Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Republican secretary of state, in
February told Der Spiegel: "A rapid [US] withdrawal [from Iraq]
would be a demonstration in the region of the impotence of Western
power. Hamas, Hizbullah and al-Qaeda would achieve a more dominant role
and the ability of Western nations to shape events would be sharply
reduced". But Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at
King's College in London, says as long as more than 100,000 troops
remain in Iraq, the US military will remain stretched, adding: "In
the short term, there is not a lot of spare capacity".
Bush administration officials disagree. The FT on March 19 quoted a
top Bush official as saying: "We are confident that we have the
forces to deal with whatever threats on a global basis may or are likely
to arise; we are capable of dealing with Iraq and with the global
situation as it presents [itself]".
Yet Sir Lawrence says the US has also ceded influence in places
where military power would not be contemplated, adding: "I think
they have lost a lot of ground in other parts of the world, certainly in
Asia and in Latin America, both of which are as important if not more so
than the Middle East". He says Washington's focus on Iraq has
allowed others, including China, Russia and Iran, America's main
strategic adversary in the region, to step into the vacuum - although
Russia would have been more assertive and China more influential anyway,
even without the Iraq war.
In a 2007 assessment, the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that "the restoration of
American strategic authority" lost in the Iraq war and its
aftermath would take "much longer than the mere installation of a
new [US] president". Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state
under Bill Clinton, says: "The global consequences [of the war]
certainly include a significant diminution of the trust and confidence
and support for US foreign policy around the world and that, I think, is
going to take quite some time to repair".
Talbott argues that earlier US presidents had, like Bush, used
unilateral American power in dealing with foreign policy challenges but
had been "more prudent" in doing so, and had
"leveraged" that power by working more extensively with
international institutions and generating goodwill for the US. He adds:
"And this administration failed to do that big time".
The financial burden of the Iraq war will also constrain foreign
policy. Talbott says: "There has always been a correlation between
the strength of the American economy and the strength of the US, and
that strength has diminished". The war has worsened US relations
with Turkey, so far failed to "remake" the Middle East in the
positive way some proponents imagined, and contributed to higher world
oil prices.
What About Iraq? In 2003, then US Deputy US Defence Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz outlined three reasons for the invasion: "One is weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), the second is support for terrorism, the
third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people".
US forces found Iraq possessed no WMD, apart from a few containers
of chemical agent - though US officials still argue that Saddam had the
capacity to develop such weapons and would have done so, given the
chance. On terrorism, an unclassified summary of a recent study of
classified Iraqi documents by the US Institute for Defence Analyses
"found no 'smoking gun' (direct link)
between...[Saddam's] Iraq and al-Qaeda", saying: the
"regime's use of terrorism was standard practice", but
that Iraqi citizens were its chief target. And while Saddam is no longer
around to repress his people, the invasion and its aftermath have
extracted a heavy human cost. The violence which followed has taken, by
conservative estimates, over 100,000 lives.
The FT on March 19 quoted a senior US official as saying: "The
cost has been very high, has been high to Iraqis above all, has been
high to US and coalition forces...but we believe that the cost of not
taking this step had been and would continue to be very high as well.
The country is on the path to greater stability, greater security, and
ultimately [to becoming] an Iraq that does not pose a threat to its
neighbours".
This is an assessment which meets less than universal agreement.
Talbott says Iraq has "gone from being a unitary state, a grotesque
and brutal dictatorship, to teetering on the brink of being a failed
state...or a power vacuum masquerading as a state or a cluster of
would-be states".
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