Formation of the appropriability regime: strategic and
practical considerations.
by Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Pia^Puumalainen, Kaisu
SUMMARY
Facilitated by improved networks and communication, knowledge
spills over to competitors more easily than before, thus creating an
appropriability problem. Consequently, protection of intangibles calls
for new approaches. Companies have various means of protection at their
disposal, but creating barriers against imitation also has another side
to it; transfer of knowledge in situations requiring knowledge sharing
may be unintentionally obstructed. The aim of this study is to increase
understanding of how firms can balance knowledge protection and sharing
so as to benefit most from their knowledge assets. Thus, knowledge
protection is approached through an examination of the appropriability
regime of a firm, and its formation among 299 firms.
KEYWORDS
appropriability regime; protection mechanisms; imitation; knowledge
sharing; intellectual property; innovation performance
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades the transition from an industrial economy to an
information economy has affected the ways in which companies operate and
establish competitive advantages. While the industrial economy was to a
large extent driven by economies of scale, the information economy has
made it natural to put more emphasis on knowledge (Shapiro & Varian
1999; David & Foray 2002). As a result, the importance of intangible
weighed against tangible assets has increased (Graham & Mowery 2003;
Teece 2000). However, creating and maintaining competitive advantage
based on knowledge is also very challenging. The markets have become
deregulated, and competition has sharpened as a result of the complex
networks and increased channels of communication. One major consequence
of the changes, and at the same time a problem related to sustaining
competitive advantage, is that the benefits of producing new knowledge
and know-how often spill over to the competitors, thus creating an
appropriability problem (e.g. Arrow 1962; Scherer 1999; see also Knott
et al. 2004 on spillovers). According to evolutionary logic, more
productive and more profitable techniques, routines, and capabilities
replace less productive ones, firstly because the best-practice firms
that use them grow and invest in further innovation, and secondly
because the more profitable technologies are imitated and adopted by
other companies (Dosi & Nelson 1994; see also Foss 1997). This is
especially true with codified knowledge or information that, because of
its public-good nature, can be captured and copied relatively easily and
cost-effectively (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962).
The innovator is not completely vulnerable to imitation, however.
Companies have various means of protection at their disposal, and by
taking advantage of these mechanisms they can make intangibles more
non-transferable, and consequently profit from their knowledge assets.
The mechanisms make it possible for them to avert or delay imitation of
their core intangibles, which enables them to earn (temporary) monopoly
rents and other quasi rents. Protecting intellectual assets can be very
challenging, however. Economic and technical developments, as well as
the internationalization of trade, have changed institutional protection
systems (e.g. patent protection) at least to some extent, and have
affected the possibilities of concealing knowledge on a more general
level, such as in terms of utilizing lead time or practical ways of
concealment. For instance, under the growing competitive pressure and
harmonization of legislation over national borders, patent protection
has been expanding to new areas, such as computer software, and it also
has been strengthening (e.g. Chesbrough 2003). The mobility of knowledge
has increased as people are moving between firms and even countries more
frequently, and as information and communications technologies have
changed the ways in which information is acquired and transferred. In
particular, the expansion and utilization of global networks such as the
Internet have facilitated the flow of information. Increasingly common
ways of distributing products via the Internet have decreased
firms' ability to fight piracy and copying, and lead-time advantage
is thus shortening.
Although some of the changes have improved the possibilities of
firms to keep their knowledge assets proprietary, it still is much
easier to protect tangible resources and property in a more concrete
form. In the case of intangibles, there are many factors that make them
flow out of the company. Besides, the effects of protecting intangibles
or those of increased knowledge flows are not always unambiguous, and
the changes have also affected companies' chances of appropriation.
In fact, protection may not be necessary in the first place. According
to the Open Innovation Model, for example, control over intellectual
property may not be that important, but the capability to utilize both
internal and external sources of ideas and paths to market is
(Chesbrough 2003). Protection may even end up being harmful: there are
many stories about patent disputes ruining a company's reputation,
and about intra-firm secrecy deteriorating employee loyalty and
motivation (Hannah 2005). Consequently, the goal should not be the
maximization of protection, but rather the maximization of expected net
profits from knowledge assets (Shapiro & Varian 1999)--in other
words, maximizing the efficiency of appropriability regime in the
competitive sense. Accordingly, it is important to know how the
appropriability regime forms and what kind of factors lie behind the
possibilities to make it most efficient considering the company's
competitive advantage and position.
STRIVING FOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS TO GAIN COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The changes that companies have faced in their business environment
have been clearly reflected in the theoretical developments. Efforts
have been made in the field of economics-based strategy research to
understand how competitive advantage can be achieved and sustained on
the firm level, as well as why and how companies end up performing
differently even in the same industry when facing quite similar
opportunities and threats. The Resource Based View (e.g. Penrose 1959;
Wernerfelt 1984) focuses on isolation mechanisms (see Rumelt 1984) that
can be founded on valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable
resources, for example (see Barney 1991 on these VRIN attributes).
Concentration on a company's resource bundle and its positions
compared to its competitor's resource base thus gives a good start
in the search for different ways of creating barriers against imitation.
However, protecting knowledge assets and resources requires careful
management, and it has to be done according to emerging opportunities
and threats (see Teece 2000). Thus the Dynamic Capabilities View (e.g.
Teece et al. 1997; Christensen 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000) is
better equipped than the more static Resource Based View to describe and
explain the dynamic strategies that companies utilize in changing
situations. Furthermore, the Knowledge Based View (e.g. Kogut &
Zander 1992, 1996; Grant 1996, 1997) also has some concepts built into
it that enable closer and more precise examination of ways of protecting
intellectual assets. The premise of idiosyncratic, tacit and inimitable
knowledge as a main source of competitive advantage is particularly
relevant.
The common denominator of the above views is in creating market
imperfections in order to gain competitive advantage. This can be
achieved by utilizing different isolation mechanisms, such as those
protecting knowledge assets from imitation. Indeed, previous research
has identified several means of protection that enable a company to
prevent, or at least delay, duplication of its most important
intellectual assets, which in turn makes it possible to earn (temporary)
monopoly rents, and also ancillary profits (such as licensing or
franchising revenues):
* Intellectual property rights (IPRs), especially patents,
copyright, and trade secrets have been among the most studied mechanisms
(e.g. Jain 1996; Arundel & Kabla 1998; Arundel 2001; Pitkethly 2001;
Knight 2001; Kelley & Rice 2002; Cohen et al. 2002; Gallini &
Schotchmer 2002; Hannah 2005).
* The tacit nature of knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Lippman & Rumelt
1982; Nelson & Winter 1982; Dierickx & Cool 1989; Barney 1991;
Zander & Kogut 1995; Teece 1988; 1998; Saviotti 1998) is of great
importance, although the focus of research has not necessarily been on
appropriation in every case.
* Lead-time (e.g. Levin et al. 1987; Lieberman & Montgomery
1988; Schoonhoven et al. 1990; Mueller 1997; Makadok 1998; Coerderoy
& Durand 2004; Carow et al. 2004) has often been of intellectual
interest as well.
* Other protection mechanisms can be found in the vast literature
on human resource management (HRM) and contracts (e.g. Rousseau &
Wade-Benzoni 1994; Baughn et al. 1997; Liebeskind 1997; Boxall 1998), as
well as in the discussion on practical and technical means of
concealment (e.g. Davis 2001; Hannah 2005).
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