INTRODUCTION
Tax policy changes during the last six years have been significant.
A dozen tax bills with gross revenue changes in excess of $1 billion
have been enacted into law and the total estimated reduction in tax
receipts is approximately $2.1 trillion as measured on a rolling,
ten-year basis from year of enactment. The cumulative total reduction in
taxes for fiscal year 2007 is $223 billion or approximately nine percent
of total receipts. On a dollar-weighted basis, the majority of these
changes constitute what this paper will define as the Bush Tax Cuts: the
2001 and 2003 tax proposals by President Bush. The key elements of the
President's 2001 tax relief proposal were to reduce marginal tax
rates on ordinary income, provide "marriage penalty" relief,
increase the child tax credit and repeal the estate and gift tax; and
the 2003 proposal was to end the double taxation of corporate income and
accelerate the phase-in of the 2001 bill. Neither legislative proposal
was enacted as proposed nor were the Bush Tax Cuts accomplished in just
two acts; in total, there were five bills that collectively created
current law with regard to these policies.
With a few exceptions discussed later, the Bush Tax Cuts are set to
expire at midnight on December 31, 2010. Under current law, these policy
changes then revert to their pre-2001 constructions. The Bush
Administration has maintained a position of advocating that all of the
Bush Tax Cuts be made permanent (e.g., Ritterpusch (2007)).
However, while the outcome of the 2008 Presidential election is
uncertain, one thing is known: George W. Bush will not be in the White
House in 2010 to advocate to preserve his tax policies. Whoever is
President will have proposed a budget with his or her own tax ideas and
a politically unimaginative policy stance such as the status quo seems
unlikely. Furthermore, budget constraints and likely Congressional
resistance are further restraints on the likelihood of making the Bush
Tax Cuts permanent. While a straightforward extension of 2010 law (i.e.,
complete permanency) is nearly impossible in the author's view, a
total lack of legislative action is equally improbable, given the
historical frequency of tax code changes and broad applicability of the
pending tax increase. Therefore, among the set of policy options for the
individual tax code post-2010, perhaps the only two elements excludable
from the set are total extension of present law and a reversion to
pre-2001 law.
The purpose of this paper is to look for lessons to be learned from
studying the legislative process by which these policies were enacted
and to measure the magnitude and distribution of the pending tax
increase. Taken together, these observations may suggest potential
parameters for the types of changes Congress could consider as 2010
approaches.
The paper contains three parts. First, a review of the legislative
process by which the Bush Tax Cuts became law highlights the multi-step
nature of the process and the typical differences between the House and
Senate approaches to tax legislation. It also serves as a good case
study of the differences between what was proposed by the President and
enacted into law. Next, results are presented from a simplified tax
calculator designed to highlight the effects of the pending expiration
of these tax policies on typical taxpayers across a spectrum of incomes.
Finally, under the assumption that permanence is not a realistic option,
the paper discusses the range of options that could be considered,
including trade-offs between political and economic issues, and presents
tax-calculator results for one reform option, a broad-base low rate
structure.
A HISTORY OF THE BUSH TAX CUTS
While over a dozen tax cuts were enacted between 2001 and 2006 for
relief totaling $2.1 trillion, this paper will define the Bush Tax Cuts
as consisting of portions from five tax bills and two major tax policy
initiatives. Those two initiatives were President Bush's keystone
tax proposals made in 2001 and in 2003. Table 1 lists the five tax bills
that created the structure now in place.
Generally, the Bush Tax Cuts are set to expire at the end of 2010.
The exception to this statement is that a series of important changes to
savings and pension policy from 2001 were made permanent in the Pension
Protection Act of 2006. (1) Notably, while these provisions were a
significant part of the 2001 tax cut, they were not originally proposed
by the President and the support for these provisions, unlike other
parts of the package, was overwhelmingly bipartisan.
