Democracy and development: consolidating peace in Africa.

In a historical approach to the conflicts in Africa, one can distinguish certain outstanding sequences. The first sequence, corresponding to the pre-colonial period, was characterized by the birth and development of kingdoms and empires of limited scopes whose peaceful coexistence could be disrupted by violent conflicts by the whims of conquest and domination. Just like the wars between nations in Europe before the two World Wars, these conflicts resembled, at their core, tribal considerations.

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A second sequence encompases the period of relative stability the continent experienced, despite the colonial imposition of geographic divisions that would one day spawn a wealth of conflicts. Indeed, the Berlin Congress of February 1885 was devoted to the Balkanization of the African continent, the parceling out of territories and the separation of people according to borders that were fixed along the interests of the colonizers, and without heed to local societies. This arbitrary construction of national boundaries constituted a principal source of post-independence border conflicts despite the Congress's preoccupation with stabilization of the continent. When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963, it adopted the principle of the intangibility of borders, thus challenging the inherited character of colonization.

The third sequence came with the independence of African nations, when, as a direct product of the divisions created by those at the Congress of Berlin, cross-border territorial claims inevitably generated conflict. The principle of respecting national borders was fragile due to the artificial character of these borders, which rarely reflected the preexisting social and cultural structures established by locals. Often, members of the same family would in fact find themselves divided between two countries because of this colonial residue. Furthermore, the East-West Cold War antagonism of the period often aggravated these conflicts. Some of these confrontations were thus rather "inter-official wars by procurement," molded through the balancing mechanisms of power and wholly controlled by the instigating powers.

The fourth sequence saw conflicts of the internal type: tribal wars, armed struggles for control of wealth and access to or maintenance of capacity. The recurrence of "conflicts surrounding the ballot box" illustrated the weakness of democracy in Africa. With independence, the colonial states yielded to numerous, hermetically-sealed single parties. Those bold enough to engage in political opposition were faced with only two possibilities: exile or the creation of armed movements. This "democratic vacuum" was characterized by remarkable features: the smothering of public freedom, farcical electoral exercises, and electoral fraud. As a result, African leaders faced a host of external pressures--the growing international perception that Africans were dependent on government aid or the strongly diplomatic messages from global figures like French President Francois Mitterand, for instance-- that highlighted and attempted to combat the vice of the single party system. A period of "national conferences" then appeared as a prelude to, and progressive phasing-in of, the multi-party system in the eighties.

Today, it is impossible to deny my particular interest in the consolidation of peace and creation of lasting development in Africa. The Senegalese experience shows that in Africa, it is wholly possible to politically succeed and achieve one's goals with the ballot box and not with weapons--provided that both sides show a high degree of restraint and leadership. The Senegalese election and subsequent development efforts give hope to the idea that a framework of democratic accountability can bring about a stronger, more successful Africa. Indeed, the objectives of peace and lasting development cannot be attained without well-rooted institutions of democracy.

Peace in African countries

Contrary to widely-held notions that have intensified through unfair publicization, the cause of African peace has greatly advanced these last years. This is the case in Sierre Leone, which has just organized free and transparent presidential elections. This is also the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in spite of some quarrels, which, in my opinion, will not go much further. In the Ivory Coast, the process of peace has been well underway since the Agreement of Ouagadougou of March 4, 2007 that was concluded under the aegis of President Blaise Compaore, President-en-exercice of the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO).

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Similarly, the case of the Ivory Coast is an example of the peaceful arbitration of disagreements by Africans themselves. Let us not forget that after the outburst of conflict in September 2002, it was Senegal, via its Foreign Minister, whom I had dispatched on the spot in my capacity as President-in-Office of the CEDEAO, who negotiated and obtained the first Cease Fire agreement, which held open the prospect for a peaceful solution. Furthermore, Madagascar might have sunk into civil war after the presidential elections of December 2001 had there not been our mediation, which lead to the Agreement of Peace of Dakar of April 18,2002 between Sirs Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana. Finally, and especially, there is the example of Liberia. After several years of bloody conflict, this country not only found peace, but also elected Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, the first female president in Africa. Africa contains more than fifty countries yet, on the whole, only Somalia, the Comoros and Sudan continue today to house sustained tension.

Senegal elections

The Senegalese experience is illustrative of Africa's trend toward peaceful democracy. When, in 1974, I created the first party of legal political opposition in Africa, the Senegalese Democratic Party, I found myself without any allies on a continent dominated by single-party rule. In her doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne in 1975, Christine Dessouches offered extremely interesting background information on this subject: according to her research, President Leopold Sedar Senghor had been determined to recognize my party, because he himself was at the same time an intellectual and a politician accustomed to the democratic system. He had already been, before the independence of Senegal, an elected deputy in the French National Assembly. President Senghor's trust in me therefore stemmed from a certain intellectual complicity that he knew bound us. He understood that 1 was not one to encourage outright warfare since I had managed to channel the passion of my most radical militants into nonviolent activity. I can say that in a certain manner, there was between Senghor and myself a kind of division of labor in the management of the Senegalese democracy: he managed the capacity and I managed popular discontent. Moreover, Senghor regularly received me as an opponent, somewhat like the Canadian model. My party brought forth creative contradictions by animating the political debate, the verbal questions, and requests for the establishment of parliamentary boards of inquiry, which were regularly rejected.

The major deviation, however, that Senghor made from the rules of democracy lay in Article 35 of the Senegalese constitution, from which he departed in the arrangement of his succession. His hand-picked successor, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, therefore ascended to power without the obstacle of electoral competition. But since I always said that I would never "walk on corpses" to get to the Presidential Palace, it was necessary to test the electoral system again and to spend two decades in opposition to President Diouf, as well as a few years of participation in the government, before finally arriving at the first democratic "alternation" in Senegal in March 2000. Throughout that period of time, I was sent to prison several times. But defending my democratic convictions was worth the price of freedom. Through such experiences, I have clung to the conviction that it is necessary to know how to forgive and to refuse the temptation of conducting witch hunts.

I recognize that in March 2000, President Abdou Diouf surprised his supporters by calling me before the formal publication of the results in order to recognize my victory and to cut short any uprising. The people had clearly decided for political change in Senegal. Dioufs gesture, it should be acknowledged, was a choice that reflected our democratic instincts.

These experiences in the Senegalese election have been useful to me in my efforts to mediate elsewhere in Africa--Gabon, Togo, former Zaire, the Comoros, Madagascar, Ivory Coast, and Sudan in particular. The success of a mediation attempt depends greatly on the confidence that the protagonists have in the mediator. Indeed, I have always benefited from the confidence of the Heads of State for whom I intervened, even before my election as president. I believe that such faith has been established in part because of the recognition that the Senegalese opposition model I led was far less evil than other African opposition efforts. The opponents in nations where I mediated conflicts were also apt to listen to me because they naturally regarded me as one of their own: as a fellow opposition leader, I could sympathize with and relate to these would-be leaders.

Development efforts in Senegal