In Plato's Apology, Chaerephon approached the Oracle at Delphi
and asked whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. The Pythian priestess
replied that there was no one wiser. Socrates was perplexed. He had
faith in the Oracle, yet he knew that he was not the wisest in the land.
He approached politicians, poets, and artisans, but he found that they
knew less than they professed. In the end, Socrates concluded that he
was the most wise--for he recognized the limits of his own knowledge.
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In similar humility, Professors Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks
approach Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military
Interventions. They set out to "examine what we know and what we
don't know about rebuilding the rule of law in the wake of military
interventions." They eschew simple solutions, seeking instead open
dialogue and debate. The result is an impressive contribution to the
literature of the rule of law.
The book opens with a discussion of "new imperialism."
Despite the chapter's provocative title, the authors seem
ambivalent about whether to enter the imperialism debate. The authors
provide an abbreviated summary of positions and fail to include even a
footnote to other scholarship on this raging debate. Their brief
observations are, however, interesting. They note the irony that, after
the Cold War, military interventions in Kosovo and elsewhere were based
on the same values (e.g., democracy and human rights) that led to the
dismantling of imperialism in the 20th century.
After September 11th, one could argue that the justification for
military interventions reverted back to more traditional grounds:
national security wrapped with a layer of humanitarian concern.
Afghanistan and Iraq reflect this approach. Regardless of the
intervener's motivation, the authors correctly state that
today's "interventionists" are expected to build
"just, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous societies in the areas
in which they control." This requires a significant commitment of
time, effort, and resources, which often proves unpopular with domestic
constituencies. Similarly, short-term interests often conflict with
long-term priorities. "Know Thyself" was reputedly carved into
the Oracle-Shrine in Delphi. If nothing else, this book helps us better
understand the constraints and contradictions we face when making rule
of law decisions.
In Chapter 2, the authors provide a fascinating, yet concise,
summary of the international framework for armed intervention. Quoting
Kofi Annan, the authors remind us that there "are times when the
use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace." Actions
taken without regard to international law, however, are likely to
squander international support for both the intervention and subsequent
rebuilding efforts. Moreover, the authors remind us of the importance of
the interveners' own conduct. The point is well taken: the abuse at
Abu Ghraib prison was not only morally unconscionable but also exposed
the coalition to charges of hypocrisy on issues of human rights and the
rule of law.
In Chapter 3, the authors seek to define the "rule of
law." Because of conceptual challenges, the authors argue that
policymakers often employ an "I know it when I see it"
standard. The problem with this approach is that it has led to an overly
simplistic focus on structures, institutions, and laws. Accordingly, the
authors propose a "pragmatic" definition. They state that the
rule of law is when "the state successfully monopolizes the means
of violence, and in which most people, most of the time, choose to
resolve disputes in a manner ... that respects fundamental human rights
norms." This definition opens up an area for future scholarship,
namely the development of indicators. In the text, indicators seem to
include everything from life expectancy and "economic
hardship" to whether the country has pursued an "ill-starred
military campaign." Reference is also made to crime rates, but this
is also nettlesome, noting that officials in Afghanistan have argued
that the homicide rate in Washington, DC is much higher than that in
Kabul. The authors concede that their definition is not intended to
stand up to rigorous scrutiny, but, at present, the concept is
uncomfortably loose.
The authors then propose a "synergistic approach" to
build rule of law. This approach has three key features. First, it is
"ends-based and strategic." Institutions can help advance rule
of law objectives, but they are not ends in themselves. Accordingly,
they wisely counsel us to avoid confusing institutional deliverables
(e.g., number of judges trained or courthouses refurbished) for progress
on rule of law.
Second, the approach is "adaptive and dynamic." Moving
past buzzwords, the authors make an important point. Rule of law cannot
be "imported wholesale;" rather it must build on existing
cultural, political, human and material resources. All too often, donors
and implementing partners shun local participation because of hubris,
expediency, or poor project design resulting in laws and institutions
that look good on paper but do little to alter on-the-ground realities.
Third, the approach is "systemic," considering the
interrelationships among various components. The basic point is
unobjectionable, but it sometimes borders on the Butterfly Effect.
Chapter 5 argues that interveners and their allies must provide
everything from sewage treatment to health care in order to provide a
secure environment in which the rule of law can take root. While
certainly true, at times it is difficult to determine the difference
between rule of law programming and the broader issue of post-conflict
reconstruction. Nonetheless, the authors' fundamental conclusion is
indisputable: the development of the rule of law is about much more than
re-writing laws, reforming institutions, and reinforcing the legal
profession.
In Chapter 6, the authors advance to justice system reform,
recognizing that justice institutions are vulnerable to "predatory
politics." If interveners fail to consider the political context,
they may inadvertently provide local factions with institutional
strength to advance their own interests. Indeed, rule of law
institutions can turn from shield to sword in the hands of individuals
intent on repressing adversaries. To address these and other issues,
this chapter provides guidance on everything from how to conduct a
strategic assessment to specific recommendations on prison reform.
The authors then address accountability for atrocities in Chapter
7, discussing the demonstration effect and capacity building impact of
accountability proceedings. Among other issues, bringing known
perpetrators to justice can break patterns of impunity and build public
confidence in the rule of law. At the same time, as the recent trial and
hanging of Saddam Hussein demonstrate, if segments of society view the
process or outcome as unjust or a violation of international law, then
accountability proceedings can also undermine public confidence in the
fairness of the legal system.
Chapter 8 addresses a central issue: how to create "rule of
law cultures." The challenges are enormous and are often
complicated by intervener's own actions when they assume governance
functions. Their newfound position is, in some sense, an abject lesson
in the power of brute force. The interveners seek to promote democracy,
yet they are not elected by nor generally accountable to the individuals
over which they govern. This may be an inherent part of the system, but
the stark resistance that officials often manifest toward any form of
local engagement is not. Indeed, one could argue that the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo failed to adopt a thoughtful approach to public
participation, which undermined its credibility and effectiveness in
various initiatives. As noted in Chapter 9, local ownership poses its
own dilemmas, but the alternative--the imposition of the rule of law
from above--is destined to fail.
As one closes the book and looks again at the cover, the brilliance
of the exercise becomes clear. The authors have cast the title not as a
statement, but rather as a question: can might make rights? With the
skill that is befitting seasoned law professors, the authors have
employed the Socratic Method in a most gentle and engaging fashion. The
titular question is never answered, but key issues are raised,
conceptual contours are explored, and the reader is enriched through the
journey.
DOUGLAS RUTZEN is President of the International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law and Lecturer in Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After
Military Interventions is by Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa
Brooks (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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