Fading mirage: illusory reform in Saudi
Arabia.
by Choe, Julia
In the eyes of many Westerners, the idea of reform in Saudi Arabia
is a contradiction. The Al Saud dynasty has long held a monopoly of
political, religious, and social power over its citizens. The government
currently bans all opposition political parties and tightly controls
domestic media outlets. Saudi Arabia has also gained notoriety around
the world for its strict interpretation of Sunni Islam called Wahhabism.
Despite the apparent lack of freedom, Saudi Arabia has in fact
experienced some movements toward reform and modernization over the past
few years. Unfortunately, they do not represent a trend toward
liberalization and political reform. Rather, they have only appeared in
response to events such as lowered oil earnings and threats of
terrorism. Given Saudi Arabia's recent economic successes, it seems
unlikely that the kingdom will move toward substantial reform in the
near future.
The years of 2001 and 2003 were marked by significant drives for
political reform in Saudi Arabia. Concerns over declining oil revenues
and rising unemployment formed the basis for domestic dissatisfaction.
The participation of 15 Saudis in the September 11, 2001, attacks left
the government with a new combination of US pressure and internal calls
for reform. In January 2003, 104 Saudi liberal reformers created a
"Strategic Vision for the Present and the Future," which
consisted of detailed proposals for democratic changes such as
separation of power and elected legislative bodies at the national and
provincial levels. This document used religious and legal arguments to
justify citizens' supervision of government actions.
Pressures for reform reached a peak when 12 suicide bombers
attacked the capital of Riyadh in May 2003, killing 30 people and
wounding 200. Saudis refer to the attacks as their own September 11, and
the bombings seemed to initially push the Saudi government to reform its
authoritarian practices. The Riyadh attacks were followed by
unprecedented criticism of religious extremism in the media. The Crown
Prince himself made speeches acknowledging the problem of Islamic
extremism--acknowledgments that would have been unthinkable just a few
years prior. In 2005, Saudis also witnessed their first municipal
elections in almost a half-century. That same year, women were even
allowed to participate in elections for the board of the Jeddah Chamber
of Commerce. The start of the 21st century, thus, seemed a positive one
for Saudi reform.
The impact of these reforms, however, should not be overstated. In
many cases, they have been overshadowed by continued authoritarian
behavior. Despite the optimism of the 2003 petitions, signatories to
more recent appeals for reform have faced stiff government resistance.
In March 2004, 13 pro-reform activists in favor of a constitutional
monarchy were arrested, some of whom are forbidden to travel abroad even
today. Perhaps most tellingly, the lauded 2005 municipal elections
excluded women, and only half of the seats were contested. Political
parties are still banned, and the government retains power over the
municipal councils' budgets. Sadly, even this encouraging glimmer
of democracy has proved to be strikingly limited.
Economic growth in the country also suggests that substantive
political reform may not arrive any time soon. As the oft-cited maxim
goes, the higher the oil prices, the lower the prospect of democracy in
the Middle East. The histories of Europe and the United States show that
heavy taxation often leads to agitation for reform and greater demands
for government accountability. However, the Saudi government's high
oil revenues allow it to forgo all income or corporate taxes. Indeed,
owning a quarter of the world's oil reserves permits the Saudi
government essentially to buy off domestic demands for reform. Since
revenues flow to the Saudi government directly, it has the option of
exercising patronage to benefit political or social actors who demand
change. Ways of placating interests include giving land gifts or
supplying public services such as education and health care.
Furthermore, the high concentration of wealth in the monarchy makes it
harder for political groups outside of the government to find financial
support. Additionally, since oil production does not necessitate mass
labor mobilization, the potential power of unions dissolves. Even if
demands for change were to remain strong within certain groups, the
middle class' demonstrated preference for economic stability over
political freedom dampens the probability of widespread demands for
change.
Current economic indicators may portend a negative political
climate for Saudi citizens. In the years leading up to 2003, rising
unemployment led to widespread dissatisfaction among the population. The
Saudi Arabia of today faces no such problem. In 2006, the country saw a
US$100 billion current account surplus and a GDP of US$350 billion. With
plans to increase its oil production to 12.5 million barrels per day by
2009, there is little sign that the Saudi government will lose economic
control, and thereby political control, over its citizens.
It is certainly possible that a downturn in the Saudi economy will
once again spark the possibility for reform. Such reforms, however,
would reflect the monarchy's pragmatism rather than its conviction.
Without firm government commitments to political change, it is unlikely
that the Saudi government will make permanent, substantial improvements
to its citizens' rights. Reform in the Saudi kingdom may not be the
hopeless cause it once was, but the prospects for lasting, substantive
changes remain illusory.
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deputy managing editor
JULIA CHOE
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NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.