[Received January 2006; accepted March 2007.]
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(1) We assume that the firm is not liable for social damage from
inadequate precautionary effort since food poisonings are difficult to
trace back to their source. This assumption clearly involves no loss of
generality.
(2) We tested the reasonableness of this assumption by estimating
lognormal mixed continuous/censored data model with and without random
effects. Although a Weibull-accelerated life model fits the data best, a
lognormal model provides an acceptable approximation to our data. The
correlation between any two observations contributed by the same plant
was very small (about 0.0477). The regression coefficients were
virtually unchanged when we restricted the correlation coefficient to be
zero.
(3) This approach effectively augments the dataset with one
additional observation--the censored time between the most recent
inspection and December 31, 2001--for each plant.
(4) Although the inspection outcome sample is a mix of
cross-sectional and panel data (for plants that were inspected only
once, and more than once, respectively), we treat all observations
contributed by plants with more than one inspection as independent from
one another. This is reasonable for three reasons. First, single
inspections account for the majority of all inspections (58%). Second,
we are interested in marginal models that predict the expected value of
a certain outcome as a function of regressors (Diggle, Liang, and Zeger
1994, p. 146 and following), and in this context ignoring the potential
correlation between observations contributed by the same plant does not
bias the estimated coefficients--if anything, it results in a loss of
efficiency (Fahrmeir and Tutz 1994). Third, since the correlation among
observations is not of interest to us, we follow Fahrmeir and Tutz
(1994, p. 113) in assuming independence.
(5) The statistical properties reported in footnote 4 extend to
vectors of binary outcomes (Carey, Zeger, and Diggle 1993), suggesting
that treating the various compliance outcomes as independent will not
bias the estimated coefficients, and at worst results in a loss of
efficiency. All of our models explicitly correct for heteroskedasticity.
(6) Using a Weibull distribution, we estimate mean duration between
visits to be 723 days (s.e. around the mean 5.65 days), and median
duration to be 633 days (s.e. around the median 5.41 days).
(7) Such a result is entirely consistent with the predictions of
the theoretical framework in the section "A Model of HACCP
Enforcement and Compliance."
(8) It is likely, for example, that plants with larger sales volume
adhere to stricter sanitation standards in their processing operations
because of economies of scale in sanitation equipment and technical
expertise (e.g., specialized staff to oversee food safety) or because
their products are more likely to be traceable in the marketing chain in
the event of a foodborne illness outbreak (see Antle 2000).
(9) The coefficients on the dummies for plant size are, however,
broadly consistent with the raw violation rates, which exhibit a roughly
quadratic relationship with class size. The violation rates are lowest
for SALES2 and SALES8 plants, and peak at about 50% for SALES6 plants.
Anna Alberini is associate professor and Erik Lichtenberg
professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University
of Maryland, College Park. Dominic Mancini is economist, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C. Gregmar Galinato is assistant professor, School of
Economic Sciences, Washington State University, Pullman.
This research was funded in part by a grant from the University of
Maryland/FDA Joint Institute for Food Safety and Nutrition. All views
expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily
represent those of the Office of Management and Budget, the Executive
Office of the President, or the University of Maryland/FDA Joint
Institute for Food Safety and Nutrition.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Inspection Data
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Compliance status at
current inspection (N = 7,086)
HACCP violation 0.4583 0.4983
Any sanitation violation 0.6169 0.4861
Observed sanitation deficiency 0.4274 0.4947
Sanitation records not
reflecting actual conditions 0.1580 0.3648
Inadequate or no monitoring records 0.4745 0.4994
Compliance status at the previous
inspection (n = 3,011)
HACCP violation in previous inspection 0.4749 0.4994
No HACCP plan when needed
in previous inspection 0.1438 0.3509
Observed sanitation
deficiency in previous inspection 0.4616 0.4986
Sanitation records not reflecting
actual conditions in
previous inspection 0.1776 0.3823
Inadequate or no monitoring
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