Coca conflict: Brazil's impending war on
drugs.
by Fulton, Lauren
With the reelection of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in
September 2006, inequities appeared to be fading and the quality of life
of the average Brazilian seemed to be improving. Lula promised to
advance the economy, already the ninth largest in the world, and thereby
strengthen Brazil's claim to be a "country of the future"
and an economic world power. In order to achieve this, Lula recognized
the necessity of combating poverty and to this end, he set up the Bolsa
family grant, which delivers aid to the most impoverished regions of
Brazil. Many Brazilians assumed that drug trafficking, which had been
increasing since the 1980s, would subsequently decrease alongside
falling poverty. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. A 25-year
legacy of drug trafficking has made the practice a major feature of
Brazil's perpetually impoverished urban slums. While the country is
currently on track to see a 50 percent reduction of poverty by 2015,
drug production has only escalated. Hence, Lula's main initiative
should be to overcome organized crime in the slums, such that the poor,
who remain vulnerable to gang warfare, will be able to live free of
crime and rise out of poverty.
In a 2001 report released by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Committee, large scale cultivation of
coca--whose leaves are the major raw material for cocaine--was noted to
be spreading from Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, where it has long been
documented, to Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Governments are concerned
that its spread may correlate with the steady rise in drug trafficking
in South American countries, most notably Brazil. While Brazilian drug
trafficking began in the 1980s with the exposure of gold miners to the
lucrative dealing of drugs in the border states, cocaine production and
trafficking has taken root in urban slums, where gangs began earning a
quick profit for exporting the contraband. In March 1999, then-Brazilian
president Fernando Henrique Cardoso created a task force designed to
fight drug trafficking and organized crime, thereby acknowledging the
connection between crime mobs, drug trafficking, and poverty.
Unfortunately, the causal links among poverty, crime, and drug
trafficking have been embedded in the nation. Poverty has created a
culture of drug trafficking that will need continued effort and money to
prevent further proliferation. The urban slums, especially those in Sao
Paulo, have spawned organized gangs that deal in cocaine and raw drug
products, and the violence that results from the combination deters
police from entering the areas. The shantytowns, or favelas, are
breeding grounds for new militias that continuously come into existence
once an old gang is defeated. In February 2007, it was reported that
these militia had overrun 90 of Brazil's 600 favelas, often taking
control of the drug trade themselves. What is most troubling is that the
militias have included former police officers, prison guards, and
firefighters who have turned to a more profitable reign of terror over
slums and drug lords, further entrenching a deeply ingrained culture of
corruption. Lula's grants and attempts to end poverty have not
reached these slums, and unless they are cleared of crime and
reconstructed without the organized gangs, poverty and drugs will
persist. Brazil needs to firmly prove that organized crime will not be
tolerated and that officials even in impoverished areas will receive a
fair salary. In order to do this, the income inequality gap must be
bridged.
Only several years ago, Brazil had the most unequal income
distribution in the world. With the Gini coefficient--which measures
income equality from 0, for perfect distribution, to 1, for completely
inequitable distribution--hovering around 0.6 between 1976 and 1996,
Brazil's growth has not benefited everyone; other countries with
similar growth rates maintain Gini coefficients of approximately 0.34.
At present, the richest 20 percent of the population receive 30 times
more income than the poorest. This disparity helps create the slums that
become home to organized gangs and drug lords. Furthermore, many of the
gains made under Cardoso and Lula measure success on a countrywide scale
and ignore the fact that while some of the impoverished have increased
their incomes, those in Sao Paulo's slums have not.
The question remains, what can Brazil do about this growing
socioeconomic threat? Lula's main objective should be to stop
preserving a facade of equal national prosperity and instead focus on
solving the real problems of the urban poor. Although poverty is
decreasing in Brazil, Lula must now deal with its consequences; drug
trafficking in Brazil can only be eradicated by continuing to fight
organized crime and close the income inequality gap.
associate editor
LAUREN FULTON
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NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.