But Congress significantly reformed and expanded the TAA program
under the Trade Reform Act of 2002, and the current Trade Adjustment
Assistance Act (TAA Act) (85) generally mandates that workers involved
in the "production of an article" are entitled to receive an
array of benefits through their state unemployment (re-employment)
agency if DOL determines that they that are eligible to apply for TAA
benefits. (86) These benefits are designed to help workers adjust to job
loss caused by expanded free trade and to transition to new employment
and provide:
* up to 130 weeks of training, including 104 weeks of vocational
training, and 26 weeks of remedial training (e.g., English as a second
language or literacy) (87)
* up to 104 weeks of extended income support--beyond the state
unemployment (re-employment) insurance benefits under state law
(typically 26 weeks)--while in training, unless the training condition
is waived (88)
* up to $1,250 to conduct a job search, and up to $1,250, plus up
to 90% reimbursement of certain relocation expenses, to relocate for a
job in a different geography (89)
* wage supplements of $10,000 for two years for workers over age 50
who lack easily transferable skills and are re-employed within 26 weeks
(90)
* a tax credit worth 65% of the health care premiums paid by
certain workers over age 50 for up to two years (91)
Thus, the promise of TAA has been a regular and, sometimes, crucial
aspect of the political bargain struck on behalf of U.S. production
workers with proponents of U.S. trade liberalization. How well the
Agency fulfills its administrative role in certifying workers'
eligibility to apply for TAA benefits determines, in part, whether
workers hurt by expanded free trade are adequately compensated for their
losses. (92) Moreover, inadequate coverage and poor administrative
performance by the Agency could increase worker resistance to expanded
free trade. (93)
3. The Next Bargain for Fast Track Authority
The political machinery for the next bargain between opponents and
proponents of expanded free trade has been activated, and the TAA
program again appears to be the likely quid pro quo for renewal of fast
track (trade promotion) authority. On Thursday, October 26, 2006, the
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) reported on the dim prospects for
further U.S. trade liberalization, stating that "[i]t is highly
unlikely that Congress will vote to approve legislation to renew the
president's authority to negotiate trade agreements when it expires
next year, particularly if the Democrats take control of the
House...." (94)
The BNA also reported, that same day, that DOL would be proposing
regulations "dealing with certification questions arising under
[the trade adjustment assistance program] at a later date." (95) On
January 4, 2007, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, Senator Max Baucus
(D-Mont.) introduced a bill (S. 122) (96)--co-sponsored by Senators Norm
Coleman (R-Minn.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), and Ken Salazar
(D-Colo.)--to "reauthorize the federal government's trade
adjustment assistance program until 2012 and expand its coverage to
include workers in service jobs." (97) And, in a speech on January
31, 2007, President George W. Bush "called on Congress to renew his
authority to negotiate trade agreements" and said that he would
"work with Congress to reauthorize and to improve the Trade
Adjustment Assistance [sic] this year." (98)
The fast track authority (TPA) granted to President George W. Bush
expired on June 30, 2007, (99) before successful completion of the WTO
Doha Round and without the creation of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas. (100) So, before free trade can be further expanded, a new
grant of fast track authority must be made to the Executive branch. But
the political price for the grant of fast track authority from a
Democratically-controlled Congress to an unpopular, lame duck Republican
President is likely to be high. Considering the alternatives, proponents
of free trade should seek to improve the TAA program so that it
functions more effectively as the principal mechanism for assisting
workers hurt by expanded free trade and more adequately compensates
workers for their losses. At the very least, the administrative defects
in DOL's certification process should be fixed. And, if Congress
once again chooses to use the TAA program as the quid pro quo for
renewal of fast track authority, it should consider amending the TAA Act
to reduce worker resistance to further U.S. trade liberalization. (101)
III. THE DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATION PROCESS AND UNSUITABLE SCHEME FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW
For workers, TAA is a phantom entitlement unless DOL certifies that
they are eligible to apply for it. (102) Under the TAA Act, a group of
