Taking inventors' lunch money: provide incentives for sensitive technology research under the Patriot Act.

(49.) According to the language of the PCT, "nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be construed as limiting the freedom of any Contracting State to apply measures deemed necessary for the preservation of its national security or to limit, for the protection of the general economic interests of that State, the right of its own residents or nationals to file international applications." Id. Such inventions meet the description of 35 U.S.C. [section] 181 (2000).

(50.) See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPS-Consistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 111, 133 (2005).

(51.) Victor Song, DNA Sequences as Unpatentable Subject Matter, Apr. 13, 2001, http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/380/Song.html.

(52.) Nothing in the language of 35 U.S.C. [section] 183 suggests what criteria are to be used in evaluating the amount of compensation due for the withholding. See 35 U.S.C. [section] 183 (2000). Departmental provisions enabled by 35 U.S.C. [section] 183, such as those describing functions under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, make no mention of it either and leave it up to the board in question to either include or exclude international transferability concerns. See 10 C.F.R. [section] 780.53(d) (2005) (outlining considerations to be taken into account while determining compensation without mentioning international transferability).

(53.) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

(54.) See id. art. 7 (listing the promotion of "the transfer and dissemination of technology[] to the mutual advantage of producers and users" as part of the agreement's objective). The WTO recognizes the need to "stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology" through the incentive offered by patent systems and the structure that they create to foster development by providing a means of recuperation of research and development costs. World Trade Org., What Are Intellectual Property Rights?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intell_e.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).

(55.) See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-910, EXPERTS' ADVICE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES SEEKING FOREIGN PATENTS at 33-35 (June 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03910.pdf.

(56.) See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 274 (2006) (illustrating how the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health created greater accessibility to medication in developing nations). When these minimum standards are in place, inventors can more easily rely on enforcement of rights in the participating countries.

(57.) CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 41-42 (6th ed. 2003).

(58.) See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 274 (2006).

(59.) TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 33.

(60.) See Mariano Municoy, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the Relationship of Private Parties, 4 CHI. KENT J. INTEL. PROP. 342, 343-55 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of a global patent litigation system while examining the effects of eroding it would have on the jurisdiction of the registered states).

(61.) See TRIPS, supra note 53, arts. 63-64 (allowing member states to demand access to decisions of other nations that affect their rights and also providing a mechanism through the TRIPS Council to resolve disputes). Once a decision in one member country is made regarding the validity of disputed rights, it is made available to the other member countries involved. Id.

(62.) See, e.g., Hornback v. United States, 36 Fed. C1. 552, 554 (1996), aff'd, 405 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (implying that since no government interest in the invention is necessary for a secrecy order, there are some inventions of no military utility that may still fall under 35 U.S.C. [section] 181).

(63.) See Karim K. Shehadeh, The Wassenaar Arrangement and Encryption Exports: An Ineffective Export Control Regime that Compromises United States' Economic Interests, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 271, 283-85 (1999) (discussing national security implications of exporting encryption technology).

(64.) GREG R. VETTER, EMBEDDING THICKETS IN INFORMATION SECURITY?: CRYPTOGRAPHY PATENTING AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4-5 n.7 (2005).

(65.) Charlie Zhu, Suppliers in High Gear for Asia Nuclear Power, FORBES, Apr. 11, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/markets/emergingmarkets/newswire/2004/04/10/rtr1328 504.html.

(66.) See David Rogers, An Overview of the Patent System (2002), http://web.archive.org/web/20050109093459/ http://www.rlo.ca/patentsys.htm.

(67.) The Right to Good Ideas, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2001, at 21. Enforceability still relies on the adopting country's ability to adapt to the requirements set out by TRIPS, which may be difficult to afford and implement in the near future. Id.

(68.) See id. It is easier to encourage the import of useful foreign technology when the patent owners are confident that their intellectual property rights will be enforced postimportation. A patentee's concerns about patent infringement postexportation will likely outweigh financial interests since those infringing goods could then become the subject of illegal import to the United States, therefore indirectly infringing on their rights conferred by the Patent Act. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 857.

(69.) L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The Trips Agreement and Developing Countries After the Doha Conference, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 129-31 (2003).

(70.) See Center for Democracy & Technology, Summary and Analysis of Key Sections of USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, http://www.cdt.org/security/011031 summary.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).

(71.) See B. Delano Jordan, National Security and the Patent Squeeze, Aug. 1, 2002, http://news.com.com/2102-1071_3-947508.html?tag=st.util.print (noting that the government can issue a secrecy order forbidding disclosure of information relating to a product or refuse to issue a patent at all). The discretionary capabilities of government agencies allowed via 35 U.S.C. [section] 181 and the Patriot Act "sneak-and-peek" provisions are similar in effect. See Lee R. Shelton IV & James Hall, Patriot Act another RICO?, ENTER STAGE RIGHT, Feb. 4, 2002, http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/ 0202/0202patriot.htm (describing the ability of the federal government to search private residences while indefinitely delaying notification to the owner with a showing of "good cause").

(72.) Chilling effects are created in the minds of inventors working in these fields who worry whether their research may raise suspicions that they are developing with the intent to perpetrate terrorism or that they might inadvertently support it. See Schemo, supra note 8.

(73.) See Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 1; Should You Be Scared of the Patriot Act?, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2087984.

(74.) See Shelton & Hall, supra note 72.

(75.) USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, [section] 221, 115 Stat. 272, 292 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).

(76.) See, e.g., Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, Chemical Terrorism, http://www.opcw.nl (follow "Chemical Weapons Protection & Assistance" hyperlink; then follow "Chemical Terrorism: Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (pointing to sarin attacks in Japan in 1995).

(77.) See Duke Law, Civil Liberties Online, PART A: Providing for New and Enhanced Laws Against Terrorism Created Within the Existing Law Enforcement Paradigm, http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/civil/index.php?action=showtopic&topic id=10 (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).

(78.) San Francisco Indep. Media Center, "Black Patents" on the Rise, USPTO Statistics Show, July 11, 2005, available at http://www.iplawbulletin.com/Members/ViewArticlePortion.aspx? ID=3675&ReturnUrl=..%2fsecure%2fViewArticle.aspx%2fId%3d3675.

(79.) Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549, [section] 904(2)(C).

(80.) Arguably, this language is necessarily expansive, bearing similarity to the language of the Copyright Act ("original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated"). 17 U.S.C. [section] 102 (2000). Both require broad language because it is not yet known, at the time of enactment, which articles may later fit the intentions of' the legislation, and it was thought better to leave some of these decisions in the hands of the legal system. JOYCE, supra note 57, at 68-69.

(81.) Frank Vizard, Safeguarding GPS: Attempts to Jam U.S. GPS-Based Weapons and Navigation Systems in Iraq Were a Reminder of Just How Vulnerable the Technology Is, SCI. AM., Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.sciam.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=00079 DD3-DAA0-1E96-8EA5809EC5880000.

(82.) See USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, [section][section] 216-218, 115 Stat. 272, 288-291 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (setting out who has authority to deem new technology as security-sensitive).