(83.) Id. For example, the sneak-and-peak provision, [section] 213
of the Patriot Act, has no allowance for compensating the loss of
research disrupted via its intrusive allowances. Id. [section] 213. This
enables the delay of serving warrants upon suspected criminals in
instances where proper service may adversely affect the situation. Id.
(84.) See generally USA PATRIOT ACT.
(85.) See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748
(7th Cir. 2002) (deferring to executive branch determination that a
corporation should have its assets frozen due to potential affiliation
with terrorism). The Department of Justice points out that the Supreme
Court has specifically authorized such deference, for example, in
detaining aliens. U.S. Dep't of Justice, The USA PATRIOT Act: Myth
vs. Reality, http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/add_myths.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696
(2001)).
(86.) See Fed'n of Am. Scientists, Secrecy Order Program in
the United States Patent & Trademark Office, June 27, 1991,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/program.html (describing the
process of how the USPTO screens applications for potential secrecy
orders in light of guidance provided by various governmental agencies).
Rather than only considering the financial implications of conducting
research, inventors and scientists must also consider whether the
research would expose them to the government searches authorized by the
Patriot Act. See, e.g., Ohio State College of Biological Sciences, USA
Patriot Act Select Agent Security Requirements,
http://www.biosci.ohio-state.edu/~jsmith/safety/
Biosafety/PatriotActResearch.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
(87.) See, e.g., John J. Nance, Just How Secure Is Airline
Security?: The Swiss Cheese Model and What We've Really
Accomplished Since 9/11, ABC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/FlyingHigh/story?id=647547&page=1
(discussing airline security). It is difficult to determine which types
of fields may be more or less likely to be monitored. While some areas
such as nuclear technology are obvious targets, others may be less
obvious. For example, before September 11, 2001, one might not have
readily considered aircraft security technology as a potential area of
concern. See id. (indicating the gaps in airline security coverage and
how September 11, 2001 has brought renewed focus on the issue). However,
today this a concern of highest importance. Id.
(88.) ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10 (noting how security
concerns effectively remove the incentive for development that the
Patent Act put in place).
(89.) Id.
(90.) See GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF MAJOR COUNTER
TERRORISM SECURITY ACTIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND HIGHER
EDUCATION 23-25 (2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31354.pdf (stating that certain research
institutions are seeking to mitigate restrictions placed on them by the
Patriot Act).
(91.) Randy Forbes, The Dual-Use Double-Edged Sword, MIL. INFO.
TECH. ONLINE ED., Aug. 25, 2005,
http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm? DocID=1102;
Michael D. Klaus, Dual-Use Free Trade Agreements: The Contemporary
Alternative to High-Tech Export Controls, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 105-06 (2003); National Security Implications of
Lowered Export Controls on Dual-Use Technologies and U.S. Defense
Capabilities: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 104th Cong.
1-2 (1995) (statement of Sen. Robert C. Smith, Member, S. Comm. on Armed
Services). These technologies may have viable peaceful uses, the effects
of which may or may not be contemplated by their identification as
sensitive. See Weiss v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 2d 113, 128-29 (1st
Cir. 2001) (holding that damages resulting from inability to leverage
patent in foreign countries must be concrete and not speculative).
(92.) Todd M. Rowe, Comment, Global Technology Protection: Moving
Past the Treaty, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 128-29 (2000)
("[The patent registration system] facilitated the evolution of a
system outfitted to the specific needs of this budding global
superpower.").
(93.) See, e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH AND DEV. STATISTICS AT THE
NAT'L SCI. FOUND., MEASURES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY IX (2004), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11111&page=R1.
(94.) By forcing research here into the public sector, the United
States faces the danger of meeting the same fate of countries that have
denied the power of capitalism in the recent past. See Jannik Lindbaek,
Guy Pfeffermann & Neil Gregory, The Evolving Role of Multilateral
Development Banks: History and Prospects, ECON. INVESTMENT BANK PAPERS,
June 1998, at 61, 67, available at http://www.eib.org/Attachments/efs/
eibpapers/y98n2v3/y98n2a03.pdf.
