Agriculture in economic development: primary engine of
growth or chicken and egg?
by Tsakok, Isabelle^Gardner, Bruce
In explaining the acceleration of economic growth, the causal
factors that attract the most attention are matters of technology and
large-scale investment: e.g., canals, exemplified by the opening of the
Erie Canal in the 1830s; the later development of railroads culminating
in the transcontinental railway completed in the 1870s; and a series of
industrial innovations that, financed by venture capitalists and banks
unrestrained by regulations, created great industries in steel,
shipping, machinery and building materials. The building of this modern
transport infrastructure was pivotal in expanding agricultural markets
and raising prices. This view, emphasizing the critical importance of
modern transport and communications infrastructure and access to
expanding markets, for the development of both industry and agriculture,
is similar to that of North (1966).
Mundlak (2005) mobilizes quantitative evidence on 19th century
growth in agriculture. He estimates that the inputs of land, labor, and
capital all grew at an annually rate of about 2% over the whole period
1800-1900, but relatively faster at almost 3% annually for all three
input categories during 1800-1840 (see figure 1). However, total factor
productivity (TFP) growth was much slower: 0.2 % annually in 1800-1840,
0.56% in 1840-1880, and 0.15% in 1880-1900. The increases in inputs
helped in the growth of aggregate output, but productivity growth at the
rates cited indicates only a modest contribution to output per capita
since the increases in output did not do much more than pay for the
additional inputs. These estimates provide the basis for a quantitative
assessment of agriculture's place in the overall picture. As
Mundlak's analysis indicates, agriculture's role is positive
but modest. The contribution is far from sufficient to explain the
nation's economic transformation.
When historians consider the fundamental causes of the changes in
investment and technological change, agriculture's role is again
marginal. Mechanical innovations such as the cotton gin, the steel
mouldboard plow, the reaper, and barbed wire are recognized as
innovations that made a real difference in agricultural productivity,
but railroads, industrial and chemical innovations, and communications
technology like the telegraph get more attention. And still more
fundamental to innovations in all sectors are the ideas of Americans as
risk-taking, money-loving, and entrepreneurial in spirit, and the laws
of the United States and (lack of) state regulation as being conducive
to innovation and investment. But these features are not particular to
agriculture. Indeed, although agriculture grew in the 19th century and
was home to some notable innovations as illustrated by example above, it
can be argued that the successful transformation of American agriculture
in terms of sustained productivity growth did not occur until the
earlier part of the 20th century. Nevertheless, agriculture did
contribute to America's overall economic transformation, e.g.,
through total factor productivity growth and in terms of export earnings
and increased urban food supply.
Which of the polar views does the U.S. case support or undermine?
Based on estimates of total factor productivity growth,
agriculture's role as a causal factor during the early stages of
America's industrial transformation in the 19th century is judged
to be significant but not crucial. Thus, the U.S. case refutes the polar
view that agriculture is necessary for sustained industrial growth.
While not a confirming instance of the anti-agriculture view, the U.S.
experience is consistent with it. The U.S. industrialization both
benefited from and contributed to the successful transformation of its
agriculture. It was a two-way synergistic interaction, not fundamentally
causal in either direction.
Agriculture in the Republic of Korea's Economic Growth
Korea has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the
developing world over the last fifty years. Per capita yearly income
grew from under $100 in 1962 to around $10,000 in the late 1990s, and
despite the downturn of the East Asian Financial Crisis, grew to around
$16,000 in 2005. The Republic of Korea has been transformed in a little
more than a generation. What was the role of agriculture?
After years of occupation and war, Korea was one of the
world's poorest countries in the late 1940s. Agriculture accounted
for 46% of GDP with the farm population constituting 61% of total. By
2005, agriculture's contribution to GDP had shrunk to 4%, and the
urban population had risen to 85% of the total. Despite the substantial
U.S. aid, Korea's economy stagnated until the 1960s. However, the
situation changed dramatically under the export orientation strategy of
General Park Chung Hee (1961-1979). The export-oriented
industrialization strategy was continued into the 1990s. From 1962 to
1994, GDP growth of around 10% annually was fueled by an annual export
growth that averaged 20%, while investment exceeded 30% of GDP.
Korea's development strategy emphasized macroeconomic stability,
high savings and investment rates, export orientation, heavy investment
in human capital, and a private business-friendly environment. Korea
borrowed heavily from abroad. Agriculture was not a major source of
funds for investment.
After the Korean War (1950-1953), with plentiful American aid under
U.S. PL480, and with an export-led industrialization strategy in place,
agricultural development and investment were not prioritized in the
first Five Year Plan (1962-1966). During this period, rice farmers
received well-below world market prices. This policy of discrimination
was reversed in 1971 and high protection has prevailed since.
Agricultural land tax revenues were some 40% of total government
revenues in the early 1960s, decreasing to 10% after 1970.
Scholars differ in their assessment of agriculture's role in
Korea's economic transformation. Ban, Moon, and Perkins (1980)
argued that although there was accelerated growth of agriculture in the
1930s (1-2%), "total productivity remained almost constant over the
1918-41 period." Kang and Ramachandran (1999) did not challenge the
argument about low productivity, but argued "An agricultural
revolution did take place in colonial Korea, and it was the direct
result of the Japanese colonial policy to modernize Korean
agriculture," which included substantial investments in
agriculture: land intensification; investments in irrigation and rural
infrastructure; and increased use of chemical fertilizers and
high-yielding seed varieties.
Ban, Moon, and Perkins who focus on the later period when economic
growth accelerated (1945-1975), pointed out that "There were no
substantial net flows of savings or tax dollars from the rural to the
urban sector ... For the most part however, it was agriculture that
benefited from the industrial and export boom rather than reverse."
Farmers benefited through expanding urban demand and access to lucrative
rural non-farm and urban jobs. Agricultural output and productivity
growth (1950s-1970s) was sustained at between 3-4% and 1-2%,
respectively per year. Subsequent output growth rates were lower at
around 2.6% (1970-1990) and 1.7% (1990s).
Although agricultural growth and productivity did accelerate during
the post-war period, it was nowhere near the high growth rates of
non-agriculture. Supporting the argument that the continued high
economy-wide growth rate was not driven by agriculture's
transformation are the following reasons: an increasing disparity
between industry's and agriculture's growth rates (as of
1962), the substantial agricultural support given by PL480 (until early
1960s), the modest financial transfers in the 1950s, and the
subsidization of agriculture from 1971 on. Instead, sustained overall
Korean growth rates were export-driven, and agriculture benefited from
such high overall growth.
Agriculture in the People's Republic of China Economic Growth,
Pre- and Post- the 1979 Agricultural Reforms
For China scholars, the widespread adoption of the Household
Responsibility System (HRS) was a watershed event in China's
economic growth performance. Under the HRS, households became
responsible for production and profits, not the collective. This reform
was enormously successful. It promoted dynamic growth not only in
agriculture but also in combination with other market-oriented reforms
in the overall economy as well. China has been one of the
fastest-growing economies since then. The agriculture/GDP ratio shrunk
from 68 to 13% in 1949 and 2004, respectively.
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