The political economy of public goods: why economists
should care.
by Doering, Otto C., III.
The intent of this article is to encourage economists to analyze
questions of public involvement in the array of public and private
activities where public participation is an issue. The scope encompasses
goods and services where there is the most universal acceptance of
public involvement and extends into less clear distinctions of
quasi-public goods and merit goods. The concern here is not so much with
the definition and bounding of different categories of goods and
services as with the need for considered analysis and assessment of such
goods.
It is increasingly important to understand public and related goods
as public perception changes and public and private resources are being
shifted between them. What we have is a continuum with pure public goods
at one end of the continuum and pure private goods at the other end. The
public and policy makers regularly make judgments about the public and
private provision of goods and services on the basis of perceptions
about the nature, cost, and efficacy of such goods. In recent years
public perceptions have shifted and redefined public goods more as
private goods. If economists can clarify, rationalize, and determine the
cost effectiveness of different approaches to providing such goods, then
they need to engage in the analysis of these public and quasi-public
goods and assess whether they are appropriate for public expenditure,
privatization, or some combined support between the two extremes.
Wassily Leontief's presidential address "Theoretical
Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts" (p. 1) delivered in 1970 to the
American Economics Association is a good starting point for such
analysis. First, there is still truth in his basic criticisms of the
state of economic analysis. He also praises agricultural economics
implying an advantage to this sub-discipline of economics in undertaking
assessments of the kind being proposed here. Reflecting on his feelings
about the state of economics, Leontief was first encouraged by the
degree of relevance of the practical problems that his fellow economists
were addressing, but he was concerned with "the palpable inadequacy
of the scientific means with which they try to solve them"
(Leontief 1971). What he identified was a lack of internal validity,
where the data or methods were insufficient or inadequate to address the
question at hand. Leontief's concerns focused on a lack of
attention to the observable reality of the economic phenomena under
consideration as well as a lack of attention to real supporting data for
analysis of these phenomena. He was equally concerned that economists
had not been willing to reach beyond the limits of economic phenomenon
to other disciplines relevant to the issue at hand--to the engineering
sciences for production and to other social and behavioral sciences for
better understanding of basic household behavior in order to turn up new
factual information highly relevant to the economic analysis.
In the course of his criticism of his peers in economics, he also
recognized agricultural economics as an "exceptional example of a
healthy balance between theoretical and empirical analysis and of the
readiness of professional economists to cooperate with experts in the
neighboring disciplines" (p. 5). He mentioned the extensive
agricultural statistics, close collaboration with other agricultural and
social sciences, and the early utilization of advanced methods of
mathematical statistics as a complement to and not a substitute for
empirical research. We can only hope that agricultural economists have
not fallen into the bad habits of analysis that Leontief decried and
that agricultural economists have maintained the virtues claimed for
them. The characteristics that Leontief praises are important for giving
adequate attention to issues resulting from the changing public
perception of public and quasi-public goods and assessing what it means
for society.
Economists place most public goods in the arena of market failure.
A common textbook definition shared by Baumol and Blinder (p. 256)
defines a public good as "a commodity or service whose benefits are
not depleted by an additional user and from which it is generally
difficult or impossible to exclude people, even if people are unwilling
to pay for the benefits. These are socially valuable commodities whose
provision cannot be financed by private enterprise, or at least not at
socially desirable prices. Thus, government must pay for public goods if
they are to be provided at all." It may be difficult, costly, or
impossible to collect fees for the public goods provided. In addition,
if the opportunity cost of serving an extra user is zero, then the good
should be provided at no charge. Private goods are at the opposite end
of the spectrum and are both depletable and excludable. Baumol and
Blinder go on to say: "It is usually not possible to charge a price
for a pure public good because people cannot be excluded from enjoying
its benefits. It may also be undesirable to charge a price for it
because that would discourage some people from benefiting, even though
using a public good does not deplete its supply. For both of these
reasons, government supplies many public goods. Without government
intervention, public goods simply would not be provided." Following
on this definition they identify "national defense, public health,
police and fire protection, and research as among the services
governments provide because they offer beneficial externalities or are
public goods." While it may appear clear how one might define
public goods so that they can be precisely identified, in fact policy
and public perception can effectively redefine such goods. Most
societies go through periods when public goods become quasi-public or
private goods, and the reverse can occur as well. This is part of the
political public policy debate over what goods government should be
involved in providing or supporting because they offer beneficial
externalities as compared with providing them through the private
market.
Scripture like references to Adam Smith are often invoked to
demonstrate the efficacy of more private market-based solutions for the
provision of public or quasi-public goods. The debate over the role of
government involvement in the provision of public goods was underway
during Smith's time in the latter part of the 18th century. If
nothing else, Smith was a pragmatist and talked about those goods and
services government ought to provide in a non-doctrinaire way that
reflected the political and social reality of his times. Smith was not a
Libertarian, but Jacob Viner (p. 200) suggests that he started from the
near-Libertarian stance: "Little else is required to carry a state
to the highest degree of affluence from the lowest barbarism but peace,
easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest
being brought about by the natural course of things." Smith
stressed extending his system of natural liberty through the abolition
of the then-existing systems of government regulation that included the
free choice of occupation, free trade in land, internal free trade, and
free trade in foreign commerce. There was joint benefit here for both
individuals and the public interest, which had been hindered by the
interference of government. Smith is arguing in reaction to traditional
and social strictures and the mercantilist regime of trading monopolies
and chartered companies. He was particularly concerned about the
negative impacts of monopolies and repeatedly stressed that they were
disadvantageous to the public.
While desiring to restrict the activities of a central government
that exercised substantial control over individual economic choice,
Viner (pp. 217-18) notes that Smith identified three duties for
government: national defense, the administration of justice and
"the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public institutions
and certain public works." Viner sees Smith arguing against those
specific actions of government he believed injurious to the individual
and to society, while also believing that government activity was
natural and appropriate when it promoted the general welfare. One thing
to recognize here is that public or government administration in late
18th century England was often inefficient, unintelligent, and corrupt.
Smith made specific exceptions about the extent of government's
role for the higher quality public administration of Venice and
Amsterdam that enabled them to be more positively involved in the
affairs of their citizens. Smith firmly endorsed the role of government
in defense (his first role for government) and extended this to
strategic goods as well. He held a broad view of the government role in
justice, including enforcement and punishment. For his third role
related to public support for certain institutions, he supported
government involvement in: setting standards and promoting consumer
labeling; enforcing contracts; protecting slaves; regulating currency
and banking; and setting fire regulations so the acts of a few did not
endanger all. In terms of public works, one of his criteria for
assigning government responsibility for roads was that private
management would not have the incentive to maintain them properly. An
additional criterion for public involvement was whether government could
make a profit from the function (i.e., be a better trader or manager
than private enterprise for that function); if so, then it was an
appropriate public function.
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