Sustainable community development, networks and
resilience.
by Dale, Ann^Newman, Lenore
The operating principle behind the organization was that they would
only hire people that would never get hired by anyone else, that there
would be no exclusions because of active addiction or health issues.
There were several operational difficulties in the first years, namely
encouraging members of the community to become involved. To overcome
this, Ken Lyotier actively knocked on doors and convinced people to
leave their rooms. The group banked all revenues, which proved to be a
key business strategy when government funding was no longer available,
and before they were self-sustaining, the bank account served to
demonstrate the group's legitimacy when trying to persuade other
funders to support the organization through some lean times.
Today United We Can employs 33 people full-time, all of whom had
not been previously employable. Their annual revenues are 1.6 million
dollars, and they recycle 50,000 containers a day, which average out to
100 containers sorted each minute. They average a clientele of 700-750
street people a day, with 300 core binners every day, and process over
20 million cans and bottles a year.
With four other business streams now in development, United We Can
is a social enterprise that integrates the ecological, social and
economic imperatives for their sustainable community development. It is
a concrete example of integrating the three imperatives--by doing
something good for the environment (the ecological imperative), such as
reducing waste through recycling, one creates jobs (the economic
imperative), thereby augmenting agency and providing social resilience
through the creation of a formal network (the social imperative). It is
also a concrete example of people with little or no economic capital
using social capital to jump start an initiative. The transition of this
organization from a loose ad hoc coalition to a social enterprise
illuminates the importance of moving from bonding social capital to
bridging social capital in order to evolve from a network to a
successful organization.
A Successful Use of Social Capital
What were the critical elements that enabled this ad hoc network of
street people to evolve into a formally established social enterprise?
Much had to be overcome; marginalized people lack a connection to others
and to community, and this disconnection from a sense of belonging is a
vicious cycle, exacerbating individual problems. First, a group had to
form and this core group then had to foster interest among others. This
sector of society is often lacking critical networks to improve their
situation, and they must use what networks they have to gain access to
bridging social capital--which is critical to marginalized communities,
and is built through network formation. In the case of United We Can,
the individuals involved used what bridging ties they did have to access
seed money and used publicity to foster further ties. Individual agency
may be a necessary condition before network formation and increased
social capital can occur. In this case, it did appear that the organizer
served as a "node" around which others gathered. In short, he
was willing to work very hard to strengthen the network.
Under a social capital perspective emphasis is placed on finding
the most effective ways in which citizens, service delivery agencies,
institutions, and organizations interact and create linkages for
developing sustainable changes in the living conditions and well-being
of community members. On the basis of our research in this community,
and in other communities in Canada, we maintain that this perspective is
critical to sustainable community development. For marginalized sectors
in a community, however, a social capital perspective must have a
particular focus on agency at both the individual and collective levels.
In the case study, divers were able to overcome the individual, ad
hoc nature of their 'hidden' activities by, first,
collectively organizing--a simple case of coming out of the dark. Media
attention certainly helped to highlight their argument about expanding
the recoverables from the waste stream. As the loosely organized group
continued to meet and build on their initial Victoria Park success,
trust began to be built and a community of binners began to evolve. In
1995, when the recycling depot was formally established the community
then had a space to collectively drop off their recyclables, receive a
fair rate of return, and socially interact in a safe place that was led
and organized by members of their community. Also key were the founding
principle of only hiring people who ordinarily would not be employable
by any one else and, more critically, flexible employment arrangements
to accommodate individual needs. For example, if someone's mental
health or addiction disease allowed them to work only 8 hours a week,
then the enabling conditions were put in place to facilitate this. The
second founding principle--that economic agency is a basic, necessary
and first condition for a healthier community--was also important.
The leadership of its founder, Ken Lyotier, and his ability to
leverage bridging and vertical social capital was crucial to the
evolution of this network. His ability to establish contacts at all
levels of society, far beyond his community, has greatly enhanced the
capacity of the enterprise. Lyotier has an uncanny ability to optimize
the right space, place and time conditions, and to strike strategic
partnerships to facilitate his organization's evolution.
We believe that this case study research proves the capacity of
marginalized communities for innovation to increase their access to
economic capital and ultimately other capitals, through self-organizing
network formation and informed government policy directions, leading to
the creation of a place and space to continue to build social capital.
Network formation is a necessary precondition for information sharing,
knowledge diffusion and ultimately innovation leading to greater
community resilience and the ability to have hope for the future.
However the supporting social structure plays a key role; the VanCity
grant greatly assisted the group in building their social capital and
agency; without such support it is harder for disadvantaged communities
to succeed in creating positive change. There is also some limit to
targeted interviewing in which interviewees suggest further interview
targets; one only maps a portion of the network, and separate
sub-networks without direct connection to the network in question can go
unnoticed. This limits understanding of how the initiative is viewed by
the greater community. Although gaining knowledge of community critique
was not the main objective of this study, it would be an interesting
avenue for further research.
Social capital is also not always beneficial, and the success of
this case should not be seen as a blind endorsement of the power of
social capital. Research has shown that tightly knit social networks can
imprison actors in maladaptive situations or facilitate undesirable
behavior (Borgatti and Foster 2003). The surrounding network's
opinion is central to the initial departure from convention during an
innovation (Ruef 2002). If too many of the binners had felt that the
effort to construct a business out of their activity was hopeless, it is
unlikely that the lead organizer could have overcome community opinion.
In short, social structure is both enabling and constraining (Ruef
2002).
Portes (1998) also notes that social capital can lead to excess
claims on group members. In the case of United We Can, success hinged on
the organizer's willingness to put in a lot of time on the project.
Such reliance is neither easily reproducible in all situations nor
sustainable over long periods of time. A group relying on social capital
alone is not as resilient as a group with support from government and
other such formal structures.
Conclusion
The "United We Can" group succeeded in using a network of
social capital to create agency for change that improved the
community's resilience by establishing a stable market for
recyclables and providing a formal network to speak for the binners of
Vancouver's East Side. The group managed to do this with very few
bridging ties; they instead made very effective use of the few bridging
ties they did have, and created more through media attention. All three
imperatives of sustainable development were strengthened through this
effort; the amount of waste diverted from landfills was increased,
contributing to the ecological imperative, a stronger social network was
formed, aiding the social imperative, and the income stream for a very
disadvantaged group was improved, aiding the economic imperative. The
long term success of this group and the community it represents remains
to be seen, however.
Positive change can be difficult to maintain when the ecological,
social, and economic dimensions of sustainable development are in
conflict (Lamberton 2005) and the strong growth of the surrounding city
is increasingly threatening Vancouver's Eastside with
gentrification. The effect of these forces upon the community is a topic
of further research for our team.
References
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Ashman, D., L. Brown, and E. Zwick. 1998. The Strength of Strong
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Bhaskar, R. 1994. Plato, Etc: The Problems of Philosophy and Their
Resolution. New York, Verso.
Borgatti, S. and P. Foster. 2003. The Network Paradigm in
Organizational Research: A Review and Typology. Journal of Management
29(6): 991-1013.
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