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Weekly UpdatesIntroduction
Administrators International (SRA) celebrates its 40th anniversary. Originally founded as a North American organization, with four sections in the United States and one in Canada, SRA has grown into a truly international society. To reflect its growing global membership, SRA added the term "International" to its name in 2000. Members today come from nearly every part of the world (Table 1). As SRA has increased its international membership and diversity of research management interests, it has remained dedicated to its mission of training and career development for research managers and administrators through formal educational offerings, exchange of best practices and continual networking among members
The face of research, too, has changed over the years. Seldom is research confined to a single team working at one laboratory, As research has become more complex, sub-specialties have developed in scientific disciplines, and special expertise in using complex research procedures and instrumentation is critically important. Not every institution can afford the increasing cost of highly sophisticated instrumentation, such as nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy (which can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars, even before maintenance and personnel costs), and funding sources are not able to pay such costs. This has led to the growth of multidisciplinary, collaborative research that is no longer confined to a single laboratory or nation, but involves multiple institutions internationally.
As the complexity and globalization of research have grown, regulations governing research also have become more complex. Institutions in the United States and elsewhere have learned to deal with the regulatory and policy differences attendant with the globalization of research. To meet the needs of universities and other organizations engaged in research, SRA has provided training and professional development opportunities to improve the research management infrastructure of institutions throughout the world.
It has been said that the path to economic and human development in a global knowledge economy is through increased education. Organizations such as the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), the Carnegie Corporation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation support efforts to increase the capacity for higher education and research in Africa, states of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere. These groups support the research efforts, complex equipment, and the development of research management infrastructure at universities and other organizations needed for international collaborations. Other U.S.-based foundations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation, have invested heavily in developing local solutions to local and global problems through research.
Despite the continued efforts of these groups and others to support research organizations and researchers, United States Export Control Regulations can be a barrier to collaborations between scientists in the U.S. and around the world. Understanding these restrictions is critical if we are to engage in global research.
This article describes United States Export Control Regulations and the needs of international researchers for access to training, the latest technologies, and the infrastructure support of their home institutions. Examples of the needs of universities in Africa, Russia, and states of the former Soviet Union are presented. An appropriate balance must exist among the U.S. need for national security, support for educational advances in other countries, and advances in research that can only be achieved through international collaborations.
An Overview of Export Control Laws and Regulations
Current U.S. export laws control dissemination of a wide range of technologies in a way that may have an adverse impact on research and the ability of international researchers to perform competitively. U.S. laws and regulations control the conditions under which certain information, technologies, and commodities can be transmitted overseas to anyone, including U.S. citizens working overseas, or to a foreign national, even if he or she is working in the U.S.
Export Administration Regulations
The responsibility of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the Department of Commerce is to apply and enforce the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which implement the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Export Administration Regulations Database). The EAR is responsible for regulating the export and re-export of many commercial items, including those often referred to as "dual-use." Dualuse items have both military and commercial applications. Some examples of these items are software, chemicals, and technologies such as aircraft power transmission systems. A list of these items can be found on the BIS webpage (Export Administration Regulations Database).
A small percentage of U.S. exports and re-exports that the EAR regulates require a license from BIS. There are 10 specific categories that require a license: nuclear materials; chemicals, microorganisms, toxins; materials processing; electronics; computers; telecommunications; lasers and sensors; avionics; marine: propulsion systems. The requirements for a license depend on, among other things, what item is being exported, where it is going, who is going to receive it, and how will it be used.
International Traffic of Arms Regulations
The mission of the International Traffic of Arms Regulations, or ITAR, is the control of arms sales to foreign parties to protect U.S. national security and to further U.S. foreign policies (22CFR120--130). The regulations of defense items are overseen by the U.S. Department of State. ITAR is responsible for regulating export and import of defense items that the United States Munitions List (USML) covers, or items that are inherently military in nature (designed to kill/defend against death in a military situation). ITAR also serves as a judge for license applications for exports, dealing with matters related to defense trade compliance and enforcement, and making reports on defense trade available to Congress and the public.
ITAR has 21 categories that require a license, including weapons, chemical and biological agents, vehicles, missiles, equipment, and all satellites. Among the problems ITAR can create for research organizations includes the expansion of its jurisdiction to research satellites, related technology and data. Universities that had been developing their own research satellite capabilities now must deal with an export regime applied to spy satellites and military rocketry.
A second issue for research organizations is the increasing application of ITAR to the life sciences. For instance, after 9/11 applications of export control regulations to research quantities of bacterial specimens were considerably stricter due to heightened national security.
Office of Foreign Assets Control
The Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, is part of the Department of Treasury. OFAC is responsible for administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions. These sanctions are governed by U.S. foreign policy and national security goals in defense against terrorists, drug traffickers, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. OFAC has the authority to impose controls on transactions and to freeze foreign assets; these controls can be either comprehensive or selective.
OFAC regulations often provide general licenses authorizing the performance of certain categories of transactions (Foreign Assets Control Regulations). OFAC also issues specific licenses on a case-by-case basis under certain limited conditions. OFAC oversees limited transactions referred to as "prohibited transactions," which are trade, financial and other dealings in which U.S. persons may not engage unless authorized by OFAC or expressly exempted by statute. However, each program is based on different foreign policy and national security goals, so the prohibitions may differ between various programs. Generally, a license may be required any time a research collaboration involves a person with citizenship in, or institution located in, one of several countries (e.g., various countries in the Balkans, Belarus, Burma, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Liberia, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe), and there are contractual or financial dealings.
The National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information--NSDD 189
The National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information, or the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, holds that the products of fundamental research are to continue to be unrestricted. This policy, created under the Reagan administration in 1981, defines fundamental research as: "the basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons."
The NSDD 189 provides that:
This clause from the NSDD 189 is important because it maintains that fundamental research that has not been classified as important to national security must remain free and unrestricted. If the national security interest is important enough to trump the need for open transfer of information in support of research, the Directive requires that the information be protected under the National Security Classification system.
Federal Research Exclusion
FEED