Crystal unclear: the challenges of water politics in the Middle East.

by Park, Gloria

Harvard International Review • Wntr, 2008 • WORLD IN REVIEW

Iraq's economy, also dependent on oil, had been declining even before the war. Its oil production continually decreased since 1999, falling from approximately three million barrels per day in 1999 to two million barrels per day in 2002. Living conditions in Iraq during this period has been said to be similar to those in the poorest African countries. Economic conditions for Iraqis saw no improvement after the US invasion. At the end of 2004, unemployment rose to a rate of 60 to 70 percent, while some 6.5 million citizens remain dependent on food rations for survival. According to Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, a Norwegian research group, malnutrition in children between the ages of six months and five years actually increased after 2003. These persistent economic problems are prioritized over the issue of developing long-term solutions to water distribution.

The economic problems of these two lower riparian states create an inequality between their economies and that of Turkey. Although Turkey has battled inflation for almost two decades now, it has still been able to implement projects that maximize production of its water resources. GAP has already brought about positive changes in southeastern Turkey by providing citizens with jobs, electricity, food, recreation, and infrastructure. Despite its domestic benefits, Syria and Iraq fear that the project will be a footstep toward even greater disparity between the Tigris-Euphrates riparian countries.

The vast differences between the economies of Israel and Jordan further reveal the difficulties in sustaining successful cooperation between two water-needing countries. Neighboring Arab countries refer to Jordan as their "poor cousin." Beginning in the 1980s, Jordan faced a harsh economic reality of deflation, external debts, and other economic problems arising from its lack of natural resources. Forced to import necessities like fuel and food, the government even pondered proposals to import water in the 1980s. Worsening deflation in 1987 caused a rise in import costs, resulting in an overall fall of average domestic prices. These problems have been somewhat alleviated since the reign of the two King Abdullahs, but they continue to play a defining role in Jordan's economy. In contrast, Israel has a relatively flourishing economy with substantial agricultural products like cereals and fruits, and industrial products like cut diamonds.

In 1994 these two countries established a peace treaty including numerous articles pertaining to water allocation--giving hope to the potential for bilateral agreements on water sharing in general. Even so, arguments still arise frequently. One such argument became the source of the 1997 conflict concerning the treaty's water clauses. The treaty had promised Jordan a total of 200 million cubic meters (MCM) of water from Israel annually, but had failed to specify exactly from where all this water would come, besides the Yarmuk River. Jordan was, therefore, only receiving 150 MCM of its promised water a year. The conflict was finally resolved after Israel promised to immediately send over 25 more MCM of water annually. This incident illustrates the difficulty of creating a working plan for cooperation. Even when countries have the desire and initiative to cooperate, developing a successful solution remains a complicated process.

Inequalities in Military Capacity

The military superiority of Turkey and Israel over their downstream neighbors is the final major component causing imbalance of power. Among the Tigris-Euphrates basin states, Turkey, once again, boasts the strongest military power. In 1998, Turkey had the second largest army in NATO, with advanced hardware from the US and Western Europe. Turkey's military expenditure is also noticeably greater than that of Syria and Iraq. Inequality of military power contributes to the difficulty of cooperation, since it gives the state with military superiority the most influence in a plan for cooperation. In 1974, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq hastily mobilized his army for war against Syria after he saw the flow of the Euphrates decline almost 1,110 cubic yards per second. If a similar event were to occur again, Turkey, with its geographic, economic, and military superiority, would have immense advantage over Syria and Iraq.

A similar phenomenon exists in the Jordan River basin. Israel by far has a larger and stronger army when compared to that of Jordan. Israel's army greatly outnumbers Jordan's because Israel holds both genders liable for military service. Furthermore, although Israel and Jordan spend a comparable percentage of their GDPs on maintaining their military strength, Israel's GDP is almost six times greater than that of Jordan. With these obvious advantages, coupled with the support of the American military, Israel, like Turkey, also enjoys more input regarding matters of water.

As a final note, military imbalances cause fear in the inferior nations, thereby empowering the superior nation even further. Disparities in military capacity can thus hinder peaceful cooperation and can increase the potential for conflict. In a negotiation setting, such differences can easily lead to the inferior country perceiving the superior as a threat to its security. The implications for future agreement, as a result, are less than heartening.

Working through the Differences

All four categories of inequality--geographic location, water resources, economy, and military--render cooperation unlikely by creating an imbalance of power between the superior state and the inferior states. The superior countries controlling the headwaters of the rivers have more access to water, and thus, more options and opportunities for economic development. With all of their obvious advantages over their downstream neighbors, the superior riparian states do not have much incentive to cooperate. Furthermore, the riparian states of both the Tigris-Euphrates and Jordan basins have unpleasant histories of wars and occupations. In the Tigris-Euphrates region, the memories of Ottoman oppression are still fresh in the collective memories of Syrian and Iraqi residents. In the Jordan basin, the Arab countries still hold hostile feelings regarding the disastrous endings of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. When the war ended with the West Bank and Jerusalem under Israeli occupation, the chances for regional cooperation decreased significantly in the Arab countries; they felt that it was impossible to maintain their self-respect while also cooperating with Israel. These unfriendly feelings are still present in the Jordan watershed area, hindering effective cooperation. In both of these regions, historical conflicts make cooperation, an already difficult process, even more so.

Water will always remain an issue in the arid Middle East. Therefore, a plan for cooperation and fair division of the limited supply of water is crucial. It is important to note that the disputing riparian states are members of international organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. As some scholars argue, these organizations can encourage cooperation by pressuring or offering incentives to speed up the much-needed process. One possible approach the international community can take is setting up a nonpartisan regional organization specifically for water politics. As an international entity, it could look beyond the immediate circumstances of individual countries and the inequalities created, and instead dedicate its efforts solely to water-sharing. Arun Elhance, a geopolitical specialist, predicts: "In the end, even the strongest riparian states sharing international basins are compelled to seek some form of cooperation with their weakest neighbors ... because when water is scarce, the costs of non-cooperation are felt on many levels." The only question that remains to be seen is when this end will come.

staff writer

GLORIA PARK