Another form of tacit knowledge has been described as
"architectural knowledge," which refers to knowledge about
both product (Henderson and Clark, 1990) as well as organizational
configurations (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Matusik and Hill, 1998).
Product architectural knowledge refers to knowledge related to the way
sub-components of a product are integrated. In addition to product
innovations, architectural knowledge is also reflected in the structural
attributes of an organization, including its communication channels,
information filters, and strategies (Henderson and Clark, 1990). For
example, a firm might have separate subunits each dedicated to the
manufacture of a separate component of a product. Periodic meetings
between representatives from each of these subunits, under the auspices
of a common supervisor, are an element of the firm's architectural
knowledge. Put differently, in addition to product configurations,
architectural knowledge might also include knowledge about an
organization's structure and relationships between subunits
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). Additionally, due to the fact that the
integration of component knowledge across organizational functions and
subunits involves social relations, architectural knowledge has been
theorized to be more tacit than explicit (Matusik and Hill, 1998).
Both the competitive significance of architectural knowledge, as
well as its association with structural attributes, can be seen in the
security measures that organizations often take in order to limit its
transfer to rivals. For example, through job design, firms often segment
duties, or "disaggregate" tasks in order to compartmentalize,
and thus protect, a firm's stock of proprietary knowledge
(Liebeskind, 1996). Worker access is limited exclusively to their
component tasks, and the role of integrating component tasks is often
limited to one or a very few individuals, often at higher (executive)
levels of the organization's hierarchy. Therefore, tacit,
architectural knowledge is potentially important as a source of
competitive advantage, and perhaps the only or the most effective way to
transfer (or imitate) such knowledge is through intraindustry
executive-level succession, with some conditions. Accordingly, the
following sections attempt to identify these conditions and their
influence on competitive strategy as well as competitive advantage.
THE COMPETITIVE INTERACTION PROCESS
Recently, a more dynamic approach to the study of competitive
strategy has been adopted by researchers. Based in part on the writings
of Joseph Schumpeter (1950), the field of competitive dynamics views
business strategy as part of a dynamic process of competitive
interaction (Grimm and Smith, 1997; Smith et al., 1992). In this
process, potential profits lure entrepreneurs to experiment with new
ideas, or innovation in the marketplace, with the hope of securing a
monopoly position. However, entrepreneurial profits also spur rival
firms to innovate as they attempt to imitate, and possibly improve upon,
previous innovations. This may result in the erosion of the competitive
position of the initial innovator (Ferrier et al., 1999).
The study of competitive dynamics suggests, in part, that
competitive advantage is driven by the timing of the interactions of
mutually interdependent firms (Grimm and Smith, 1997; Smith et al.,
1992). For example, it has been argued that, in certain contexts, the
monopolistic position and the attendant entrepreneurial profits
appropriated by the successful innovator provides an incentive to be a
"first-mover" with respect to a particular innovation
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). However, these profits also provide
rivals with an incentive to rapidly respond by imitating these
innovations in order to supplant the first-mover, or maintain
competitive parity by preventing the development of insurmountable
barriers to imitation (e.g., learning curves, economies of scale, brand
equity). This strategy also allows the "fast-second" mover to
avoid some of the risk associated with introducing an innovation to the
market, yet still participate in a "quasi-monopoly" (Baldwin
and Childs, 1969). The timing of competitive response is therefore
crucial to the notion of competitive advantage. To the extent a firm
initiates strategic actions that are difficult, costly, or
time-consuming for rivals to imitate, it will sustain a competitive
advantage. From a rival's perspective, rapid response may become a
strategic imperative. This idea is consistent with research findings
that indicate a positive association between strategic decision-making
speed and firm performance (Baum and Wally, 2003; Bourgeois and
Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Competitive dynamics research also examines the nature or character
of a competitive response. For example, the propensity for an
organization to either imitate or be imitated by its rivals has evolved
as an important phenomenon in the study of competitive dynamics.
Competitive dynamics research defines response imitation as the degree
to which competitive responses mimic, or are similar in character to,
the precipitating actions. In theory, like rapid responses, product
market responses that are imitative will tend to erode any advantage
appropriated by the initial actor, and enable the responding
organization to maintain some form of competitive parity (Grimm and
Smith, 1997; Smith et al., 1991). Although, as discussed below,
imitative competitive responses may not necessarily benefit the
responding firm over the long term. In sum, competitive dynamics
research attempts to formally model the competitive actions and
reactions of rival firms. The paragraphs below explore how knowledge
transfer associated with intraindustry executive succession potentially
influences competitive dynamics, and particular attention is given to
both the speed and imitativeness of competitive responses.
INTRAINDUSTRY EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION AND COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS
Research findings appear to confirm that a firm's top
management team plays a role in competitive dynamics. In general, top
management teams that are more heterogeneous can enhance decision
effectiveness. More diverse management teams tend to view a decision
problem from multiple perspectives, engage in more expansive information
search, and consider a broader array of decision alternatives than more
homogenous teams (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). However, a study of the
competitive responses of firms with more demographically heterogeneous
top management teams found these were less likely to respond, and
responded more slowly to competitive actions (Hambrick et al., 1996).
Ostensibly, communication and coordination problems associated with
heterogeneous groups make it difficult for diverse top management teams
to achieve consensus and marshal the resources necessary to quickly
respond. Additionally, empirical findings reveal that highly experienced
top management teams were less likely to respond and responded more
slowly to competitive actions than teams with less experience (Smith et
al., 1991). This apparent tentativeness among more experienced top
management teams is perhaps driven by risk aversion, as well as a
tendency to rely on established routines, knowledge bases, and norms
which tend to limit information search and constrain decision-making
processes.
Changes to the top management ranks may also affect competitive
dynamics. In particular, intraindustry successors may play an important
role in enabling competitive response. Defined as succession from within
the industry, but outside the firm (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003),
intraindustry succession may enable firms to obtain the requisite levels
of tacit, architectural knowledge necessary to respond competitively.
However, the potential influence of this phenomenon on competitive
advantage remains largely unexplored. According to both competitive
dynamics and knowledge management theory, the issue of the timing of
competitive response is highly relevant to the idea of competitive
advantage. From the competitive dynamics perspective, firms competing in
an industry must respond to a successful competitive action as quickly
as possible in order to combat any first-mover advantage, and maintain a
certain degree of competitive parity. Competitive response is likely to
be slowed, however, to the extent the initial action is predicated on
tacit knowledge. Less subject to inter-organizational transmission,
tacit knowledge will be more difficult for potential responding firms to
access and utilize. It has been established, for example, that responses
to competitive actions are slower if they have relatively high
implementation requirements (Chen et a., 1992). Implementation
requirements generally refer to how responses are executed, and the case
can be made that some of this "know-how" is tacit.
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