2001 Tax Cut
From a political perspective, the Bush tax cut proposals began on
the campaign trail in 2000. From a legislative perspective, the initial
official proposal was President Bush's first budget proposal. In
February 2001, the White House submitted to Congress the
President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Proposal, which contained
roughly 30 tax proposals. Here I identify a subset of those proposals as
being the elements of the 2001 Bush Tax Cut: the ten percent bracket,
the reduction of other ordinary tax rates, the marriage penalty relief,
the doubling of the child tax credit to $1000, and the repeal of the
estate tax. (2) The other roughly two dozen provisions cover a range of
issues and vary in size from less than $1 billion to $70 billion (the
healthcare tax credit proposal) and also include other major policy
initiatives of the President such as proposals to encourage charitable
giving. In total, these five provisions accounted for 85 percent of the
cost of the entire tax proposal made by President Bush in his first
budget.
The President's budget proposed these policies to take effect
January 1, 2002, but the idea of accelerating these provisions and
making some retroactive to January 1, 2001 soon began to circulate in
Congress. In fact, on February 5, 2001, three days before the
Administration officially submitted the President's Budget,
President Bush indicated support for this idea (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2001).
House of Representatives
Congressional action on the President's proposal began in the
House of Representatives as a series of bills that addressed the
President's proposal in pieces. (3) H.R. 3, Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Act, containing the ten percent bracket and reduction in other
tax rates as proposed by the President, was reported by the Committee on
Ways and Means on March 1, 2001 and passed the House on March 8 by a
vote of 230-198, with ten Democrats voting "yea" along with
all Republicans. Marriage penalty relief and the child tax credit
increase was reported by Ways and Means on March 22, 2001 and passed on
the House floor on March 29 by a vote of 282-144, with 64 Democrats
joining all Republicans in voting "yea." Estate tax repeal was
reported by the Committee on March 29 and passed the House on April 4,
2001 by a vote of 274-154, with 58 Democrats joining all Republicans.
Retirement savings legislation raising contribution limits for IRAs from
$2,000 to $5,000, raising contribution limits on 401(k) plans and making
other pension law reforms (generally known as Portman-Cardin; notably
not in the President's Budget) was marked up in the Committee on
April 25, 2001 and passed the House on May 2 in an overwhelming
bipartisan vote: 407-24. (4,5)
In the eight weeks between March I and May 2, the U.S. House of
Representatives voted 96 times. Eleven votes were on final passage of
legislative bills under regular order and four of those eleven were tax
bills. Put differently, there was a clear focus on working methodically
through the Committee and on the floor to allow Members to cast
separate, individual votes on all the aspects of the 2001 Bush tax cut.
(6) From this vote data, it is simple to observe that tax credits and
increased tax deductions for low-and middle-income taxpayers are more
politically popular than across-the-board reductions in marginal rates.
However, there has been bipartisan support for estate tax repeal, a
policy that is more distributionally skewed than the rate cut proposal.
Finally, reducing the tax on savings through expanded tax-deferred
retirement savings was overwhelmingly bipartisan and may suggest that
tax reform proposals designed around tax-free savings vehicles may be
more feasible than other approaches.
Senate
On May 15, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee marked up a
comprehensive version of the President's proposal that contained
the ten percent bracket, $1,000 child tax credit, reduced marginal
rates, marriage penalty relief, expansion of pensions and IRAs, a
temporary AMT relief provision and a few dozen other smaller provisions.
This bill had a revenue loss of $1.347 trillion over ten years,
reflecting the Senate's budget resolution.
On May 16, the House passed H.R. 1836, which contained only tie
House version of the marginal rate provisions. The vote was nearly
identical to that of H.R. 3: 230-197, with 13 Democrats and all
Republicans voting "yea."
On May 23, the Senate amended H.R. 1836 with the Finance
Committee's bill and passed it by a vote of 62-38, with 12
Democrats and 50 Republicans voting "yea." The Senate then
requested a conference with the House. Two days later, a conference
report was signed. (7) The House vote was 240-154, with 28 Democrats
voting "yea." The Senate vote was 58-33, with two Senators
voting present. Two Republicans voted "nay" and 12 Democrats
voted "yea."
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