A new climate treaty: US leadership after
Kyoto.
by Claussen, Eileen^Diringer, Elliot
For years, despite a steady accumulation of science showing the
clear and present dangers of global climate change, efforts toward an
effective international response have been at a virtual standstill. The
principal reason is that the United States has refused to play. But with
Washington now seemingly on a course to enact mandatory limits on US
greenhouse gas emissions, it is plausible to begin envisioning a
multilateral solution to this quintessentially global challenge. It is,
in other words, time to contemplate a new climate change treaty.
The urgency of the task is irrefutable. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change's latest assessment concluded with 90 percent
confidence that human activity is warming the planet and warned of
irreversible and potentially catastrophic consequences if emissions
continue unabated. Politically as well, the next few years represent a
critical window for action. The emission limits assumed by most
industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012. What
momentum the treaty has achieved and the multibillion-dollar carbon
market it has spawned may well be lost unless a new agreement can be
forged.
Any new treaty will be environmentally effective and politically
feasible only to the degree that it successfully engages and binds all
of the world's major economies. Coming to terms with cost and
equity while also bridging the gap between developed and developing is
an extraordinary diplomatic challenge. Meeting it will require fresh
thinking and approaches, a genuine readiness to compromise and a
collective political will that, while perhaps emerging, is by no means
assured. What is needed above all right now is US leadership, for no
country bears greater responsibility for climate change, nor has greater
capacity to catalyze a global response.
Responsibility is measured most directly in terms of emissions, and
it should surprise no one that history's greatest economic power is
also the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter. By the same token,
the tremendous enterprise, prosperity, and technological prowess that
have contributed so heavily to the atmospheric burden uniquely qualify
the United States to lead a low-carbon transition. Indeed, no nation has
done more to advance scientific understanding of the causes and
consequences of global warming. But thus far, the US contribution to the
global effort largely ends there.
For the first time, however, US politics are beginning to favor
real climate action. Even before the recent Democratic takeover of
Congress, momentum was building for mandatory measures to reduce US
emissions. As on many other environmental issues, individual states are
leading the way, with California once again at the forefront. Business
leaders, sensing that carbon constraints are inevitable and fearing a
patchwork of state rules, are increasingly calling for a uniform
national approach. Ten major companies, including General Electric,
DuPont, and Alcoa, recently joined with four nonprofits in the US
Climate Action Partnership to push for mandatory emission limits.
Several bipartisan bills now before Congress would mandate emission cuts
of 60 to 80 percent by 2050.
With the enactment of mandatory US measures probably occurring no
later than 2010, the global politics of climate change will be
thoroughly transformed. Having resolved what it will do at home, the
United States will know far better what it can commit to abroad. To
avoid losing competitive advantage to countries without emission
controls, the United States will have a strong incentive to rejoin and
strengthen the global climate effort.
For the struggling multilateral process, the United States'
re-entry cannot come soon enough. After President Bush's outright
rejection of Kyoto, other countries rallied around the treaty and
brought it into force. But without the United States and Australia, the
protocol encompasses only about one third of global emissions. Even if
all countries meet their targets, which is unlikely, global emissions in
2012 would still be 30 percent higher than in 1997, when Kyoto was
negotiated. While talks on post-2012 commitments have begun, under the
treaty's terms they contemplate targets only for those countries
that already have them. European leaders are floating ambitious numbers,
butJapan and others have made clear they are not taking on new
commitments without movement by the United States and major developing
countries. The political reality is that the negotiations are headed
nowhere, unless they are somehow broadened or linked to bring in the
other major players.
With the United States back at the table, there could be a way
forward. Once the largest emitter says it is ready to deal, China and
other emerging economies might also be willing. Under this more hopeful
scenario, what could a future climate treaty look like? To begin with,
it must commit all the major economies. Today, 25 countries account for
85 percent of global emissions (as well as 70 percent of global
population and 85 percent of global GDP). Environmentally, no long-term
strategy to cut global emissions can succeed without them. Politically,
it is imperative that all major economies be on board. All share
concerns about costs and competitiveness, and none can sustain an
ambitious climate effort without confidence that others will contribute
their fair share. This requires binding commitments. But a new treaty
should be flexible, allowing countries to take on different types of
commitments. Circumstances vary widely among the major economies, and
the policies that can address climate change in the context of national
priorities will vary from one to the other. Countries will need
different pathways forward.
One pathway, to be sure, is the one charted by Kyoto: binding
emission targets coupled with emissions trading. Emission targets
provide environmental certainty--everyone knows by just how much
emissions are to be reduced--while emissions trading harnesses market
forces to deliver those reductions at the lowest possible cost. The
European Union's regional trading system and Kyoto's Clean
Development Mechanism (which grants developing countries tradable
emission credits for reductions they achieve) have generated over US$30
billion in greenhouse gas trades since their launch in 2005. As the
World Bank recently concluded, targets and trading is also critical
because it is by far the likeliest means of generating the multi-billion
dollar investments needed to drive down emissions in fast-growing
developing countries.
A fully global system of targets and trading might appear to be the
ideal policy but is politically unrealistic. Developing countries, which
cannot as confidently project their future emissions and bitterly oppose
any perceived constraint on their growth, are not about to take on
quantified emission limits. A more realistic alternative would be
policy-based commitments: countries agree to undertake policies that
reduce emissions, while also advancing core development objectives such
as economic growth or enhanced energy security. China, for instance,
could commit to strengthening its existing energy efficiency and
renewable energy goals, while Brazil and other rainforest countries
could commit to reducing deforestation. Though developing countries
would have no binding emission limits, they could participate in trading
through a system awarding them emission credits for meeting or exceeding
their policy commitments, thus providing a powerful market incentive for
robust compliance.
A flexible new framework could include other types of commitments.
One promising approach is sectoral agreements: governments commit to
targets, standards, or other measures to reduce emissions from a given
sector such as transportation or electricity, rather than across the
economy. Particularly in industries producing globally traded goods,
this would help overcome competitiveness issues by ensuring for a more
level playing field. Governments could also commit to joint technology
efforts, both to develop long-term breakthrough technologies and to
ensure that developing countries have access to them.
Finally, a post-2012 agreement must help poor countries cope with
increased flooding, drought, and other inevitable consequences of global
warming. It is a cruel irony that these impacts will fall
disproportionately on sub-Saharan Africa and other regions that are
least responsible for climate change and least able to adapt. Stronger
international support for adaptation is not only a moral imperative, but
a political necessity.
A new treaty that allows countries different but limited pathways
could both build on the Kyoto Protocol and move past it. The natural
venue for negotiating such a pact is the 1992 UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Kyoto's parent agreement, which has been ratified
by virtually every nation--including the United States. The precise form
of this new treaty can emerge only through negotiation, as it must be
tailored to the specific circumstances of very diverse countries. But
the basic elements are clear. They include binding targets for developed
countries to curb their emissions and drive the global emissions market,
binding policy commitments for developing countries, possibly with
sectoral and technology agreements overlaid, and stronger support for
adaptation.
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