Rebuilding a nation: myths, realities, and solutions in Iraq.

A failure to understand Iraq's history risks catastrophic blundering, likely to result in an exponential rise in the region's entropy, as US policymakers and Iraqis ponder how to deal with the violence which has engulfed Baghdad. Several pernicious myths have entered this debate and, having become accepted "facts," cause real-world harm when they influence the thinking of foreign policymakers. The myths, which assume a lack of national Iraqi identity, artificiality of the state, continuous sectarian fighting throughout history, Kurdish desire for independence, and Shi'a disloyalty, lead some to the conclusion that dividing Iraq is the best way to end the violence. Instead of building on these myths, however, the international community should create a long-term solution by working with the emerging democratic Iraq to recognize and develop its historic presence as a unified nation. The future of the country is as a cohesive, democratic, and pluralistic federation. With that understanding in mind, it will be possible to devise a strategy that averts some of the darker possible scenarios and helps return Iraq and the region to stability.

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The Myth of Artificiality

The first of these myths is that Iraq is an artificial state, created in an exercise of imperial hubris during the waning days of the British Empire after World War I. The myth-makers, who are universally non-Iraqi, assert that nothing historical or cultural binds Iraq's people together. Rather, the inhabitants were forced to coexist by their British masters, who stitched together the three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul into a single state. This argument is not only unhistorical, but it also has a far more destructive corollary that there is no point in attempting to hold this historic anomaly together and that its natural state should be one of division, de facto or de jure, among its three components, Shi'a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurd. The myth ignores that Iraq is actually a nation with an ancient identity that actively took part in international affairs and modernization before the Saddamist Baathists took control. This corollary courts disaster.

To begin with, Iraq has the oldest recorded history of any country on Earth. The word "Iraq" itself is ancient, and probably dates back to Akkadian times. When medieval Islamic geographers referred to "Iraq," they meant roughly the same place we mean now. Over the 500 years it was ruled by the Ottomans, the other two provinces were not independent of Baghdad, but were administratively subordinate to it. Thus, over a span of centuries--if not millennia--the people of Iraq have been one, for all their ethnic and confessional differences. Ancient history notwithstanding, Iraq has now been a modern state for four score and seven years. Since 1920, a distinct Iraqi identity has emerged, one distinct from and layered over tribal, ethnic, and sectarian affiliations.

The process of forging an Iraqi national identity manifested itself in the country's actions on the international stage. Iraq was the first predominately Arab country to gain its independence when it was admitted into the League of Nations in 1932. It was among the 54 countries that founded the United Nations in 1945, and it was also a founder of both the League of Arab States and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. This confidence and vibrancy in international affairs mirrored a high degree of internal optimism and cohesion.

Fueled by Iraq's increasing oil wealth, a burst of economic development beginning in the mid-1950s resulted in spectacular strides. By the end of 1979--the last full year before the disastrous war with Iran--Iraq was on the verge of joining the developed world. Its per capita GDP equaled that of Spain, which would enter the European Union six years later. By then, Iraq had cash on reserve in hard currency reserves totaling US$50 billion (in 1980 terms). It is difficult to imagine the heights Iraq might have reached, domestically and internationally, had it been blessed with more enlightened leadership over the next 23 years. Instead, Saddam Hussein launched a series of wars which decimated the country's population and economy.

Colin Powell asserted in 2002 US Congressional testimony that Iraq was a failed state. That is a hard case to prove, given the gains it made from 1920 through 1979. It would have been more accurate for Powell to have said that after 1979, Iraq had a failed government. Saddam Hussein's deliberate policy of maintaining control by playing violently on ethnic and confessional differences has led some commentators to believe that such differences have always resulted in violence in Iraq, even though a long history argues otherwise.

Reconciliation with Insurgent Nationalists

Despite Saddam Hussein's policies, this national history has fostered a true sense of national Iraqi identity that cannot be lightly dismissed. Indeed, as UN officials continually assert, it has been clear for some time that a significant segment--it is difficult to quantify the percentage precisely--of the current insurgency is now composed of Iraqi nationalists fighting against what they perceive as a potential break-up of the country by outside forces. These nationalists are individuals who, though suspicious of the United States, were relieved by the removal of the previous regime. Decisions made along the way, such as the dissolution of the army and overly aggressive de-Baathification, have pushed these individuals and groups to violence.

The United Nations is a logical intermediary in the efforts of the Iraqi government to reach out and provide both nonviolent avenues for discussion and reassurance that the dissolution of Iraq is not on the agenda. Another way of reaching out to Iraqi nationalists involves the constitutional process, a method which is often largely ignored by the international community. In October 2005, an agreement was brokered immediately prior to the referendum on the permanent constitution, which had garnered opposition and rejection by both nationalist and Sunni parties. Under the agreement's terms, the process of amending the constitution would be re-opened during the first session of parliament. This pact was appropriate, recalling that, because the Sunni parties had boycotted the elections for the constitution-drafting Assembly, they then had minimal representation in the drafting process. In essence, the agreement extended the transitional period long enough to allow for full Sunni participation, even though the referendum has already approved the permanent constitution. As things turned out, a swing of 73,000 votes in Nineveh Governorate, just two-thirds of one percent of the total vote, would have defeated the constitution. Had this last-minute agreement not occurred, it is likely that the constitution would have been defeated.

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Proceeding with the constitutional amendment process would not only honor a promise, but would also allow for addressing substantive deficits in the document. One gaping lacuna in the permanent constitution relates to the ambiguities respecting the ownership, management, and distribution of Iraq's oil. This issue is perceived by many insurgent nationalists as fundamental to the future unity and stability of the country, and thus the ambiguities constitute a major irritant.

Regardless of any eventual substantive resolution, however, re-opening the amendment process allows for full acceptance of the process of constitution-drafting, which, by virtue of the Sunni parties' boycott, did not occur in 2005. Though there is broad agreement within Iraq's polity that the future of the country is as a unified, democratic, and pluralistic federation, there is not yet a consensus as to what federalism means in the Iraqi context. Engaging in the review process would allow for discussion by all parliamentary parties on these and other issues, thereby increasing confidence-building measures among not only the parties, but their respective constituents as well.

Any political solution would, of course, include a reconciliation process. Here the Iraqis must have a free hand to deal with their compatriots, which they have not had in the recent past. In 2004, when then-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced amnesty for those outside the political process, the US embassy in Baghdad immediately declared that such a policy would not be available to anyone who had spilt American blood. This statement, in turn, led Prime Minister Allawi to say that amnesty would not apply to those who had killed Iraqis.

While current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was contemplating another such amnesty in May 2006, the US Congress decried amnesty for those who had killed US citizens. Yet if amnesty was not for those who had been involved in insurgent acts, for whose benefit was it? For reconciliation to have meaning, it has to include some unsavory characters, including some who have shed the blood of Iraqis and US citizens. That, after all, is the experience of other countries in similar circumstances. The Germans, for instance, had to reverse an overly rigorous de-Nazification process in order to maintain national cohesion and rebuild a functioning state.