(88.) See Guzman, supra note 86, at 2179.
(89.) See Bufford, supra note 85, at 114.
(90.) See OMAR, supra note 22, at 24.
(91.) LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note
86, at 742 (envisioning a form of territorialism more like
universalism).
(92.) See id. at 743-44.
(93.) See id. at 744.
(94.) See Bufford, supra note 85, at 114-15; OMAR, supra note 22,
at 24.
(95.) OMAR, supra note 22, at 24.
(96.) See Bufford, supra note 85, at 114 (citing Jay L. Westbrook,
A Global Solution to International Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2277, 2309
(2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, A Global Solution]). Other disadvantages
include the ease of conflict between jurisdictions; the inability of
creditors to know in advance where the debtor's assets will be
located when bankruptcy intervenes; uneven distribution of assets; and
the opportunity for both creditors and debtors to use strategic methods
to advance their own interests. Id. at 116 (discussing a case where a
territorial regime in Japan refused to enjoin a major resort development
in Australia, but the American court, under a universalist approach, was
able to impose an automatic stay to prevent secured creditors in
Australia from foreclosing on the Australian real property).
(97.) Id. at 110 (noting that the pure form of universalism occurs
only in an ideal world and is only practical as a theory).
(98.) Id. (citing Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 96, at
2292-97).
(99.) See OMAR, supra note 22, at 26.
(100.) See Bufford, supra note 85, at 111.
(101.) See id. at 111-12 (discussing the modified form of
universalism).
(102.) See id. at 112 (citing as an example Westbrook, A Global
Solution, supra note 96, at 2297).
(103.) See OMAR, supra note 22, at 27.
(104.) See id. (discussing the apparent contradiction between the
strategy of secondary or ancillary practices and their actual effects).
(105.) See Tony McAuley, Chapter and Verse: Insolvency Laws in
Europe Are Being Overhauled, May
2005,http://www.cfoeurope.com/displaystory.cfm/3929315/ (chronicling the
changes and reforms in different European countries' bankruptcy
laws). Countries like England and Italy have even attempted to model
their reorganization laws after America's Chapter 11. Id.
(106.) See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 86, at
479-80 (discussing the outcome differences in Felixstowe Dock &
Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Ltd., [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76).
(107.) See McAuley, supra note 105, at 4 (noting that early
insolvency law was based on Roman penal laws, which resulted in harsh
punishments for the debtors); see also 1 JAN DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON
INT'L INSOLVENCY & BANKR. [section] 1.01 (Matthew Bender ed.,
1986) (noting that while modern insolvency laws are derived from Roman
laws, ancient Roman law was not static and developed over a thousand
years).
(108.) DALHUISEN, supra note 107, [section] 1.02[1]. A person could
become indebted only by obtaining a loan. Id. (citations omitted). Such
loans, however, were uncommon in early Roman rural communities and could
only be obtained by the nexum (literally "fetters") or an
early form of contract known as sponsio. Id.
(109.) Id.
(110.) Id. [section] 1.02[1] (discussing the passage of Lex
Poetilia Papiria de nexis).
(111.) Id. Liquidation was made possible by the growing use of
contracts that legally bound the debtor to pay his debts. Id.
(112.) Id. In this procedure, if a debtor defaulted on a legally
recognized and enforceable obligation, the debtor's estate would be
attached. Id. Though the debtor remained in control of his estate, he
was supervised by his creditors or by his trustee if there were many
creditors. Id. If the debtor continued to refuse payment, his creditors
would recover such payment by a sale of the estate to the highest
bidder. Id.
(113.) Id.
(114.) Id. [section] 1.03. This procedure was designed for the bona
fide debtor who became insolvent or unable to pay debts due to a force
of nature. Id. Through this procedure, a debtor could petition the
Praetor, or Governor, for relief by assigning all of the debtor's
estate, with certain exemptions, to his creditors. Id.
(115.) Id. There are conflicting theories on whether such a
procedure granted the debtor a discharge of his debts. Id. (citations
omitted).
(116.) Id. [section] 1.04[2]. Debt reduction was typically granted
to heirs of the debtor upon a majority decision by creditors to make the
acceptance of inheritance more attractive. Id.
(117.) Id. [section] 1.05.
(118.) Id. [section] 2.01[1]-[2].
(119.) Id. (discussing tribes throughout Spain, northern Italy,
Germany, and France where Roman law still appeared during the period of
decline).
