The Conservator: saving states from political bankruptcy.

The last several decades have seen a growing awareness of the phenomenon of failed states and its implications for the international system. In part, failed states are a product of the great proliferation of the nation-state model after 1945, which was punctuated by the founding of the United Nations and the decline of European colonialism. Failed states reveal the weaknesses of the original Westphalian model, but also uncover its strengths. What may be most remarkable is that the nation-state model, born and nurtured in Europe over 300 years ago, has been so successfully adapted to many different societies around the world. As the embodiment of sovereignty, the nation-state model has served as a political framework for cultures as diverse as those of the United States, China, Japan, India, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa--and the list goes on. It also constitutes the basis for the United Nations Charter and a host of multilateral conventions of central importance to the functioning of today's international system.

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Directly put, a nation-state traditionally is required to control its own territory and be capable of meeting its international obligations. Today, those obligations are generally delineated in the United Nations Charter, as well as treaties and conventions to which the state is a signatory. Significantly, since 1945 these conventions and treaties have generally dealt with the matter of human rights and questions involving trade and economic policy that limit the sovereignty of states. In addition, they provide a basis for interventions when a state in the process of failure begins to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

Examples such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Vietnam suggest that size, economic strength, and territorial cohesiveness are not necessarily critical factors in determining whether a nation-state will succeed. Nor is the political system under which the state operates domestically necessarily a factor in determining the country's success under the nation-state model. Authoritarian states can do quite well, as many nineteenth century European states and modern Arab states have proven.

Failed state indices, such as the one published in Foreign Policy may provide a useful relative ranking of states, how they are governed, and the levels of freedom and quality of human rights that their populations enjoy. But few of those states will decline to the point where they become threats to others or liabilities that the international community must nurture for the sake of regional stability.

The failure of a state is often characterized by a breakdown of political, civil, and economic structures. Commercial activity is often diminished to subsistence level, resulting in the spread of poverty, disease, human rights depredation, refugee creation, and foreign intervention that includes the introduction of terrorist elements and armed conflict. As in Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon, and elsewhere, terrorist groups have found failing states to be convenient venues for training and operations. Because of their transnational impact, the consequences of state failure have required a multinational response effort.

Failed State or Work in Progress?

Iraq provides a case study of what qualifies as a failed state. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, the people of Iraq were brutalized by a tyranny that deserved and received worldwide condemnation for its violations of human rights, most notably those of the Kurds, its support of terrorist movements and activities, and its aggressive stance vis-a-vis Iran and Kuwait. Nonetheless, the regime built up a stable physical infrastructure as well as educational and medical delivery systems that were generally regarded as among the best in the Arab world. In addition, women were allowed far more rights than in almost any other Arab state. Under Saddam, Iraq may have been guilty of aggression, and in the case of Kuwait, deserving of military defeat and subsequent sanctions--but it was not a failed state. Everyone knew that Saddam controlled Iraq's government and was responsible for what that government did domestically and internationally. Other states could act, individually or collectively, on the basis of that grim reality.

Today, the situation of Iraq is dramatically different. In many respects Iraq now bears the characteristics of a failed state.

Iraq was invaded, conquered, and occupied in 2003 by the United States, with modest participation by other countries that were designated as the "coalition of the willing." The invasion and occupation was without United Nations Security Council authorization and is widely considered to have been in violation of the UN Charter.

Moreover, Iraq remains occupied, as over 170,000 foreign troops are spread throughout the country in order to stifle internal violence. The foreign troop presence was ex post facto legitimized by a series of Security Council resolutions, the latest of which is Resolution 1723 (2006). The occupation force also includes many thousands of armed contract employees that perform quasi-military functions and operate beyond the reach of the Iraqi criminal justice system.

As a result of US efforts to reestablish Iraqi sovereignty, Iraq now has a democratically elected government, established under a constitution that was approved through popular vote. Thus, to an extent, the Iraqi state has substantial legitimacy. However, that government's writ barely runs beyond Baghdad's heavily protected "Green Zone." What authority the Iraqi government enjoys is largely enabled by the protection afforded by US military forces, over whose operations the government has little control. In addition, Iraq has only a partially trained army and police force, and both are of doubtful competence and loyalty.

The Iraqi government's authority is continually challenged domestically by a variety of armed, competing militia groups, and each is loyal to clerically-based or tribal authority, both Shia and Sunni. They have engaged in active combat amounting to civil war against both the government and rival militias and pursue programs of ethnic cleansing, particularly in Baghdad. Large parts of the country, in the north with the Kurds and in the south and in large parts of Baghdad with the Shia, are governed with little reference to the central government lodged in the Green Zone. It is clear that anti-US insurgency continues to inhibit Iraqi state-building.

In addition, the occupation, civil war, and anarchy resulting from the lack of an operating government controlling the instruments of coercion and power have allowed criminal gangs to flourish. Islamic jihadists, some with foreign participation and association with al Qaeda, to operate in a murderous fashion.

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While the present government of Iraq is largely recognized as sovereign and represents Iraq without objection in the United Nations, it plainly cannot exert authority beyond a limited portion of its territory. While it conducts bilateral relations with its neighbors, it must rely on the United States to combat dissidents throughout much of its territory and protect its frontiers. The irony of the relationship is highlighted by the Iraqi government's professed warm friendship with Tehran, while its relationship with Washington is increasingly hostile. The United States has strongly expressed its conviction that Iran trains and arms opposition militias in Iraq and supplies weapons for use against US forces. At the same time, Iraq's violence, weak government, civil conflict, and potential for partition have burdened its neighbors, provided opportunities for intervention, and raised fears of future armed conflict.

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The consequences for the Iraqi people have been disastrous. The country's infrastructure has been dismembered. Corruption permeates the government, leaving the individual Iraqi with nowhere to turn. The country's health care system is in shambles, with the educational system not far behind. Electric power is available for only a few hours per day. The water is polluted, and water-borne diseases such as cholera are growing threats. Kidnappings, murders, and "cleansings" are a constant menace, as are US military efforts to counter them. The economy barely functions; except for oil in depressingly limited quantities, the country exports little of value. For these reasons, the flow of refugees continues, with over 2.5 million Iraqis having relocated in neighboring countries, and over 2 million internally displaced. These citizens represent much of the country's professional and entrepreneurial talent. Coupled with the 600,000 to 700,000 Iraqis killed, it means that 18 to 20 percent of Iraq's pre-war population has been uprooted or killed--a reality that will critically threaten the country's ability to survive.

By any measure, Iraq today must be considered a failed state that is unique but in many ways comparable to others which have put a great burden on the international community--Cambodia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and the consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.