuate the country's poor conditions. Libyan dissidents
claim that Qaddafi will most likely use this new relationship to
consolidate his political base and continue stamping out any possibility
for political reform. There are also repercussions in the international
arena. The United States has portrayed the war on terror as not only a
military conflict but also an ideological struggle; current
nation-building processes in Iraq and Afghanistan are inextricably
linked with the words and values of "freedom,"
"liberty," and "democracy." In Libya, Qaddafi's
eager suppression of the opposition Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG), recognized as a terrorist organization, has only reinforced
beliefs that US and EU motives are not those of building democracy but
of self-interested security. Critics of a Western alliance with the
Qaddafi regime claim that this "Western hypocrisy" further
alienates the Muslim world and gives radical Islamists even more
ammunition to attack the West.
Despite these drawbacks, there are key economic and strategic
arguments for a stronger US-Libyan partnership. Since the restoration of
diplomatic relations, US oil companies have begun moving into Libya to
capitalize on the ninth largest oil reserve in the world. Libya's
great promise of oil and its urgent need of foreign investment to
develop its fledgling economy have led to a rush by Western governments
to consolidate trade agreements with the Qaddafi administration. The
German foreign minister has already expressed hopes that the country
will join the EU-Mediterranean Partnership.
Furthermore, Libya's strategic location at the juncture of the
Middle East and North Africa--two hotbeds of Islamic extremism--makes
Libya a crucial ally in the war on terror. The growing influence of the
LIFG and the vast unpatrolled deserts of northern Africa make the region
a potential al Qaeda stronghold. The Qaddafi administration has already
proven to be a reliable ally in the war on terror. One of the first
countries to publicly condemn the September 11th attacks, it has
provided extensive intelligence information to US and UK anti-terrorism
efforts and has muted its criticism of US inaction in the
Israeli-Palestine conflict. Furthering the alliance with the Qaddafi
regime would provide the United States with crucial intelligence and
manpower needed for counterinsurgency efforts in the area.
Most importantly, US acceptance of Libya at this point has profound
implications on ongoing diplomatic negotiations with rogue states such
as North Korea. The Libya model is based on the idea of reciprocal
unilateral measures. Libya's nuclear disarmament and present
cooperation against terrorism merit reciprocity and recognition of good
behavior; failure to do so by the United States would deter other
potential allies from joining it in the future. "Western
hypocrisy" is not a severe risk because the United States already
has existing controversial close ties with states similar to Libya, such
as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. The small marginal cost of
hypocrisy is outweighed by the economic, military, and diplomatic
benefits.
There is little evidence that stronger ties with Libya will further
destabilize the region or increase Islamist extremism against the West.
Though the United States and the West should continue to pressure the
Qaddafi administration on its human rights abuses, it is beneficial and
necessary that the United States continues to pursue its new
relationship with Libya.
associate editor
SAMANTHA FANG
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