(120.) Id. [section] 2.01[2]. The liquidation procedure of
distractio bonorum was a form of venditio bonorum designed for two or
more creditors that led to a piecemeal sale of the debtor's estate.
Id. [section] 1.02[4].
(121.) Id. [section] 2.01[2]. Certain individual remedies,
depending on local laws, could include governmental attachment of the
debtor's movable or immovable property in addition to the
restriction of the debtor's intangible rights. Id. [section]
1.02[3] (discussing early individual remedies used under Roman law).
(122.) Id. [section] 2.01[2] (noting the different procedures of
Roman law being used in different regions of Western Europe).
(123.) See id. [section] 2.01[1].
(124.) See id. [section] 2.01[2].
(125.) Id. [section] 2.02[1] (discussing the use of distractio
bonorum and new innovations in bankruptcy proceedings).
(126.) Id. For example, if a debtor incurred debt with no intent to
repay it, the debtor would be subjected to a severe punishment called
banca rotta. Id. The term literally means "broken bench" and
denotes a ceremonial breaking of the debtor's bench to deny the
debtor his ability to continue his craft. Id.; see also OMAR, supra note
22, at 5 (discussing the etymology of bankruptcy).
(127.) See DALHUISEN, supra note 107, [section] 2.03[1] (noting
that even though compositions were only available in limited situations,
debtors benefited from them due to the diminished debt and possible
discharge, and creditors benefited by the avoidance of complicated
bankruptcy proceedings and accelerated payment).
(128.) Id. (noting that Book III of this Code contained the
bankruptcy laws).
(129.) Id. [section] 3.05[1] (noting that small merchants were
treated as nonmerchants, and nonmerchants were subject to special
insolvency rules consisting of little more than individual remedies).
(130.) Id. [section] 3.05[2].
(131.) Id. Amministrazione controllata requires a plan the court
feels will lead to full recovery of the enterprise. See Andrew Chetcuti
Ganado, Heralding a New Corporate "Rescue Culture", THE
ACCOUNTANT, Sept. 2002, at 9, available at
http://www.miamalta.org/MagSept02Page09.htm. Creditors must agree by a
majority vote. Id. (citing Italian Law, arts. 187-93).
(132.) See DALHUISEN, supra note 107, [section] 3.05[3] (discussing
the ammistrazione straordinaria delle grandi imprese in crisi whereby
the government and judiciary took the role of reorganizing the
enterprises).
(133.) Id. (noting that the reorganization practice was a highly
political matter).
(134.) The introduction of ammistrazione controllata and
ammistrazione straordinaria marked a movement away from the use of
traditional Roman insolvency remedies.
(135.) See DALHUISEN, supra note 107, [section] 3.05[3] (noting
that the approach gives the cabinet committee in charge of economic
policy the regulatory powers to interfere with corporation
reorganizations).
(136.) See 2 COLLIER INT'L BUS. INSOLVENCY GUIDE [paragraph]
27.01[2][b] (Richard F. Broude et al. eds., 2006) (noting that Ireland
inherited its common law from the English common law system after
obtaining its independence in 1922 and continued to follow English
common law in most cases thereafter).
(137.) See DALHUISEN, supra note 107, [section] 2.02[8].
(138.) Id.
(139.) See id. (discussing early forms of exemptions).
(140.) See id. (noting that the Act of Queen Anne established the
debtor's first right to a discharge).
(141.) Id.
(142.) Id. (noting that before abolishing compositions in 1621,
creditors were forced into composition agreements with debtors; after
many years without compositions, English law took its cue from Scottish
law and reintroduced compositions to benefit creditors).
(143.) Id. (noting that settlements derived from composition were
not binding on the minority creditors and did not provide a discharge
for the debtor).
(144.) Id. [section] 3.08[2] (noting that the Act of 1844 for
Winding-Up the Affairs of Joint Stock Companies traditionally covers
corporate insolvencies).
(145.) 2 COLLIER INT'L BUS. INSOLVENCY GUIDE [paragraph]
27.02[2][a] (Richard F. Broude et al. eds., 2006).
(146.) Id. [paragraph] 27.04.
(147.) Id.
(148.) Compare id. (noting that creditors typically prefer to wind
up an insolvent debtor) with Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 449, 450 (1999) (noting that
involuntary petitions by a party other than the debtor are rare in
American bankruptcy).
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