The matching problem (and inventories) in private
negotiation.
by Menkhaus, Dale J.^Phillips, Owen R.^Bastian, Christopher T.^
Gittings, Lance B.
[Q.sup.comp]
4 4 PN(MPJY) No <[Q.sup.comp]
4 4 PN(MPJY,CS) Yes <[Q.sup.comp]
4 4 PN(CS) Yes <[Q.sup.comp]
2 4 PN(CS) Yes <[Q.sup.comp]
4 2 PN(CS) Yes <[Q.sup.comp]
No. of Resulting Buyer/Seller
Buyers Price (b) Matches
Many [P.sup.comp] Many
4 [P.sup.comp] Many
4 >[P.sup.comp] Many
4 >[P.sup.comp] --
4 [P.sup.comp] 3
4 <[P.sup.comp] 3
4 <[P.sup.comp] 5
2 <[P.sup.comp] 5
4 [P.sup.comp] 5
* Sources: The laboratory results presented here are only those from
selected literature reviewed in this study, along with those from the
current study. These include: PMK--Phillips, Menkhaus, and Krogmeier
(2001); MPB-Menkhaus, Phillips, and Bastian (2003); MPJY-Menkhaus et
al. (2003); and CS--Current Study.
(a) CEM--Competitive Equilibrium Model; DA--Double Auction;
EA--English Auction; PN--Private Negotiation.
(b) [Q.sup.comp]--Competitive Quantity Traded;
[P.sup.comp]--Competitive Price.
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