US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Baghdad on Jan. 15
and praised its MPs for passing on Jan. 12 the first of laws meant to
reconcile warring Iraqis, saying progress was remarkable, although more
was needed. Rice, travelling with President Bush on his Jan. 9-16 Middle
East tour, gave one of the most upbeat assessments yet by a senior US
official of political progress in Iraq during a surprise visit to meet
Iraqi leaders.
The measure reversed a de-Ba'thification law, allowing
non-criminal members of the formerly ruling Ba'th Party to join the
state and armed forces. She said there was a "spirit of
co-operation" among Iraq's ethnic and religious groups, who
had often frustrated the US with their failure to agree on basic issues
(see rim1-IraqSunniLoyaltyJan14-06).
Al-Qaeda In Turkey: Al-Qaeda has been active in Turkey and is a
potentially serious threat to its state. Its cells have penetrated the
Kurds and other segments of Turkish society which are opposed to
Kemalism, the secular ideology of Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern
Turkey whose legacy is jealously preserved by the state's military
but still not eagerly tolerated by an AKP government dominated by
Islamists.
Below are extracts from an article on the subject published on Jan.
17 by The Jamestown Foundation (with underlining and bracketed
explanations by APS): "While the Turkish government would describe
itself as a full participant in the 'war on terror', there is
a tendency by the public to view this conflict primarily as a struggle
against Kurdish militants, and only to a lesser extent against al-Qaeda.
Nonetheless, two recent events have linked Turkey and al-Qaeda.
"First...Israeli intelligence recently warned of a possible
terrorist strike by al-Qaeda operatives against Israeli institutions in
Turkey. Second, in the central Anatolian city of Aksaray, Turkish
authorities took 19 people into custody that were suspected of links
with al-Qaeda; five members of this group were later arrested. It is not
yet clear whether the Israeli intelligence reports were accurate, though
it is known that al-Qaeda has previously planned attacks against Israeli
targets in Turkey.
"Al-Qaeda operatives who carried out simultaneous suicide car
bombings against the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel Synagogues in Istanbul
on the morning of November 15, 2003, considered their targets to be
Israeli rather than Turkish, even though the 27 initial victims were
largely Turkish Muslims. At his court hearing, Harun Ilhan - a top
member of a Turkish al-Qaeda cell and the mastermind of the Beth Israel
bombing - described Israel as the state of all Jews, Judaism as
'Zionism under the guise of religion', and clearly stated that
the synagogue bombings were meant as a message to Israel.
"Five days later, on November 20, 2003, the same al-Qaeda cell
detonated two additional trucks at the HSBC Bank headquarters and the
British Consulate in Istanbul.
"Further investigations revealed that Turkish militants in
al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had organized a cell
before...[9/11], that the Istanbul bombings were ordered...by... bin
Laden and that preparations for these bombings were carried out under
the guidance of Muhammad Atef - also known as Abu Hafs al-Misri - then
leader of al-Qaeda's military wing. Initially, Atef assigned two
targets for the Turkish militants: the Incirlik Air Base in Adana (used
by the US) and an Israeli tourist ship traveling to the southern port of
Antalya. The militants decided that it was impossible to stage an
assault on Incirlik, and postponed an attack on the Israeli cruise ship
due to a lack of intelligence.
"Two years after the...bombings, Louai Muhammad Hajj Bakr
al-Saqa - an al-Qaeda operative of Syrian origin - was arrested after a
failed plot to attack an Israeli cruise ship near Antalya. The court
accused al-Saqa of preparing for the operation by purchasing a 6,000
euro (US$8,899) yacht called Tufan that was to be filled with
explosives, making a $60,000 down payment on a villa in Antalya's
Beldibi district worth $350,000 and obtaining a diver's submersible
sea-scooter. The plot was foiled when al-Saqa and a Syrian accomplice
were arrested after a bomb accidentally exploded in an Antalya safe
house they were working in.
"When it became obvious that al-Saqa - who could easily pass
as Turkish due to his fluency in the language - played a key role in
al-Qaeda's operations in Iraq, many began to think that the
terrorist organization had set a goal to hit Israeli targets in Turkey.
According to Yedioth Ahronoth, al-Qaeda is likely to have infiltrated
Turkey with some of its operatives for this attack...[T]he 2003 Istanbul
bombings demonstrate that the [Neo-Salafi] network has the capacity to
recruit militants within Turkey, primarily due to the growth of radical
Islam there since the 1980s.
