Shivakoti, Ganesh P., Douglas L. Vermillion, Wai-fung Lam, Elinor
Ostrom, Ujjwal Pradhan and Rober Yoder (Eds.) Asian Irrigation in
Transition: Responding to Challenges. New Delhi: Sage, 2005, 528 pp.,
hardback.
This book is a selection of papers from a workshop on "Asian
Irrigation in Transition" that was held at the Asian Institute of
Technology in Bangkok in 2002. The other institutions involved were the
International Water Management Institute, the Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and the Department of
Political Science at the University of Hong Kong. It has twenty chapters
that include case studies from Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
The second chapter by Randolph Barker and Francois Molle provides a
historical overview of Asian irrigation development. Dam construction
grew rapidly in the three decades after 1950 and peaked around 1980. The
reasons included a decline in world cereal prices together with the
exhaustion of the most favorable sites. Moreover, the green revolution
aided by the expansion of irrigation had ended the threat of famine even
in South Asia, the poorest part of the continent. In the faster-growing
economies of East and Southeast Asia, agriculture was no longer a large
share of the economy.
While canal irrigation growth has largely ended, this is not true
of groundwater irrigation, which has continued to grow very rapidly till
the end of the century. Barker and Molle do not inform us whether this
too has peaked. Owing to the common pool problem, there has been massive
overinvestment in pumps. Water scarcity has grown, albeit at very
different rates in different regions. The absence of new sources of
supply and the projected increases in demand from the growth of
population and industry imply that water will have to be allocated
better.
Barker and Molle state that the conventional wisdom among policy
makers and academics that most Asian irrigation systems are poorly
managed may be misleading; efficiency may be higher than what is assumed
once return flows are taken into account. However, the remaining
chapters mostly take it for granted that poor irrigation management
means that there are large potential gains to be made by improving
management and that these can only be achieved by means of more
meaningful user (read "farmer") participation.
There is no doubt that some Asian systems, especially in the poorer
countries of South Asia, are badly managed and that irrigation
bureaucracies engage in rent seeking. However, as some chapters in this
volume point out, the adverse consequences of badly timed and uncertain
water allocation may be limited by the fact that canal water recharges
groundwater. Farmers use the aquifer as an on-site storage facility and
can time water applications as needed. It is true that this comes at the
expense of pumping. On the other hand, there may be considerable expense
involved in inducing farmer participation and monitoring in a reformed,
less centralized, allocation system.
Most chapters deal with institutional reform, usually understood as
reducing the role of the irrigation bureaucracies and increasing that of
farmer organizations, known as Water User Associations (WUAs). The
bottom line that emerges from this book is that it is unclear whether
anything much has been achieved. Reforms have mostly been directed at
greater farmer participation in management at the lower levels of
distribution in order to reduce costs for the government agency, leaving
the upper levels firmly in bureaucratic hands. And even where they have
gone further, it is not clear whether productivity has gone up. There
seems to be only one exception to this dismal pattern, and that is the
case of the much-cited Gal Oya system in Sri Lanka discussed by Norman
Uphoff (chapter 3). We do not learn, however, why it succeeded while all
other reforms in South Asia have apparently failed.
Reading this book was a thought-provoking but unsatisfying
experience. Several questions came to mind. First, just how inefficient
are the bureaucratically managed systems that are undergoing reform
experiments? The chapters in this book do not quantify this seriously.
They do not even cite references to the literature about such
quantification. One suspects that the underlying reason for this is that
poorly managed systems do not collect the basic data on the timing and
quantum of water flows and crop productivity that are essential to such
evaluations.
The second question that follows naturally from the first is: How
much of a productivity gain can be expected from such reforms? Without
an answer to the first question one could hardly expect answers to the
second, and sure enough, we mostly do not get them. We are left to
conclude that, since the dog did not bark (except in Gal Oya), nothing
very much has happened as yet.
The third question arises naturally from the fact that one of the
major motivations for governments to reform irrigation systems is
budgetary: To reduce the level of government subsidies. Is the
efficiency gain from a reform likely to be large enough to cover the
loss of the subsidy that farmers receive? If not, then why expect
farmers to incur the costs of the collective action necessary to take
over governance in addition to the operating costs of the system? This
question is not tackled squarely by any of the authors or even raised by
the editors even though it is surely central to the reform process.
With this in mind, I find myself somewhat skeptical of
Vermillion's (chapter 16) characterization of the Andhra Pradesh
reform that was initiated in 1997 as "empowerment with
accountability." The reform was lubricated by a loan from the World
Bank. Water charges were more than tripled from Rs 60/acre to Rs
200/acre and the recovery rate went up from 54% of target revenues at
the old rate to 70% of target revenues at the high rate. By the second
year after the reform, the irrigated area in the state had increased by
10-15% and yields by 20%. This was apparently not attributable to
rainfall and the increase in irrigated area "occurred mainly in the
tail of canal commands."
Does this improvement hold up over the longer term? A survey of 300
farmers in six WUAs conducted in 2003 gives the following picture.
Average acres irrigated per farmer in the tail of canal commands jumped
from 2.61 in 1997-98, the year preceding reform to 3.54 the following
year, but then stayed between 2.69 and 2.79 for the next three years
before crashing to 0.57 in 2002-03 as a result of drought. Average acres
irrigated in the tail of tank (a small reservoir) commands, by contrast,
fell from 1.43 to 1.12 between 1997-98 and 1998-99, remained between
0.99 and 1.05 for the next three years, before falling to 0.52 in the
2002-03 drought year. So, these survey data, albeit from a small sample
of WUAs, do not support the idea of any consistent improvement, although
in the reform year, there was a significant difference between canal and
tank performance, possibly due to works carried out in canals using loan
funds. They also cast doubt on the state-level numbers for Andhra
Pradesh, whose source is presumably official.
In conclusion, one is left with the feeling that much more data on
the technical parameters of the system are needed before meaningful
evaluations can be made. Social scientists attempting to study
irrigation are not going to make much headway if they stick to
"soft" issues. This issue of missing information may also
cripple bottom-up reforms based on farmer participation. As long as
water control at higher levels remains opaque, farmers may not be
willing to make the contributions necessary to induce good governance.
E. Somanathan
Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi
COPYRIGHT 2007 American Agricultural Economics
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