Reinventing integration: Muslims in the West.

As the sixth year of the US-led war on terror rages on, it would appear that few constructs are more self-evident than the one dividing Islam and the West. Muslim minorities in the West are often scrutinized through this paradoxical prism. On which side of the divide do they fall? For pessimists, the signs do not look good.

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The results of several recent polls have set off alarm bells in a tense Europe, still shaken by the July 7, 2005 bombings in London. For example, the Pew poll found that given a choice of identifying as first Muslim or Christian or as first a citizen of their country, the majority of British, French, and German Muslims choose faith, while the majority of British, French, and German Christians choose country. Some have taken these results as witness to the danger of over-accommodating religious differences. They have advocated that European Muslims be persuaded or forced to forsake their Islamic identity for a Western one. However, new findings from a Gallup study of Muslims in London, Paris, and Berlin, and the general public in each corresponding country, challenge the very legitimacy of such a trade-off and offer another way to reconcile citizenship and creed. In many such instances, the divide between European Muslims and the general public is inexistent or not as large as originally seemed.

In light of these results, people of all backgrounds should forsake popular assumptions and alarmist rhetoric for an evidence-based understanding of European Muslims, consequently creating a new narrative for their societies. This fresh perspective indicates that national and religious identities are not mutually exclusive, but mutually enriching, and that integration is not defined by citizen conformity, but by citizen cooperation.

Islam, Identity, and Integration

One of the most pervasive assumptions in discourse on European Muslim integration is that Muslim religiosity threatens Europe. Those who believe in the irreconcilability of Western and Muslim identity generally argue that Muslim piety, expressed in religious symbols and moral conservatism, contrasts against the backdrop of an increasingly secular and sexually liberal Europe: a recipe for increasingly insular Muslim communities and profound alienation from European national identity. These isolated communities, the argument continues, represent illiberal islands corrupting Western society's liberal values; they are "cesspools" for radicalization. Integration, or conformity with majority culture, is therefore seen as vital defense against citizens with dual loyalties.

However, a new study paints a very different picture. While Muslims in three European capitals are indeed highly religious, this piety does not lead to sympathy for terrorism, desires to isolate, or lack of national loyalty. Not surprisingly, the study found that Muslims in London, Berlin, and Paris are much more likely than the general public in their corresponding countries to say religion is an important part of their daily lives, and to identify strongly with their faith. Predictably, the Muslims surveyed are also much more likely to express traditional moral values. In comparison to the public at large, Muslims overwhelmingly see homosexual acts, sex before marriage, and abortion as "morally wrong."

However, religious and national identities are not mutually exclusive. Not only do urban Muslims identify strongly with their religion, but they are at least as likely as the general public to identify strongly with their countries of residence. As a British Muslim MP recently commented, "My nationality is first British and my religion is first Muslim."

Also defying conventional wisdom, high levels of Muslim religiosity and corresponding conservative moral outlooks did not translate into a sense of threat from the "sinful West" and into a desire to isolate. Instead, urban Muslims were slightly less likely to feel people with different religious practices than their own were a threat to their way of life, and slightly more likely than the general public to say they would prefer living in a mixed neighborhood. Not only do religious and national identities coexist, but it is Muslims who are the most eager to forsake isolation for integration.

Nor was a strong Muslim identity related to religious exclusivity and intolerance. In fact, Muslims in Paris and London were over 10 times more likely to express positive opinions of "fundamentalist Christians" and Catholics than negative opinions. On the other hand, the public was essentially as likely to express positive opinions as negative opinions of Sunni Muslims, with the exception of the German public, which was almost four times as likely to express negative as positive views of Sunni Muslims. Muslims in these cities were also at least as likely to support the rights of members of other faiths to display their religious symbols as they were to render support for their own symbols, belying the popular assertion that Muslims demand preferential treatment for Islam. More accurately, Muslims' expectations of respect for Islam and its symbols extends to an expectation of respect for religion in general. Recently, Shahid Malik, a British Muslim MP, even complained about what he called the "policy wonks" who wished to strip the public sphere of all Christian religious symbols. He explained, "Many fellow Muslims will be horrified the liberal PC brigade want Christmas canceled to avoid offending us. We actually relish this time of year."

Muslims in Paris, Berlin, and London wish to hold on to their values, but they also choose diversity over conformity. They define integration as mutual respect and cooperation between distinct cultures, not as the dilution of minority culture into a dominant mainstream, nor as the dilution of majority culture into a politically correct muck. The West should therefore not consider Muslims a threat, given their predilection for integration within their societies.

The evidence indicates that a much more likely threat to European societies than Muslim intolerance of other faiths is the public's fairly common negative perception of its Muslim neighbors. This danger is reflected in the gap between public perception of Muslim attitudes and the positions Muslim communities actually take. For example, while Muslims were as likely as the general public to identify strongly with their country of residence and express confidence in its democratic institutions, the majority of British, French, and German residents did not believe Muslims were loyal to their respective nations. The vast majorities of Muslims in Paris, Berlin, and London say they are respectful of other faiths. Although Muslims in each city support this claim in their expressed positive opinions of Christians, a significantly lower percentage of the public in each country agrees. What divides much of the public in France, Britain, and Germany from their Muslim neighbors is not a gap in principles, but one in perceptions.

But how can one reconcile these results with other polls, such as the Pew study, that find that the majority of Muslims in Great Britain, Spain, and Germany choose Muslim identity over national identity? Is this not proof that Muslims in Europe reject the West? The evidence suggests otherwise. A primarily religious identity hardly means a crisis of integration. In predominantly Muslim countries, the Pew study also found the majority of Muslims in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and even Turkey consider themselves Muslims first, rather than citizens of their country. Significantly, the same poll found that Christian Americans--seldom accused of lacking national pride--were almost evenly split between those who said they were first Christian and those who said they were first US citizens. Clearly, expressing a religious primary identity does not necessarily mean rejecting one's country. The commonality among these communities is not a lack of patriotism, but a majority who considers religion important--and therefore at the heart of its identity.

Radical Rejection

But should this strong Muslim religiosity scare the West? Is this a sign of sympathy for terrorism? According to the data, the answer is no. The results from the Gallup study challenge the common dogma underpinning current discourse on radicalization and show that Muslim communities are as likely as any other to reject terrorism. In light of this evidence, the primary motivation for Muslim integration into mainstream European societies must shift from a desire to reduce security risks to a desire to promote equal citizen contribution and national unity, thus reducing suspicion and alienation of the public's Muslim neighbors.

Those who push for integration primarily as a security measure assume that communities in Europe with a disproportionate percentage of Muslims provide a sympathetic environment for terrorism, and therefore act as a "cesspool" for radicalization--an assertion unsubstantiated by evidence. Countering perceptions of religious radicalization, Muslims in these three cities were at least as likely as the general public to condemn terrorist attacks on civilians and to find no moral justification for using violence, even for a "noble cause." This data suggests that Muslim neighborhoods are no more hospitable to terrorist cells than any other neighborhood.

Some sympathy for terrorist acts does exist in the Muslim world, but in a very small minority. After analyzing survey data of over 90 percent of the global Muslim population, Gallup found that despite widespread religiosity and anger at some regional Western policies, only a small percentage sympathized with the attacks of September 11.