(95.) See The Right to Good Ideas, supra note 67.
(96.) See Patriot Act 'Essential' to War on Terror, UPI,
Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20060119-112550-4653r (detailing 2006 statements by FBI Director Robert
Mueller relating the benefits the Patriot Act provided to intelligence
agencies).
(97.) Id. These groups are concerned with the discretionary
monitoring capabilities provided that may intrude on the liberties of
U.S. citizens. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says New
Ashcroft Bill Erodes Checks and Balances on Presidential Power; PATRIOT
II Legislation Would Needlessly Infringe on Basic Constitutional
Liberties (Feb. 12, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org//safefree/general/17189prs20030212.html.
(98.) James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Secretly Lifted Some
Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2005, at A1; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Chief Calls
on President to Shut Down Illegal Spying on Americans, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/23978prs20060131.html. Justice
Department lawyers have issued briefs explaining that "the
Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct
warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of
foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute
extinguish that constitutional authority." Risen, supra note 98.
Even the President has stepped forward in his own defense of the powers
given to him to use force in the war against terror after September 11,
2001. President Bush Gives Pep Talk to NSA, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 25,
2006, available at http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/01/25/D8FBTAB08.html.
(99.) Federal Judgeship Approval for Nevada Official Delayed, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Sep. 14, 2005, available at
http:/lwww.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/nevada/2005/sep/14/
091410097.html. These changes require time that is currently allotted,
understandably, to more pressing issues such as hurricane disaster
relief and filling Supreme Court vacancies.
(100.) Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Patriot Act Fix Wedged Among Many
Priorities, FOX NEWS, Jan. 22, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182451,00.html.
(101.) Press Release, Paul A. Logli, President, Nat'l. Dist.
Atty. Assoc., USA Patriot Act Effectiveness Points to Need for Renewal
(Jan. 18, 2006), http://www.expertclick.com/NewsReleaseWire/default.cfm?
Action=ReleaseDetail&ID=11395.
(102.) Id.
(103.) See id.
(104.) Vlahos, supra note 100.
(105.) The Patriot Act: Of Liberty and Libraries, ECONOMIST, Dec.
17, 2005, at 29-30.
(106.) See id. The following situations allow for a delay in
notice: "(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that
providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may
have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705); (2) the warrant
prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any wire or electronic
communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly
provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information,
except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a
reasonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter be
extended by the court for good cause shown." USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, [section] 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001) (codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.).
(107.) Such technologies are those best kept within domestic walls
in the judgment of the applicable government agency or department. 35
U.S.C. [section] 181 (2000).
(108.) See id. [section] 183. See generally TRIPS, supra note 53
(providing a comprehensive framework and uniform minimal standards to
help reconcile the world's patent laws).
(109.) Id.
(110.) See id; see also Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci.
(AAAS), The War on Terrorism: What Does It Mean for Science?, Dec. 18,
2001 [hereinafter AAAS],
http:/lwww.aaas.org/spp/scifree/terrorism/report.shtml.
(111.) See Richard A. Johnson, Arnold & Porter, Power Point
Presentation, U.S. Export Controls--The Challenge for Research
Universities (Oct. 2003),
http://www.sunysb.edu/research/spo/export-controls/pdf.
(112.) David Encaoua et al., The Economics of Patents: From Natural
Rights to Policy Instrument, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES., Aug. 26 2003,
at 3, available at http://www.nber.org/CRIW/papers/encaoua.pdf.
(113.) 35 U.S.C. [section] 183 (2000).
(114.) The fear of being labeled by the federal government as
undertaking national security-threatening research stems from the idea
that the research could be interrupted before it reaches finality. Cf.
AAAS, supra note 111 (discussing post 9/11 restrictions on scientific
freedom).
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