"Over the years, many Turkish youth (indoctrinated by Wahhabi
shaikhs) have volunteered to fight with Islamist groups in areas such as
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Ogaden; in so doing, some
have developed a close relationship with al-Qaeda.
"...Newspapers often report stories of Turkish nationals who
die in suicide attacks...[in Iraq]... Habib Akdas - ...[head] of the
Istanbul bombings - was reportedly killed in a US bombardment of
al-Anbar province in September 2004. Similarly, it is claimed that
Gurcan Bac, another leading member of al-Qaeda, died in a clash in
Fallujah in 2005.
"Lastly, a US Army spokesperson announced the deaths of Mehmet
Yulmaz and Mehmet Resit Isik in Iraq's Hawiya region in June 2007.
The spokesperson stated that these individuals helped foreign activists
enter Iraq through Turkey. Yulmaz, also known as 'Halid
al-Turki', was a top leader of the organization while Isik was his
deputy. Another report revealed that two Turkish al-Qaeda militants,
Sadettin Akdas - the brother of Habib Akdas, who is suspected of
plotting the Istanbul bombings - and Burhan Kus, escaped from the Abu
Ghraib prison in April 2007. In the wake of the Istanbul bombings,
groups linked to or inspired by al-Qaeda have been the target of greater
scrutiny by intelligence organizations...
"...[On March 9, 2004, two Islamist youths - Nihat Dogruel and
Engin Vural - independently sought to bomb 40 Masons congregating in the
Masonic Lodge in Istanbul's Kartal district; Masons are considered
to be pro-Zionist by many Turkish Islamists. Security prevented the two
from deploying the bomb properly and, as a result, only Dogruel and a
waiter were killed, while Vural was wounded and arrested....
"Far from being professional militants, Turks influenced by
al-Qaeda are generally ordinary citizens. One of the suspects arrested
in Aksaray was a high school English teacher, and the other four were
also employed and socially integrated individuals. It might also be
worth noting that one of these bombers - Ilyas Kuncak - had
grandchildren.
"Al-Qaeda-style militancy in Turkey continues to attract
individuals outside the usual profile of young, single,
unemployed/underemployed youths".
The article added: "Turkey has witnessed attacks by a variety
of terrorist organizations for many years. Its intelligence services and
security forces are therefore well-equipped and well-experienced in
counter-terrorism. Yet for several reasons, Turkey is ill-prepared for a
potential fight against al-Qaeda.
"Turkish counter-terrorism is overwhelmingly focused on the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This organization has carried out
armed offensives against Turkish authorities since August 1984, and
revoked its latest ceasefire in 2004. Over the past six months the
overwhelming majority of Turkey's security resources have been
poured into efforts to liquidate the PKK.
"Turkish public opinion remains unconvinced of the threat
posed by al-Qaeda. Some believe that this organization does not exist,
having been fabricated for manipulative purposes by countries such as
the United States and Israel. Others accept that al-Qaeda is real,
though do not view it as an organization countering US and Israeli
hegemony, but rather as a tool used by these countries to colonize the
Middle East. With Turkish-US relations strained as never before, a
larger number of Turks are inclined to sympathize - or at least
empathize - with al-Qaeda's stated goal of combating US policies.
"Turks do not see themselves as the primary target of
al-Qaeda. The Turkish public did not react to the 2003 Istanbul bombings
in the way the general public in Madrid and London did to the terrorist
attacks that they sustained. Many believe that it is impossible for
al-Qaeda to target Turkey, especially as the country is run by a party
with Islamist roots.
"Others subscribe to the theory that al-Qaeda did not, in
fact, target Turkey in November 2003. According to this view, the
intended victims of the synagogue bombings were Jews, and therefore a
'concern' of Israel, even though the victims were Turkish
rather than Israeli citizens. Similarly, attacks against the British
Consulate and HSBC Bank have been dismissed as attacks upon Britain,
though again, most of those killed were actually Turks.
"The enforced exclusion of Islamic movements from the
political process in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes across the
Middle East makes al-Qaeda's job easier, while Turkey has managed
to integrate Islamic movements into its political structure.
"The fact that the Islam-based Justice and Development Party
(AKP) came to power [in early November 2002] through legitimate
elections and has been able to remain in power is testament to this
fact.
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