SBIRS programme under attack in new report.

News that Lockheed Martin had successfully mated the spacecraft bus and the payload for the first Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous orbit (GEO) satellite was overshadowed by a scathing new report on the troubled programme from the GAO. The report notes that "Since its inception, SBIRS has been burdened by immature technologies, unclear requirements, unstable funding, underestimated software complexity, poor oversight, and other problems that have resulted in billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule delays."

SBIRS is intended to provide early warning of ballistic missile launches and support other missions simultaneously, including missile defense, technical intelligence and battlespace awareness. The programme was initially launched in 1996, at which time the DoD expected to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of about $4.2 billion. However, over the past 11 years, SBIRS has proven to be technically challenging and substantially more costly. In an effort to stem cost increases and schedule delays, DOD has restructured the programme multiple times, including revising programme goals. SBIRS is now estimated to cost over $10.4 billion, and the first satellite launch is expected in 2008. Because of continuing problems with SBIRS, DOD began a parallel alternative effort in 2006 known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), to compete with SBIRS and ensure that the nation's missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, or possibly provide a follow-on capability to SBIRS.

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The GAO report concludes that, although the Air Force has acted to reduce risks in the SBIRS programme and has had some recent successes, the programme still faces risk of not delivering promised capabilities within its revised goals. To reduce risk, the SBIRS program cut back on quantity and capability in e face of escalating costs. It deferred capabilities, such as mobile data processors for the Air Force and the Army and a fully compliant backup mission control facility, and it pushed off a decision to procure the third and fourth satellites. The Air Force also concurrently initiated AIRSS as a secondary means of achieving the same capability. However, about 11 months after the most recent SBIRS restructuring, a November 2006 assessment report by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) showed that some efforts within the programme were experiencing significant cost increases and schedule overruns and that the outlook is worsening. Furthermore, the programme is rapidly spending its management reserves--funds set aside to address unexpected problems.

The GAO comments that the Air Force has not positioned the AIRSS program for success. First, not enough time is budgeted for developing and launching the first satellite--only 12 months from preliminary to critical design review, and 4 years from critical design review to satellite delivery. Second, the AIRSS program may be optimistic in its assumptions about technology/ risk, since it is working to build an infrared telescope with a large viewing capability that has never before been developed and it is planning to use "cryocoolers" that have yet to demonstrate low levels of jilter, high efficiency, and long life, and a sensor chip whose assembly s performance level has yet to be verified.

Third, the Air Force's research laboratory officials have stated that on-orbit testing is the only way to validate the proposed capability for AIRSS and reduce risk to an acceptable level. To achieve these results, the Air Force is proposing to launch a small-scale demonstration satellite in late 2010. However, the results from the on-orbit demonstration satellite will not be ready in time to fully inform the development of the first AIRSS satellite. Furthermore, AIRSS officials plan to award contracts for the first satellite before data from on-orbit testing is completed.

The report concludes that SBIRS continues to face risks that endanger DOD s ability to sustain, replace, and expand its current missile-warning and defence capabilities. Moreover, the programme still has complex and difficult work ahead as it undertakes efforts to integrate technology. Recognizing these risks, the Office of the Secretary of Defense made a sound decision in pursuing the AIRSS programme to act as an alternative to the third SBIRS GEO satellite. However, the programme has since diverged from this purpose and opted to pursue a higher-risk effort in order to advance capability. Moreover, the Air Force has added risk to this effort by compressing the schedule and limiting the knowledge gained from the demonstration effort. While it is acceptable in any given portfolio to take some high risks, the GAO declares, it is not sound for all investments to be high-risk--particularly when the capability is as critical to the conduct of military operations as the mission-warning capability is.