workers, or their employer or duly authorized representative, may
petition the Agency, or their state unemployment office, for
certification of eligibility to apply for TAA benefits. (103) By
statute, DOL is supposed to "determine whether the petitioning
group meets the [eligibility] requirements of section [2272]" of
the TAA Act within forty days after the petition is filed. (104) Once
certified, an eligible worker may then apply for and receive TAA
benefits from his or her state unemployment (reemployment) office--if he
or she was certified and applies within two years of the date of his or
her layoff--provided the worker: had sufficient (minimal) earnings from
employment for at least 26 weeks of the 52 weeks before the layoff; was
entitled to state unemployment insurance and was not otherwise
disqualified for extended unemployment compensation; and was enrolled in
an approved training program unless the training requirement is waived
by DOL. (105) The petition form itself, however, typically does not
provide DOL with substantial enough evidence to make an eligibility
determination. (106) And, as demonstrated below, DOL frequently uses
requests for voluntary remand to comply with the forty-day statutory
period to investigate workers' eligibility, without actually
gathering any additional determinative evidence. (107)
DOL's investigative shortcomings, though, are not related to
its existing written guidelines for investigating TAA petitions. (108)
Actually, the Agency's written guidelines for conducting TAA
investigations seem to guarantee workers procedural due process. (109)
In subpart B of the guidelines, the Agency appropriately articulates the
kind of investigation required:
The investigation may include one or more field visits to confirm
information furnished by the petitioner(s) and to elicit other
relevant information. In the course of the investigation,
representatives of the Department shall be authorized to contact
and meet with responsible officials of firms, union officials,
employees, and any other persons, or organizations, both private
and public, as may be necessary to marshal all relevant facts to
make a determination on the petition. (110)
The Agency has also properly equipped itself in subpart B with all
of the necessary administrative apparatus for conducting a thorough
fact-finding investigation, including providing for a public
hearing--replete with testimony, evidence, briefs, oral argument,
authentication, transcripts, and appearances--and subpoena power. (111)
And, again in subpart B, DOL correctly sets forth the required contents
of the Agency record upon which it is obligated to make an eligibility
determination, based on these findings of fact:
(1) A significant number or proportion of the workers in such
workers' firm (or appropriate subdivision of the firm) have become,
or are threatened to become, totally or partially separated;
(2) Sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision have
decreased absolutely; and
(3) Increases (absolute or relative) of imports of articles like or
directly competitive with articles produced by such workers' firm
or an appropriate subdivision thereof contributed importantly to such
total or partial separation, or threat thereof, and to such decline in
sales or production.... (112)
The TAA Act mandates the Agency certify workers' eligibility,
but, of course, not all workers are eligible. (113) DOL must certify a
group of primary production workers' eligibility in both of the
following job loss situations, if it determines that the workers'
layoff or threat of layoff was due to:
* increased imports like or directly competitive with articles
produced by the workers' firm or subdivision, that
"contributed importantly" to an absolute decrease in sales or
production and to the workers' layoff or threat of layoff; or
* a shift in production of articles like or directly competitive
with articles produced by the workers' firm or subdivision, to a
foreign country, if that country is (1) a party to a free trade
agreement with the U.S., or (2) a beneficiary country under the Andean
Trade Preference Act, African Growth and Opportunity Act, or the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, or if there has been or is likely
to be an increase in imports of articles like or directly competitive
with articles produced by the workers' firm. (114)
DOL must also certify a group of secondary production workers'
eligibility to apply for TAA benefits in two other job loss situations,
if it determines that:
* a significant number or proportion of workers have been laid-off
or are threatened to be laid-off from an upstream "supplier"
of a related article, if that supplier supplied component parts--that
accounted for at least 20% of its production or sales--to a firm that
employed a group of primary workers certified to apply for TAA benefits;
or
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